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The thesis is motivated by a contemporary paradox: beneficiaries’ occupational 
pension contributions, as invested through their pension schemes, form 
significant financial flows. But almost all beneficiaries are disengaged from the 
governance decisions determining these flows. Moreover, if beneficiaries are 
dissatisfied with the performance of their pension scheme, opportunities to exit 
are absent or limited in pensions systems with a (quasi-)mandatory second pillar, 
where the market impulse is stifled. This thesis offers a new perspective on how 
to understand and respond to this paradox. Drawing upon Hirschman’s Exit, Voice 
and Loyalty (1970), I argue that in the face of either absent or limited opportunities 
for exit, governance innovations which enhance beneficiary voice should be 
considered. In particular, voice has the potential to bring benefits to pension 
scheme governance which, given the recent turn to sustainable investing, 
addresses the complexity of governing schemes in the best interests of 
beneficiaries. 
Taking Hirschman’s suggestion of voice as an alternative to exit seriously, I draw 
upon influential democratic (deliberative and participatory democracy) and 
strategic management (stakeholder) perspectives which theorise on engaging 
with publics for decision-making. I distil their normative concerns into an 
integrative conceptual framework, that includes seven qualities of voice: 
(a) inclusive engagement; (b) deliberative communication; (c) informed 
engagement; (d) transparency; (e) influence; (f) articulating value; and (g) 
feasibility.  
The idea of enhanced forms of voice is likely to be challenged as infeasible in 
pension schemes and on matters of sustainable investing. I address this critique 
by presenting a qualitative, interpretative analysis of two governance innovations 
that engage beneficiaries: the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly. Both 
models are integrated into sustainability-focused pension organisations situated 
in mature, multi-pillar pensions systems, where beneficiaries have no or restricted 
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opportunities to exit. The empirical findings explore how the practice of these 
models shape the realisation of the qualities of voice.  
Although I take the normative ambitions of voice seriously, I do not take a 
polemical stance that ignores the structural and contextual challenges to realising 
its promise. Instead, I draw out the locally specific conditions in each case study 
that enhance or encroach upon the realisation of voice. By drawing connections 
with the literature on citizen engagement in public governance, I examine the 
promise and challenge of institutionalised voice for pension schemes. I argue that 
while there are significant and pervasive obstacles, the conditions of pension 
schemes also provide an institutional setting conducive to voice. Moving forward, 
I suggest ways in which voice in pension scheme governance might be further 
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Most people would rather not think about occupational pensions – an unappealing 
cocktail that mixes considerations of our own inevitable ageing along with 
personal finance. It is a tipple which few like to savour. But the retrenchment of 
state pensions and longer life-expectancies have meant that occupational 
pensions, sometimes referred to as second pillar pensions, are becoming 
increasingly important. The UK policy of automatic enrolment, established in 
Pensions Acts from 2007 (Department of Work and Pensions, 2020) exemplifies 
this trend and has resulted in the number of eligible employees with an 
occupational pension increasing from 10.7 million in 2012 to 18.7 million in 2018 
(Department of Work and Pensions, 2020). 
Other than participating as a contributor or recipient, beneficiaries are by and 
large disengaged from their occupational pensions. This disengagement sits oddly 
with the significance of their contributions, as invested by pension schemes. 
Global pension fund assets at the end of 2019 stood, in total, at $39.5 trillion (£30 
trillion), equivalent to a quarter of global bank assets (FSB, 2020). Given the scale 
of these assets, where and how pension schemes invest are consequential for 
firms, for society and for the environment. This is of particular importance to 
beneficiaries who rely on their schemes to provide a pension and ensure a good 
quality of life in old age.  
It is this contrast, a contemporary financial paradox, which forms the kernel of this 
thesis. This observation is not new, but surprisingly few have addressed its 
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implications. Peter Drucker (1993) highlighted nearly thirty years ago how 
beneficiaries were disengaged with their pensions. Since then, occupational 
pensions – from here on I will refer to them simply as ‘pensions’ – have become 
even more important as financial and social institutions.  
The origins of my own interest in pensions lie in headwinds of the financial crisis. 
At this time I was teaching a series of courses on business and society. This 
literature includes those perspectives that see ‘responsible’ or ‘sustainable’ 
business as a transformative model for business-society relations (Carroll, 2016), 
as well as those who believe, from very different vantage points, its aspirations 
are misplaced (Banerjee, 2014; Friedman, 1970). Given this debate, I became very 
interested in the role of those actors with most leverage over corporations, whose 
interests would have most influence: their investors. Pension schemes are an 
increasingly significant investor group, giving rise to ‘pension fund capitalism’ 
(Drucker, 1993). Given this growth, the investment behaviour of pension schemes, 
particularly as ‘sustainable investors’ and as active owners, is consequential for 
corporate behaviour. But also, pension schemes are an institutional bridge, as 
investors, between corporations and the ‘ordinary’ individual, the beneficiary who 
is a member of an occupational pension scheme. It is this understanding of the 
position of pension schemes, as linking institutions which connect corporations to 
individuals, which underpins this thesis.  
At the heart of pension scheme governance are the fiduciary duties, or their 
equivalents, that require schemes to act in the best interests of beneficiaries.  But 
how are these duties expressed in the governance of pension schemes? How and 
for whom are these decisions made? Board members are relied upon to use their 
good judgement. These boards mainly comprise representatives of employers, 
employees and/or unions and sometimes, in the UK, independent board 
professionals (The Pensions Regulator, 2017). Given that elections are widely used 
to select these board participants, some might argue that beneficiary interests are 
well met in these governance arrangements. However, the fiduciary duties 
inevitably create a form of decision making that is isolated from beneficiaries’ 
preferences. For fiduciary duties to be met, it is not necessary for board decision 
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making to be close to or to engage with beneficiaries. It is sufficient for fiduciaries 
to act in the best interests of beneficiaries, based on their own understanding. 
Voice is present here, but in a weak and highly diminished form. Indeed, the 
isolation of board decision making from beneficiaries entrenches a principal-agent 
relationship, along with its associated risks (Clark and Urwin, 2008). 
If a beneficiary is dissatisfied with the decisions her pension scheme makes, that 
fails to act in her best interests, can she choose to leave the scheme and join 
another? In pension systems operating a (quasi-)mandatory second pillar, such as 
the UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Ebbinghaus, 2011), the market impulse 
is largely stifled. While employers can choose pensions providers, the choices 
available to beneficiaries themselves are either highly limited (opting out, at best) 
or absent. In these circumstances, finding a new pension scheme, involves finding 
a new employer first.   
Given this highly undesirable situation, I turn to Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty (1970). Hirschman argued that in the face of declining organisational 
performance, individuals (whether consumers, citizens, members, beneficiaries) 
have three choices: leave the organisation (exit), complain (voice) or remain with 
the hope of improvement (loyalty). The focus of Hirschman’s argument is primarily 
addressing circumstances where exit and voice co-exist, examining the interplay 
between the market and the non-market, and their interaction with the status 
quo, namely loyalty.  
Where exit is an option, he identifies voice as well-suited to specific circumstances, 
for example, in those where goods require large financial outlays and when 
individuals are members of an organisation rather than simply consumers. 
Hirschman states that members are more likely to voice concerns because an 
individual is a member of fewer organisations in comparison with their extensive 
transactions as consumers. He argues this improves the cost-benefit calculation 
for an individual contemplating voice. Additionally, members can be smaller in 
number than consumers in a marketplace, therefore accounting for a larger 
proportion of sales and giving rise to more influence. In this scenario, the cost-
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benefit calculation is again tipped towards voice. I would add that the designation 
of membership in itself is likely to initiate the sentiment of commitment (in 
Hirschman’s terms ‘loyalty’) that can foster voice. There are striking similarities 
between his description of the optimal conditions for voice, and the conditions of 
the pensions industry, whatever the system type.  
Hirschman characterises voice as ‘any attempt at all to change the practices, 
policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organisation to 
which one belongs. Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather 
than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs’. He goes on to discuss the 
types of activities which could count as voice, such as ‘individual or collective 
petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher 
authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through 
various types of actions and protests including those that are mean to mobilize 
public opinion’ (1970: 30). 
While Hirschman examines the interplay between exit, voice and loyalty in various 
scenarios, this thesis is based on a specific set of conditions; in (quasi-)mandatory 
pension systems exit does not effectively exist as an option. Hirschman argues that 
in these circumstances voice is the only available option to express dissatisfaction. 
Following Hirschman, I characterise voice as an attempt to change policies that 
result in dissatisfaction. Unlike Hirschman, I do not focus on the types of activities 
initiated by individuals or publics, such as petitions or wider social movements. 
Instead, the focus of this thesis is on the potential role of institutionalised entities, 
as established by the pension schemes themselves, to engage with and facilitate 
the voice of beneficiaries. The case studies of the Member Council and the 
Delegate Assembly, which I discuss in chapters six and seven, are illustrative of 
governance innovations that have been established by schemes to elicit 
beneficiary voice in pension schemes.  
As Hirschman points out, economists understand a great deal about exit – the 
market mechanism. And, to a limited degree, political scientists also address the 
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potential of exit for realising socially and politically desirable conditions1. In 
contrast, voice is largely considered the domain of political science, and 
specifically addressed in the study of democratic systems and governance.  
In this thesis I take Hirschman’s argument for voice as an alternative to exit 
seriously. To be clear, I do not make the argument that boards are defunct. Rather, 
my argument is that board decision making can be strengthened by governance 
innovations which enhance beneficiary voice. Indeed, forms of voice have been 
widely organised into public governance settings (Smith, 2009), as well as in 
corporate settings (Lee, 2019; Whittington and Yakis-Douglas, 2020) to inform the 
decision making of either elected representatives in the case of the former, or 
senior executives in the case of the latter. In public governance, mini-publics such 
as citizens juries and assemblies are used to inform decision making on complex, 
technical matters. Similarly, stakeholder forums and other consultative models are 
part of the standard tool kit of the strategic management of firms. Despite the 
widespread influence of voice in these other fields, to the best of my knowledge, 
this thesis is the first to examine the effectiveness of institutionalised voice in 
pension schemes. It offers a novel perspective on the place, value, and potential 
of voice in pension scheme governance. By synthesizing the theoretical and 
analytical resources from democratic theories and stakeholder theory, and 
applying my conceptual framework to two case studies of innovation, the thesis 
initiates a wider conversation on the potential of institutionalised beneficiary 
voice in pension schemes. 
The relevance of voice in pension schemes is additionally underscored by a recent 
trend: the turn to sustainable investing. I argue that this adds further complexity 
to governing pension schemes in the ‘best interests’ of beneficiaries. On matters 
where the materiality of sustainability concerns are clear, the course of action is 
straight forward. But sustainability issues should not be over-simplified. In some 
 
1  As an example, see the work of political scientist Mark E. Warren (2011) who discusses exit in 
democratic theory. More recently, Ilya Somin argues that exit mechanisms (‘foot voting’) are able 
to realise similar, if not better, democratic qualities (‘better-informed and more thoughtful 
decision making’) than ballot box voting (Somin, 2020: 39).  
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circumstances there may be a lack of evidence or in others evidence may be 
ambiguous. In other cases, sustainable investing may raise wider questions about 
whether monetary value, as captured by the risk-adjusted return, is the best way 
to define the value of a pension for beneficiaries.  
Hirschman argues that through voice, a consumer is able to improve the policies 
and outcomes of an organisation. In this thesis, I suggest that voice has the 
potential to provide pension schemes with knowledge that will enable them act in 
the best interests of their beneficiaries. 
To understand the promise of voice, I turn to three prominent and influential 
theories that address the benefits of voice for decision making, organisations and 
individuals: stakeholder theory, participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy. Stakeholder theory suggests that closer engagement with 
beneficiaries may reveal their preferences towards sustainability, providing a 
source of knowledge for organisations to draw upon in the creation of value. It 
also argues that stakeholder communication processes are the means through 
which ethical issues can be addressed in strategic decision making. Theorists of 
participatory democracy stress the place of participation on knowledge creation, 
and the beneficial consequences of this knowledge for individuals and society 
more widely. In pension scheme governance, active participation offers the 
possibility of improving beneficiary knowledge not only on pensions or investment 
matters, but also on wider governance matters. The value of participatory 
democracy for understanding pension scheme governance therefore lies in its 
capacity to understand how knowledge imbalances between beneficiaries and 
schemes can be addressed, and the consequences of this, not only for schemes as 
organisations, but for individuals, and wider society. Deliberative democratic 
theories argue that through deliberation, participants become more informed, 
more engaged, and more able to participate on complex issues where preferences 
are undeveloped. It is argued that public deliberation (in contrast to private acts, 
such as voting), encourages participants to consider not just their own but also the 
perspectives of others; not just their individual interests but also wider interests. 
Additional, epistemic advantages are also realised from the deliberative process. 
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Drawing on these three theories, I discuss the potential of voice for pension 
scheme governance and the specific task of sustainable investing.  
Critics may question if forms of voice are feasible in pension schemes, or may 
wonder if the ambitions of stakeholder, participatory and deliberative democratic 
theories can be fully realised in practice. I address this critique by turning to real-
life examples of voice. At the heart of this thesis’ empirical enquiry is the following 
research question: how have pension schemes engaged more closely with pension 
scheme beneficiaries on sustainable investing, and through which models? To 
answer this, the empirical analysis is framed by the following questions: how, and 
to what extent, are the social actors involved sensitive to the qualities in the 
conceptual framework of voice?; in what ways, and to what extent, do these 
models realise the qualities in the conceptual framework of voice?; and finally, 
what are the implications of these findings for the potential of voice in pensions 
governance? 
Two case studies of governance innovations are examined: the Member Council 
(from the Netherlands) and the Delegate Assembly (from Switzerland). Both 
models are situated in sustainability-focused schemes situated in mature, multi-
pillar pensions systems (Ebbinghaus, 2011), where beneficiaries have restricted or 
no opportunities to exit. The value of empirically examining these examples is that 
(quasi-)mandatory settings provide an opportune setting for voice, enabling the 
practice, and value, of voice in sustainability-orientated pension schemes to be 
examined in more detail and its potential explored. 
Although in this thesis I take the normative ambitions of voice seriously, I do not 
take a polemical stance that ignores the structural and contextual challenges to 
realising its promise. In the analysis of the case studies of the Member Council and 
the Delegate Assembly, I draw out the locally specific conditions which enhance 
or encroach upon the realisation of voice, and its qualities. I then elaborate on the 
promise and challenge of voice in further detail, drawing upon not only my own 
empirical case study findings, but also more established experiments with voice in 
public governance. As a result, the comparisons I draw between the case study 
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findings and the broader evidence also reveal the pervasive problems and 
challenges to the realisation of voice. Moving forward, by identifying how other 
models of public engagement have been designed to address these challenges, I 
indicate future opportunities for strengthening and enriching institutional voice in 
pension scheme governance. 
My argument is laid out in the following steps. To begin, in chapter one I present 
a portrait of pension schemes; their historical origins, place in society and their 
function. This is followed by an overview of their governance, as expressed in law 
and in regulations, and in terms of the internal and external actors involved. 
Finally, I examine the insights agency theory brings to understanding pension 
scheme governance. Chapter two introduces sustainability and responsibility, 
initially as concepts that address the role of business in society and then as 
concepts that have influenced investment strategies and their practices. To 
conclude this chapter, I examine the questions arising from sustainable investing 
for pension scheme governance. I argue that sustainability raises complex 
governance problems on how beneficiaries’ best interests can be understood and 
known by fiduciaries, or their equivalents.  
In response to these problems, in chapter three, I present three theories of voice: 
stakeholder theory, participatory democracy and deliberative democratic theory, 
and examine their potential for understanding and reshaping the context of 
pension schemes and sustainable investing. I argue that these theories offer 
accounts of rationality, knowledge and preference formation that contrast with 
the dominant agency perspective. As such, they offer theoretical resources for 
understanding how voice can help address the questions arising in pension 
scheme governance and sustainable investing. 
In chapter four, I combine these theories of voice into a normative integrative 
conceptual framework of voice that can be used to empirically assess pension 
scheme governance. This chapter draws on Smith’s (2009) Democratic 
Innovations, an assessment of institutionalised voice in public governance 
settings. Smith’s own work was informed by Dahl’s (1998) criteria for a democratic 
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process. This approach dovetails well with Hirschman (1970) who referred to 
Dahl’s views on democratic participation himself in Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Despite 
the multi-disciplinarity of this thesis, there is a natural affinity between its 
theoretical elements and their respective approaches to understanding 
institutional design and effectiveness. 
My conceptual framework brings together the concerns of stakeholder theory, 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. Stakeholder theory 
contributes an emphasis on the place of plural perspectives in releasing firm value. 
Participatory democracy focuses on the one hand, on the value of active 
participation for enhancing knowledge, but equally, on the significance of realising 
genuine influence. And finally, deliberative democracy emphasises the importance 
of the democratic characteristics and conditions required for deliberative public 
communication. By blending these the central concerns of these three theories 
together into one conceptual framework, I define the effective use of voice as the 
realisation of: (a) inclusive engagement; (b) deliberative communication; (c) 
informed engagement; (d) transparency; (e) influence; (f) articulating value; and 
(g) feasibility. The value of this framework is twofold: first, it builds on the 
theoretical discussions within these three prominent theories and by blending 
them together provides a framework for a normative understanding voice, 
suitable for the institutional context of pension schemes. Second, it can also be 
applied to empirical examples of voice, guiding the analysis of their effectiveness.  
In chapter five, I explain my choice of a qualitative theoretical lens, and the value 
of this method for examining the practice of governance. In the following chapters 
six and seven, I apply this conceptual framework to two qualitative case studies of 
governance innovation in pension schemes: the Member Council model and the 
Delegate Assembly. This term is derived from two sources. In his book Democratic 
Innovations, Smith (2009) examined citizen engagement in policy-making. 
Similarly, Clark and Urwin (2010) described governance innovations in the 
pensions industry.  By discussing these case studies of enhanced beneficiary voice 
as governance innovations, this thesis offers possible extensions to both of these 
usages. Drawing upon documentary evidence and governance actors’ 
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interpretations of the practice of voice, the ways in which the two case study 
models realise the conditions for the normative qualities of the conceptual 
framework are assessed. 
In chapter eight, I examine the potential and challenge of institutionalised voice in 
further detail. Drawing upon the findings from the two case studies and comparing 
these, I identify parallels with the literature on citizen engagement in public 
governance and establish a deeper level of insight on their effectiveness. By 
highlighting how other forms of voice have addressed similar challenges, I identify 
how the weaknesses of voice can be addressed, and how its effectiveness in 
pension scheme governance can be enhanced and enriched. To finish, a short 
concluding chapter draws the thesis findings together, and identifies a future 











1.  A Portrait of Pension Schemes and their 
Governance 
To understand the promise and challenge of voice in pension scheme governance, 
we must first appreciate their distinctiveness as institutions. To begin with, the 
significance of pension schemes for beneficiaries and the relatively weak position 
of beneficiaries are important to acknowledge. Beneficiaries invest a proportion 
of their income to secure retirement income and a good quality of life in old age2. 
In parallel to this, in (quasi-)mandatory pensions systems (Ebbinghaus, 2011), 
beneficiaries are limited or unable to exit their scheme and choose another 
pension provider. As a consequence, beneficiaries are disempowered: they are 
strongly encouraged or directed to participate in schemes, and to invest 
considerable sums, but they have weak links to the decision making that guides 
performance. In this context, understanding the way in which pensions are 
governed enables us to understand why voice – as an alternative to exit – holds 
promise. 
Even among OECD countries, pension provision varies considerably. Provision is 
shaped by historical legacies in welfare state policies, bodies and systems of law, 
contemporary political-economic configurations and demographic trends. Despite 
this diversity, it is possible to draw out some broad themes on the structural 
features of pension scheme governance, and their historical and legal context. To 
 
2 In the UK, the minimum contribution from employees from 2019 onwards is 5% of their salary 
(Office for National Statistics, OCPSS, 2019). 
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set the scene for the later empirical chapters, which are located in specific country 
contexts, the discussion in this chapter focuses on pensions in three mature multi-
pillar systems: the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK (Ebbinghaus, 2011). These 
countries’ pension systems are characterised by a basic universal state pension, 
along with well-established mature occupational pension provision (Ebbinghaus, 
2011), referred to as the second pillar. Building on Ebbinghaus’ typology, these 
countries share (quasi-)mandatory occupational pension provision, with limited 
beneficiary access to exit. They also all have relatively high levels of investment as 
a proportion of GDP (Ebbinghaus and Wiß, 2011; OECD, 20193).  
In this chapter I begin with a discussion of pension schemes in society, covering 
their significance not only for beneficiaries, but also as institutional investors. 
Next, I examine the legal context of pension schemes and their functional 
responsibilities. Informing my later empirical discussion of interpretations of 
pension scheme practice, I discuss the types of activities governance involves, 
along with the range of internal and external actors. Following this, the regulatory 
context, and the normative notions of good governance are discussed. Finally, I 
view pension scheme governance through the agency lens, the most widely used 
theoretical perspective on pension scheme governance. Together, these elements 
present an in-depth portrait of the institutional setting of pension schemes, 
creating the backdrop for later discussions on the promise and challenge of voice. 
Pensions and society  
One of the oldest occupational pension schemes is the Chatham Chest, a weather-
beaten trunk that is on display at the Royal Maritime Museum in London. 
Originating from 1590, this trunk was established by a benevolent ship owner, as 
an early collective pension for wounded sailors (National Maritime Museum, no 
date). Occupational pensions only emerged at scale during the 19th century as 
 
3 After the US – which holds over half of all OECD pensions assets – the UK has the second largest 
pensions market (USD 2.8 trillion) in the OECD. The Netherlands has the fifth with USD 1.5 trillion. 
Switzerland has the 7th with just under USD 1.0 trillion (OECD, 2019b). 
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large-scale employers, such as governments, utilities and large corporations, 
began to be established. Given their financial stature, these employers could make 
a credible commitment to delivering an employee pension, and the benefits this 
provided to the employer created the incentive to do so (Sass, 2006). As Laboul 
and Yermo (2006) note, economic theory argues that organisations reap the 
benefits of pension schemes through improved human resource management 
(e.g. lower turnover) and improved productivity.  Additionally, the possibility of 
using pension schemes as sources of internal finance, as part of book-reserve 
finance systems, was an additional early incentive. Alongside these benefits, the 
union movement has also contributed to the growth of occupational pensions and 
the shift in expectations that a good employer provides an occupational pension 
(Ghilarducci, 2006).  
In recent years, the significance of occupational pension provision for retirement 
income has grown. There has been a ‘retrenchment’ of public pension provision in 
the UK (Munnell, 2006) as well as in the Netherlands (Anderson, 2011). Most 
recently, the UK Pension Acts from 2007 made it a requirement for employers to 
enrol eligible employees in an occupational pension scheme (Department of Work 
and Pensions, 2020; The Pensions Regulator, 2021); a move which encourages 
employees to participate through requiring them to opt-out, rather than opt-in. In 
the wake of this Act, participation in occupational pension schemes in the UK is 
likely to increase further, making them an increasingly important source of income 
in retirement. This policy change has moved the UK system even closer to the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, both of which operate (quasi-)mandatory pension 
systems. The implication of mandatory or opt-out pensions systems is that the exit 
mechanism is either absent or diminished. The question of voice, is therefore 
particularly pertinent in this context, given that alternative options for expressing 
beneficiary dissatisfaction are unavailable. 
In parallel to their social welfare role, occupational pension schemes are 
increasingly significant as a group of institutional investors (Davis, 2008; Clark, 
2000; Hawley and Williams, 2000; Useem and Mitchell, 2000). In total, global 
pension fund assets at the end of 2019 stood, in total, at $39.5 trillion (£30 trillion), 
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equivalent to a quarter of global bank assets (FSB, 2020).  Furthermore, they have 
grown by more than 80% over the last 10 years (FSB, 2020). As early as the 1990s 
Peter Drucker discussed ‘pension fund capitalism’ (Drucker, 1993) to describe their 
prominence as institutions, and later the term ‘fiduciary capitalism’ (Hawley and 
Williams, 2000) was coined. 
In recent years, pension schemes have experienced challenging times and 
reassessed their ability to meet their liabilities (Clark and Urwin, 2008). As a result 
of increasing life expectancy, market volatility, the use of marked-to-market 
accounting practices that reflected market volatility, and a steep fall in long-term 
bond interest rates, increasing numbers of pension schemes have been in a 
position of deficit rather than surplus (Clare and Wagstaff, 2013). The 2008-9 
financial crisis dealt a further blow to their performance, resulting in the closure 
of some defined benefit plans and loses among some defined contribution plans 
(Clark and Urwin, 2010). By the end of 2014, pension schemes were operating in 
an environment of low returns, low interest rates and low growth in advanced 
economies (OECD, 2015). And the future economic outlook is not good: even 
before COVID-19 there was a high risk of further market volatility or even ‘serious 
financial distress’ (Borio, 2016), but the current pandemic has created immense 
economic disruption and instability. 
In parallel to these trends, interest in sustainability has gathered pace. Sustainable 
investing is an investment approach that takes into account the influence of non-
financial considerations such as social, governance and environmental 
considerations upon long-term investment performance. Broadly speaking, it is 
based on an appreciation of the interconnectedness of the performance of 
investments with their wider social and environmental context. It has been argued 
that given pension schemes’ long-term investment horizons, as well their 
tendency to invest in a cross section of the economy (meaning that overall 
portfolio performance will reflect the performance of the economy as a whole), 
sustainable investing is a particularly relevant investment approach for pension 
schemes (Hawley and Williams, 2000). The UN initiated PRI (Principles for 
Responsible Investment) is an example of an NGO/industry organisation that seeks 
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to encourage consideration of sustainability concerns in investing. The increasing 
number of PRI signatories (PRI, 2020) reflects growing interest in sustainable 
investing, and its move from a niche industry to a mainstream investment 
approach4. 
Given the societal, financial, and social welfare significance of pension schemes, it 
is surprising that their governance, and the way in which decisions are made, are 
so rarely discussed. It also reveals a curious paradox, between the collective 
financial significance of beneficiaries’ pension contributions and their 
disengagement with the decisions made on their behalf. In the following section I 
examine pension scheme governance in detail. By understanding how decisions 
are made, on what basis, by whom, and for whom, this chapter lays the foundation 
for understanding the implications of sustainable investing for pension schemes, 
and the relevance of voice for this context.  
Pension schemes and their governance  
Pension schemes provide beneficiaries with their retirement benefits, delivering 
the ‘pension promise’ (Clark and Monk, 2008). They ‘are beneficial organisations 
combining various administrative and organizational tasks with a vaguely defined 
but widely accepted mandate – that they act on behalf of beneficiaries’ best 
interests’ (Clark, 2006: 483). An occupational pension ‘scheme’ is the 
organisational entity responsible for the administration and governance of the 
pension ‘fund’, that is, the portfolio of assets which are used to deliver the 
individual pension benefits to a beneficiary (Aschcroft et al., 2011). Pension 
schemes are arranged for employees, with the benefits provided to these 
individuals or other family members with entitlements.  
There are a variety of collective terms in use, such as ‘members’, ‘participants’ and 
‘beneficiaries’. In this thesis I refer to beneficiaries, in the same way as the 
Pensions Regulator (UK), to describe all individuals who are either actively 
 
4 Established in 2006, there are now 3,038 PRI signatories as of December 2020 (PRI, 2020).  
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contributing, or receiving pensions as part of an occupational pension. 
Beneficiaries are:  
Active members, who are building up benefits in the scheme; pensioners 
who are receiving a pension from the scheme; deferred members who 
have left the scheme but still have benefits; prospective members who are 
able to join the scheme in the future if they become eligible; widows and 
widowers of members; dependents of members; former spouses who have 
been granted pension credits within a scheme; and in some cases the 
employer who may be entitled to receive funds from the scheme in the 
case of a surplus or winding up. (2007, no page)  
Pensions are arranged either as defined contribution or defined benefit pensions. 
In defined contribution pensions, the level of retirement benefit is not guaranteed 
by the employer and the beneficiary bears the financial risk of the investment’s 
performance. In defined benefit pensions, the retirement benefit is guaranteed, 
with the employer bearing the financial risk (Kakabadse et al., 2003). Pension 
schemes in the Netherlands are predominately defined benefit, average salary 
schemes (Bonoli and Häusermann, 2011). Defined benefit pensions are also still 
commonplace in Britain5, although the trend is moving towards defined 
contribution schemes. In Switzerland they are largely defined contribution 
(Anderson, 2011) and, as in Britain, there is also a growing increase in the number 
of schemes offering defined contribution. 
The tasks and functions of pension schemes involve three core activities: the 
administration of contributions; the determination of value and beneficiary 
eligibility; and the management of scheme assets (Clark, 2004). The latter involves 
 
5 The Department of Work and Pensions’ 2009 survey of pension provision shows that around a 
third of private sector employees (32%) have a pension in a defined benefit scheme, around a 
sixth (14%) have a pension with a defined contribution scheme, and around an eighth (7%) have 
a pension which is part of a hybrid scheme (2010: 18).  Many pension schemes are closing down 




optimising the trade-off between risk and reward, maximising performance within 
a risk budget, and creating value for all stakeholders (Clark and Urwin, 2010). 
The dominant agency perspective in corporate governance identifies the necessity 
of separation between executive and board decision making, for example through 
independent boards and the separation of CEO and Board chair (Daily et al., 2003). 
In pension schemes, some have argued that there is a less clear separation 
between the role of the board and the executive in scheme activities (Thomas, 
2011). This suggests that pension scheme governance is more susceptible to 
governance risks than corporate bodies.  
Understanding the governance of pension schemes therefore involves an 
appreciation of how governance tasks and functions are controlled, and by whom. 
The OECD define the governance of pension schemes as: 
All the relationships between the different entities and persons involved in 
the functioning of the pension plan. Governance also provides the 
structure though which the objectives of the pension plan are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance. It is the 
mirror image of the corporate governance of the public limited company, 
which consists of the set of relationships between the company’s 
management, board, shareholders, and other stakeholders. (2002: 2) 
These tasks and functions are fulfilled by diverse governance forms, depending 
upon the scheme’s setting and its jurisdiction. Among the multi-pillar pension 
systems of the UK, Netherlands and Switzerland (Ebbinghaus and Wiß, 2011), 
pension scheme governance forms are either institutional (the Netherlands and 
Switzerland) or trust types (UK) (Stewart and Yermo, 2008). The institutional type 
includes pension foundations or associations that are independent entities, with 
legal personality and capacity, with their own governing board. Contractual types 
also exist around the world, and these involve a segregated pool of assets without 
legal personality and capacity that is governed by a separate entity (e.g. bank, 
insurance company or pension fund management company). The trust type has a 
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combination of institutional and contractual characteristics: the trustees legally 
own (have legal title to) the pension assets and must administer these in the 
interest of the beneficiaries, according to the trust deed, although trustees are not 
legally part of the trust (Stuart and Yermo, 2008).  
Pension schemes’ fiduciaries or their equivalents6, are responsible for acting in the 
best interests of beneficiaries (Ambachtsheer, 2016; Stewart and Yermo, 2008). 
These duties are themselves based on principles which gain their legitimacy from 
socially accepted moral imperatives (Clark 2006). While the legal context will differ 
between pensions (Johnson and de Graaf, 2009), there is a common 
understanding that all pension fiduciaries have the responsibility to act in the best 
interests of their beneficiaries. This responsibility involves the duty to act 
prudently and the duty of loyalty (PRI/UNEP, 2019). As Hawley et al. note: 
While the exact formulation of fiduciary duty varies between jurisdictions, 
the main concepts are relatively consistent. Fiduciaries are generally 
required to discharge their duties: (a) solely in the interest of participants 
and beneficiaries; (b) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits; (c) 
impartially, taking into consideration differing interests of various 
participant and beneficiary groups; (d) with the care, skill, and prudence 
exercised by similar fiduciaries, including as to diversification of 
investments; (e) incurring only costs that are appropriate and reasonable; 
(f) in accordance with governing law and documents. Duties (a) through (c) 
are often referred to as the duty of loyalty, while (d) is called the duty of 
prudence or standard of care. All must be grounded in the specific context 
– that is, the nature of the pension promise and success in delivering on it. 
(2011: 7) 
These duties establish the legal authority of the fiduciaries. In the mature, multi-
pillar pension systems that are the focus of this thesis, this authority is given 
 
6 I refer to ‘fiduciaries or their equivalents’, following Galler’s interchangeable use of the terms 
‘fiduciaries’ or ‘trustees’ to describe ‘persons or entities with discretion in the management of 
pension plan assets to whom the prudent person rule applies’ (2002: 69). 
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expression in the foundation board’s or trustee board’s decision making. These 
legal duties rightfully identify the interests of the beneficiaries as paramount, but 
there are implications to their execution as a fiduciary duty. From the perspective 
of democratic theory, these duties require the boards to interpret and make a 
claim to know (Saward, 2010, italics added) beneficiaries’ best interests. 
Essentially, for fiduciary duties to be met, it is not necessary for board decision 
making to be close to – to engage with – beneficiaries. To fulfil these duties, it is 
sufficient for fiduciaries or their equivalents to make a claim to know, and act on 
this knowledge, in the best interests of beneficiaries. As another democratic 
theorist Hannah Pitkin notes, a trustee must act on behalf of others but ‘is under 
no obligation to listen, or respond, to beneficiaries’ wishes’ (Pitkin 1967: 130, italics 
added).  
Pension scheme governance: Boards and other actors 
Understanding pension scheme governance involves a recognition of the actors 
involved and their roles and their characteristics (e.g. functions, interests). 
Similarly, theoretical discussions of corporate governance also focus on actors 
involved (e.g. executives and non-executives), their roles and characteristics, and 
the impact of these on governance effectiveness. In each national context, the 
structure of pension scheme governance arrangements and their responsibilities 
are defined by regulation and legislation. But within these bounds, individual 
pension schemes have some discretion in their governance arrangements. This 
section provides an overview of the actors involved in the tasks of pension scheme 
governance.  
Whether a pension scheme is located in the UK, Switzerland or the Netherlands, 
they will have a central decision-making board that is the most important decision-
making entity in the pension scheme. The board is ‘the ultimate decision-maker, 
having overall responsibility for strategic decisions such as setting the investment 
policy, choosing the investment manager(s) and other service providers, and 
reviewing the fund’s performance’ (Stewart and Yermo, 2008: 5). Additionally, 
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they are involved in ‘determining the management structure of the fund, 
determining the parameters of the risk budget (and) designing the performance 
benchmark(s) against with the fund is to be compared’ (Kadabakse et al., 2003: 
382-3). Eligibility to participate in the board is determined by national legislation, 
however, most OECD countries share a requirement to have board members that 
represent both employers and employees. In Switzerland and the Netherlands 
there should be an equal number of employer and employee representatives 
(Stewart and Yermo, 2008), while in the UK at least one third should be member-
nominated (The Pensions Regulator, 2006). As Stewart and Yermo (2008) note, the 
involvement of employees on the board can help address the risk of agency 
problems and serve to strengthen the alignment of the board’s interests with the 
interests of employees, as well as enhancing communications with the wider 
membership. There are, however, also problems associated with their 
involvement: specifically, the implications of limited knowledge among employee 
representatives for effective governance decision making (Clark, 2004; 
Ambachtsheer et al., 2008) and the implications of this for generating the 
necessary levels of challenge to realise good governance. Ambachtsheer et al. 
(2008) argue that, while there is no expectation that trustees should have the 
same level of expertise as professionals, they should: 
Be capable of strategic thinking. This means they should insist on clear 
linkages between the pension contract, how the organization defines, 
measures and manages risk, and how outcomes are measured and 
rewarded. It is up to management to show the board how this is best 
accomplished through a liability-anchored, risk budget-based investment 
process. (2008: 17)  
There is the additional possibility that conflicts of interest will arise within boards 
(Coco and Volpin, 2007). As Ebbinghaus and Wiß (2011) note, occupational 
pensions are part of labour relations, which can add an additional horizontal 
conflict of interest – between employer, employees and retirees or between 
employer associations and trade unions. Conflicts of interest may relate to 
negotiations on occupational pensions, either at the individual level or as part of 
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the collective bargaining, and will be influenced by the extent to which labour 
relations are contentious or consensual, centralised or decentralised 
(Ebbinghaus, 2006). Given this, it is essential to have a clear policy to guide board 
members’ behaviour (Thomas, 2011).  
Governance decision making takes place in boards which meet on a regular basis 
for discussion and decision making, supplemented by additional sub-committee 
meetings, for example on investment strategy (Fox 2010). The frequency of 
meetings and the extent to which subcommittees are used are likely to differ 
depending on the size of the scheme. The size of pension schemes is recognised 
as a factor which impacts on the effectiveness of their governance arrangements 
and governance outcomes (Thomas, 2011). The lack of capacity of smaller 
schemes and the proportionally higher costs mean they are regarded as less 
effective, with Clark going as far as to say ‘pension fund governance is an issue of 
size and scale as it is an issue of proper rules and procedures’ (Clark, 2004: 25). 
Aside from the board, a wide variety of other actors are also involved in pension 
scheme governance, performing functions that are determined through market, 
supervisory or other legal relations. Pension schemes are particularly heavy users 
of external service providers, with the ratio of external to internal costs around 
10:1 (Clark and Urwin, 2008). Schemes will evaluate the performance of 
investment service providers and manage these contracts, often using external 
consultants to help with this process (Clark, 2006: 490).  
Clark (2000) provides clarity on the range of actors involved, based on a trustee 
model of governance, widely used in common law jurisdictions7. Figure 1 
illustrates the breadth of actors drawn upon by a pension scheme to meet its 
responsibilities. It illustrates the board as the central authority in pension scheme 
governance, with some responsibility delegated to sub-committees such as the 
investment committee. The work of the scheme is supported by a range of 
 
7 This overview is based upon a single employer pension fund (or scheme) that is jointly trusted 
and relatively immature, in that there are more beneficiaries contributing funds than those 
receiving pensions. It is also assumed that the fund is of a sufficient size to choose between the 
internal and external management of functions. 
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external service providers, including actuaries and auditors. The management of 
the investment may be done by an internal investment team, but often this is a 
contractual relationship with an external investment manager. They will report on 
investment returns to the fund administrator who will be involved in scheme 
management, such as providing annual benefit statements and making transfers 
in and out of the scheme, but also communications and reporting to participants 
and beneficiaries.  
Figure 1. Pension Fund Investment Management: Institutions and Services 
(Clark, 2000: 73) 
 
Pension scheme regulation  
Regulatory and statutory legislation shape the ‘rules and procedures’ of pension 
scheme governance (Clark and Urwin, 2010; Clark, 2004). As Fox (2014) notes, in 
the UK particularly important legislation is the Pension Schemes Act (1993) and 
the Pensions Act (1995), which expanded the regulation of pension schemes and 



































in the Pensions Act (2004) to address not only scheme level governance, but also 
governance at the industry level, including the creation of the Pensions Regulator. 
This Regulator performs a supervisory function, as well as developing codes of 
good practice. Further Acts addressed, among other issues, the governance of 
disputes between beneficiaries and schemes (the Pensions Act 2007), as well as 
employer responsibilities (the Pensions Act 2008 and 2011). As Anderson (2011) 
notes, in the Netherlands, occupational pensions were regulated by a regulatory 
framework PSW Pensioen en Spaarfondswet, replaced by the Pension Act (PW – 
Pensioenwet) in 2007. In addition, the Pension and Insurance Authority (PVK) has 
been, since 2004, integrated into the Dutch central bank. The Pension Act provides 
the regulatory framework for occupational pensions, but the social partners have 
significant freedom to govern their pensions, negotiated as part of collective wage 
agreements. In Switzerland regulation has been relatively limited. In 2003 the 
BVG-LPP law established cantonal-level supervision of occupational pension 
providers, along with requirements at scheme level such as the composition of 
boards and the use of external experts within governance decision making. An 
additional extra-parliamentary Committee for Occupational Pensions is a 
permanent committee that includes representatives of the confederation, 
employers, trade unions and insurance companies. It has responsibilities for public 
pension funds but also supervises occupational pensions and their reform (Bonoli 
and Häusermann, 2011). 
Pension schemes also self-regulate by meeting standards of practice accepted 
across the industry. This approach has been particularly influential in Switzerland, 
although concerns have been raised by the limited uptake of the voluntary 
industry-wide code (Stewart and Yermo, 2008). In the UK, the Myner’s Report 
(2001) looked at the investment decision making among institutional investors 
and as well as influencing later statutory legislation, developed a set of ‘comply or 
explain’ principles for pension schemes to meet in order to achieve best practice 
in investment decision making. In the Netherlands, regulation has been more 
active, with the regulator (the central bank) assessing the Principles of Pension 
Fund Governance, which was developed as part of the Pensions Act (2007). While 
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voluntary codes often focus on a limited number of financial or legal areas of risk, 
growing attention is being given to sustainability and the consideration of ESG 
issues, and how (if at all) they take into account members’ views, for example by 
the Pensions Regulator in the UK (OECD, 2019a). 
Further sources of influence on pension scheme behaviour are the bodies 
operating at national and international levels which produce recommendations on 
normative notions of good governance. There are industry bodies, such as the UK 
National Association of Pension Schemes which represents the interests of 
schemes, and also aims to share best practices between schemes (e.g. NAPF, 
2005). Internationally the OECD (e.g. OECD, 2002; Stewart and Yermo, 2008), the 
World Bank and the Stanford Institutional Investors Forum provide policy papers 
and best practice recommendations (e.g. Clapman and Waddell, 2010), along with 
the Rotman International Centre for Pension Management which produces 
research based reports with governance recommendations. These organisations 
focus on common themes, developing recommendations for good governance in 
pensions. They focus on the need for transparency in governance (Dorfman, 2011; 
Clapman and Waddell, 2010), along with the value of self-assessment for board 
effectiveness (Stewart and Yermo, 2008). The necessity for the effective 
delegation of duties, and clarity of board responsibilities are also widely addressed 
(Stewart and Yermo, 2008; Clapman and Waddell 2010; Dorfman, 2011).  
Additionally, suitable procedures for the selection and operation of governing 
bodies and managing institutions are highlighted (Dorfman, 2011), along with a 
focus on ensuring trustees have the right core competencies (Stewart and Yermo, 
2008; Clapman and Waddell, 2010). An additional focus is on effective leadership 
from both the board and executive staff (Clapman and Waddell, 2010; Dorfman, 
2011). Related to this is the necessity of ensuring any conflicts of interest are 




Pension scheme governance: An agency theory perspective 
There is widespread interest in understanding, and improving, the corporate 
governance of modern corporations (Daily et al., 2003). In academia, a plethora of 
textbooks on corporate governance exist, along with corporate governance special 
interest groups and specialist journals. Given the scale of the pensions industry, it 
is surprising that the governance of pension schemes and other institutional 
investors is not more widely addressed (Schneider, 2000). It is particularly odd 
given that agency problems are even more significant in this institutional context 
(Clark and Urwin, 2008). Needless to say, within the specialist literature, on 
pension scheme governance analyses are heavily influenced by agency theory (e.g. 
Clark and Urwin, 2008; Benson et al., 2011), which is the most dominant 
theoretical approach in corporate governance research more generally (Daily et 
al., 2003). Agency theory raises questions about effectiveness of pension scheme 
governance arrangements for realising their task. In particular, it highlights the 
limited capacity of pension schemes (agents) to act in the ‘best interests’ of 
beneficiaries (principals), as well as the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms 
(monitoring) available to beneficiaries. 
Agency theory defines the relationship between the beneficiary and the pension 
scheme as one between a principal (the beneficiary) and an agent (the scheme, 
comprised of its executive and governance functions). The relationship is 
described as a contract which involves the delegation of decision-making authority 
to the agent, on behalf of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It carries a 
number of assumptions, including notions about individuals – that they act only 
according to self-interest, that they have bounded rationality and have an aversion 
to risk. Additionally, it is based upon further organisational notions: that there is 
partial goal conflict and information asymmetry between principals and agents, 
and that efficiency is the criterion for identifying organisational effectiveness 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Based on these presuppositions, it examines the character of 
goal conflict between agents and principals, and the optimal contract (either 
behaviour or outcome orientated) which addresses this problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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While a pension scheme should, according to law, act in the interests of 
beneficiaries, this theoretical perspective clarifies the barriers to achieving this. It 
highlights issues related to information asymmetries, which lead to the problem 
of moral hazard (e.g. agents engaging in unobservable behaviour which does not 
benefit the principal). Principal-agent relationships will result in higher agency 
costs for the principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and attempts will be made to 
reduce these costs to a minimum using governance mechanisms based on 
behaviour (such as monitoring systems) or outcomes (such as incentive systems) 
(Schneider, 2000; Hess and Impavido, 2003).  
For pension schemes, principal-agent problems are exacerbated due to a number 
of market and industry characteristics. First, although the beneficiary-pension 
scheme relationship is the most central, pension scheme governance also involves 
further principal-agent relationships: another principal in the form of a defined 
benefit plan sponsor (e.g. an employer) will be present (Clark and Urwin, 2008), 
and mandates exist with investment management firms (who will act as an agent 
to the pension scheme principal). Taken altogether, it becomes clear how the 
investment of beneficiaries’ capital is governed through varied principal-agent 
relationships between multiple actors (Schneider, 2000), whose motivations may 
not all be aligned (Benson et al., 2011). These may create additional agency costs, 
all of which will be borne by the beneficiary (Benson et al., 2011) or the ‘ultimate 
principals’ (Hokisson et al., 2013: 674).  
Additionally, in pension schemes the asymmetries in knowledge between pension 
schemes and beneficiaries are arguably greater than those between shareholders 
and executive management in corporate governance, the classic focus of agency 
theory. Furthermore, beneficiaries have greater difficulty in monitoring their 
agents (Clark and Urwin, 2008), given limited access to information (for example, 
there are no mandatory AGMs). The same could also be argued for pension 
scheme boards, in the role of principals, in relation to both their executive 
management of the pension scheme and to their mandated asset management 
firms (both working as their agents). Certainly, pension scheme boards have 
characteristics (low levels of remuneration, limited number of board meetings) 
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that are likely to make monitoring of any agents more difficult (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In contrast to publicly listed corporations, there exists no market for control based 
upon the possibility of a drop in share value, and the threat of a replacement of 
the management team (Clark and Urwin, 2008).   
While agency theory clarifies the characteristics – and problems – that are 
generated in pension scheme governance, it does not explain the whole story. In 
particular, the assumption of self-interested individuals with a priori interests, 
which exist by virtue of an actor’s position and circumstances does not recognise 
the role of communication in governance decision making. Governance also 
involves processes of collective opinion formation and transformation, which lead 
to particular decisions being taken by decision making bodies. Indeed, it is 
commonly accepted that the exchange of information, opinions and collective 
deliberation are part of any well governed board, and there will also be an 
exchange of views between the board and external governance actors too (such 
as actuaries or consultants). These communicative exchanges will inform and 
shape the interests of board members and external parties.  As O’Barr and Conley 
(1992) show in their account of pension scheme management, it is not wholly 
financial concerns that shape governance decision making but also socially derived 
understandings. In seeking to understand how opinions and interests are formed, 
it becomes clear that other theories are necessary to enhance our understanding 
of how communicative exchanges shape governance decision-making.  
Concluding comments 
This chapter began with an introduction to the societal, economic and financial 
significance of pension schemes. I outlined the unique position of pension 
schemes as institutions and the distinctive relationships they have with their 
beneficiaries. To understand the relevance of voice for this setting, it is important 
to understand in more detail how pensions are governed. The chapter examined 
the legal foundations of their governance, stressing their implications for how 
pension schemes may engage (or not) with beneficiaries. I then examined the 
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functions and legal duties of pension schemes and the internal and external actors 
involved in governance. I turned to the regulation which shapes pension schemes, 
and the normative notions of good governance circulating among international 
institutions and academic institutes. And finally, I discussed the insights from 
agency theory on understanding the problems found in pension scheme 
governance. Nonetheless, it is clear that agency theory’s focus on the a priori 
preferences of principals and agents provides a partial theoretical understanding 
of the governance of pension schemes. Later in the thesis I address this critique by 
drawing on normative democratic and strategic management theories to 
understand more fully the potential of communication in governance. But before 
I examine these as alternative theoretical perspectives, in the next chapter I turn 











2.  Sustainable Investing and the Governance of 
Beneficiaries’ Best Interests  
The turn to sustainable investing in the investment industry (Sparkes 2002; 
Sievänen et al. 2013) has intensified in recent years and reflecting this many 
pension schemes are considering sustainability matters in their investment 
strategies. This trend is particularly advanced in the UK, where the pensions 
regulator requires schemes to report on how they address sustainability (OECD, 
2019). This chapter provides a conceptual backdrop to this trend and examines 
the implications for pension scheme governance. While I primarily discuss 
sustainable investing, I also draw on other areas such as corporate social 
responsibility and environmental, social and governance (ESG) investing. These 
terms have different origins, theoretical influences and are often applied to 
distinct economic entities or fields (e.g. corporate social responsibility is applied 
to a broad set of corporate activities, while ESG is predominantly used in the fields 
of finance and investing). At the simplest level, they all share the consideration of 
non-financial issues when understanding the responsibilities of economic actors8. 
In this chapter I begin by introducing responsibility and sustainability as concepts 
and I draw upon Garriga and Melé’s (2004) typology of theories of corporate 
 
8 One recent example of the way in which responsibility and sustainability issues are combined is 
the formulation of the Swiss citizens’ initiative on the responsibilities of Swiss corporations 
(‘Konzernverantwortungsinitiative’) voted on 29 November 2020. The initiative argues that 
corporations should have a responsibility to protect the environment and human rights by 
meeting the same minimum standards abroad as they do in Switzerland.  
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responsibility to identify the rationales that underscore them. Next, the ways in 
which these concepts and rationales are interpreted in the investment industry 
are covered, along with a brief overview of the types of investment instruments 
that shape practice. To conclude, I consider the implications of sustainable 
investing for pension scheme governance and examine the ways in which 
sustainable investing raises complex governance questions. 
Corporate social responsibility and sustainability 
Since the early stages of capitalism, there have always been innovative business 
leaders with a strong sense of social responsibility (Carroll, 2009; Carroll and 
Shabana, 2010). The origins of contemporary corporate responsibility are 
commonly seen to be in the mid-20th Century (Melé 2004; Carroll and Shabana 
2010), with Bowen’s Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (1953) regarded as 
a seminal text on the normative responsibilities of economic actors (Carroll 2009; 
Jamali et al., 2009). Bowen argues that businesses should ‘follow those lines of 
action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society’ 
(Bowen, 1953: 6; Garriga and Melé 2004). Since then, social responsibility has 
remained a contested field. Some two decades later, the economist Milton 
Friedman influentially argued that managers of firms have only a responsibility to 
manage the firm in the interests of the shareholders, and they do not have the 
‘political’ responsibilities which would be required to invest this money in other 
activities (Salazar and Husted, 2009). In The Social Responsibilities of Business is to 
Increase its Profits he states: 
There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long 
as it stays within the rules of the game, i.e. it engages in open and free 
competition without deception or fraud. (Friedman, 1970, no page) 
It was the emergence of environmentalism that introduced the wider notion of 
‘sustainability’ to the debate on the responsibilities of economic actors. The 
publication of the Brundtland report Our Common Future (1987) commissioned by 
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the UN World Commission on Environment and Development raised public 
awareness of the concept of sustainability. The Brundtland report’s definition of 
sustainable development as meeting ‘the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (1987: 
39) captures the essence of sustainability. Its legacy is that the purpose of 
achieving the long-term flourishing of ecology, society, growth and human life is 
no longer a niche concern (Portney, 2015). With hindsight, some criticise the 
Brundtland definition of sustainable development for its lack of precision (White, 
2013), while others argue that it has been falsely appropriated by the corporate 
world, reflecting a form of corporate ‘green-washing’ (Siano et al., 2017). 
Notwithstanding these concerns on its use and abuse, its malleability has also 
been seen as part of its success, with one author of the report describing how the 
term sustainability was used as a ‘bridge’ concept to help engage a range of actors 
– including the private sector – to address environmental and social challenges 
(Desai, 2007). Certainly, it has impacted the finance industry in this way, and 
provided a way of framing the consideration of wider environmental and societal 
issues in investment strategies. 
A typology of corporate social responsibility theories 
Why would pension schemes choose to invest in a way that considers 
sustainability? Garriga and Melé’s (2004) typology of corporate social 
responsibility theories simplifys the diversity of perspectives in this field. Their 
framework focuses on corporate social responsibly, but it can equally be applied 
to understanding the motivations behind sustainable investing. Based on Parsons’ 
theory of social systems (1961), Garriga and Melé start with the hypothesis that 
corporate social responsibility theories are related to either ‘adaption to the 
environment (related to resources and economics), goal attainment (related to 
politics), social integration and pattern maintenance, or latency (related to culture 
and values)’ (2004: 52). Using this hypothesis, they classify corporate social 
responsibility theories into the following four groups: instrumental theories that 
focus on wealth creation, political theories that focus on duties and rights, 
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integrative theories that focus on societal-business dependencies, and ethical 
theories. 
The most famous exponent of the instrumental theory of corporate social 
responsibilities is Friedman’s (1970) contribution. As discussed earlier, he argues 
that businesses should focus on maximising shareholder value, so long as this is 
done within the ethical and legal limits of a society. This focus on shareholder 
value is not simply a means of maximising material benefits, but it is the ethical 
responsibility of managers who have no political rights to use the firm’s resources 
in ways that do not benefit the shareholders. However, as Friedman also 
suggested, this aim does not exempt the corporation from contributing towards 
the public good. He argued that corporations stand to gain by making social 
investments and suggests that such investments could, for example, lead to better 
quality employees, lower wage bills or, more negatively, ‘lessen losses from 
pilferage and sabotage’ (Friedman, 1970, no page).  An instrumental perspective 
is also present in the extensive literature which aims to justify the ‘business case’ 
for corporate social responsibility and sustainability, thereby linking social 
investments with improved financial performance (e.g.; Orlitzky et al., 2003; 
Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). Theories that can be 
considered instrumental also look at how the competitive advantage of a firm can 
be improved through wider social investments, given the firm has the best 
knowledge and resources to solve firm-relevant problems (Porter and Kramer 
2002), or how the human, organisational, physical and environmental resources 
and capabilities of a firm, can contribute to its competitive advantage. 
Additionally, developing new consumer markets among the poor (Prahalad, 2002) 
and cause-related marketing (Varadarajan and Menon, 1988) by associating firms 
with charities are also taken to be ways to improve the financial performance of a 
firm through strategically marketing social or ethical issues. 
Political theories are those which explore the political dimensions of corporate 
responsibility or sustainability, and their power in shaping markets as well as 
society. One example, ‘corporate constitutionalism’, explores how businesses, as 
social institutions, have social power which is exercised through their own actions 
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and in relation to external constituency groups. This, in turn, defines and limits the 
functional power of business (Davis 1960). ‘Integrative social contract theory’ 
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994) elaborates on the implicit consensus (social 
contract) between business and society, and the responsibilities that this 
relationship entails. ‘Corporate citizenship’ similarly emphasises the rights and 
responsibilities of the firm but based on the political concept of individual 
citizenship. Within this theory, corporate citizenship is taken to be simply a means 
to philanthropy or social investment, while others conceive it more broadly, to 
include a concern with the protection of citizenship, in situations where 
governments have failed to do so (Matten et al., 2003). More recent authors, such 
as Scherer and Palazzo (2011a), continue this tradition by conceptualising the 
corporation as a multi-national political actor, and explore its responsibilities 
through a political lens. 
Integrative theories argue that businesses have a responsibility to respond to 
social values and, notably, to integrate them into their business so that business 
practice reflects these social values. By doing so, businesses realise legitimacy and 
even social prestige. When society provides unclear signals as to its expectations 
of a firm, a ‘zone of discretion’ (Ackerman, 1973) emerges. It is argued that firms 
should aim to diminish this zone, through corporate social responsiveness 
(Ackerman and Bauer, 1976). The process of integrating social issues into 
corporations through ‘institutionalization’ is emphasized by Ackerman (1973), as 
well as by those who use the concept of ‘issues management’ to describe a process 
which ‘prompts more systematic and effective responses to particular issues by 
serving as a coordinating and integrating force within the corporation’ (Garriga 
and Melé, 2004: 58). Other integrative theories hold that corporations should 
meet the principle of public responsibility, not only responding to legal and 
governmental regulation, but also to more disparate and fluid concerns such as 
public opinion and ‘emerging issues’ (Preston and Post, 1981). In addition, 
stakeholder management is focused less on society at large and more on specific 
groups of people who are affected directly by a corporation’s activities. 
Stakeholder management involves the consideration and integration of these 
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wider actors’ views in the management of the corporation. Stakeholder 
management is less of a conceptualisation of a business’ social responsibilities and 
more of a process through which a dialogue between a business and society is 
created.  
The beginnings of corporate social performance theory lie in the 1970s (Sethi, 
1975), with Carroll (1979) introducing it as a three-dimensional concept9. Later, 
Wood (1991) established a corporate social performance model that pulls 
together a number of different integrative theories. Beginning with the principles 
of corporate social responsibility (at institutional, organisational and individual 
levels), processes of corporate social performance (such as issues or stakeholder 
management), and corporate outcomes (such as social impact) follow. 
Ethical theories of corporate responsibility and sustainability derive from a 
normative standpoint. Examples include a refashioning of stakeholder 
management theory (Freeman 1984), based on the principle that stakeholders 
have legitimate interests and that these interests have ‘intrinsic value’ (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995). A multitude of authors have re-interpreted stakeholder 
management inspired by diverse ethical theories, ranging from the liberal theories 
of Rawls and Kant, through to libertarian and feminist conceptions, and the ethical 
concerns of Aristotle (Garriga and Melé, 2004).   
Garriga and Melé’s (2004) typology of corporate social responsibility theories, as I 
have discussed above, provides an insight into how different orientations and 
motivations (instrumental, political, integrative, and ethical) may shape 
understandings and applications of corporate social responsibility. Similarly, the 
concept of sustainability may be informed and shaped by these orientations and 
motivations. In the following section I examine the integration of these concepts 
into strategies and practices in the investment industry. 
 
9 This definition has been more recently updated as: first, meeting economic, legal and ethical 
responsibilities (Schwartz and Carroll, 2003); second, an understanding of the social 
responsibilities and issues need to be identified; and third, a clarification of the philosophy (or 




Given the breadth of concepts and theories in the literature on corporate 
responsibility, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is a similar degree of 
heterogeneity in the use of these concepts in the investment industry, including 
references to ‘ethical’, ‘responsible’ and ‘sustainable’ investing. In addition to 
these, the term environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) investing has 
become widely used, perhaps because it does not identify a particular normative 
rationale, but rather describes an investment which involves the consideration of 
any of these issues. Some authors have noted a change in the use of concepts over 
recent years – moving from ‘ethical’ to ‘socially responsible‘, and most recently to 
‘sustainable’ investing (Sparkes, 2002; Sparks and Cowton, 2004). Capelle-
Blancard and Monjon (2012) confirm this widespread perception, using a content 
analysis of 671 academic and 27,500 newspaper articles on the theme between 
1980 and 2010. They show that there has been a decline in the use of the word 
‘ethics’, arguing it has unfashionable religious connotations. Others have also 
suggested that the phrase ‘ethical investment’ comes with too much ‘negative 
baggage’ (Sparkes 2002: 12). While some argue that these different terms – 
ethical, responsible and sustainable – are based upon different rationales and as 
such inform different types of investment strategies (Woods and Urwin 2010), 
others stress the commonalities between them (Sandberg et al., 2009; Sievänen 
et al., 2013). The following definition was coined by the industry body, Eurosif: 
Sustainable and responsible investment (‘SRI’) is a long-
term oriented investment approach which integrates ESG factors in the 
research, analysis and selection process of securities within an investment 
portfolio.  It combines fundamental analysis and engagement with an 
evaluation of ESG factors in order to better capture long term returns for 
investors, and to benefit society by influencing the behaviour of 
companies. (2018: 12) 
By far the most common rationale for sustainable investing is the instrumental 
rationale that emphasises the business (and investor) benefits of considering non-
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financial criteria10. Non-financial criteria, whether related to corporate 
performance or wider social or environmental risks that corporations face, are 
seen as necessary in any accurate financial assessment of value and risk. And this 
rationale is particularly appealing to pension schemes and other institutional 
investors who are either concerned about reducing the investment universe 
through screening, or which believe their fiduciary duties limit any wider 
consideration of sustainability (Woods and Urwin 2010). The following quote, 
taken from the website of RobecoSAM, an asset management firm, typifies this 
rationale: 
We passionately believe that the integration of sustainability criteria into 
traditional financial analysis helps us to evaluate companies’ quality of 
management and future performance potential. This in turn enables us to 
identify attractive investment opportunities that can generate long lasting 
value for our clients. In short, a focus on sustainability leads to better 
informed investment decisions… mainstream investors still underestimate 
the impact of long-terms sustainability trends on companies’ ability to 
succeed in the long term. This can lead to market inefficiencies that 
investors who focus on sustainability factors can exploit. (2013: 2) 
Although the instrumental rationale for sustainable or responsible investing is now 
widespread, in its early days responsible investing was justified primarily on ethical 
grounds. The responsible investment movement gained momentum in the 1970s 
as a result of concerns about the ethical behaviour of corporations, and their 
contribution to social injustices – particularly in the US (Sparkes, 2002; Sandberg 
et al., 2009). Religious groups were involved in creating the industry in the UK, 
with churches involved in the set-up of the first ethical fund and screening agency 
(Sandberg et al., 2009). An ethical rationale for investing is based upon integrating 
ethical principles into the investment decision making process (Domini 2001: 16). 
 
10 The UN/industry led NGO Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), which seeks to encourage 
sustainable and responsible investing, has produced advice which presents a legal justification 




And despite the strength of the instrumental perspective, some, such as 
Richardson (2009), argue against the prioritisation of instrumental over ethical 
rationales, arguing that the business case is not always present, and that ethical 
grounds for responsible investing remain important. For others, ethical investing 
represents not only a different rationale, but also a particular investment practice 
(Sandberg et al., 2009), with ethical investing achieved through negative 
screening, while socially responsible investing involves positive screening and 
best-in-class approaches, along with shareholder activism (Capelle-Blancard and 
Monjon, 2012). Given the stances taken by these scholars, investment rationales 
and investment practices are best viewed not as distinct, but as fully intertwined. 
Sustainable investment instruments  
Alongside the growing interest in the concept and theories of sustainable investing 
has been growth in the amount of assets invested. According to the Global 
Sustainable Investment Alliance (2018), sustainable investment assets, at the 
beginning of 2018, stood at $30.7 trillion (£22.1 trillion), a figure which had 
increased by a third in two years11. Given that sustainable investing can be 
described by its investment practices, it is useful to understand what these 
practices involve. While some pension schemes may have their own internal 
investment management functions, for many pension schemes this task is 
provided by an external asset manager. A pension scheme’s sustainable 
investment strategy is articulated through a range of ‘instruments’ (Eurosif, 2005) 
which will be drawn upon at different stages in the investment process. The 
instruments developed for equities and bonds, the most popular asset classes 
among pension schemes, are widely used (Wood, 2011). 
Sustainable investing is realised through two distinct strands of practices: data-
driven practices and practices related to shareholder rights. Data-driven practices 
 
11 ‘GSIA uses an inclusive definition of sustainable investing, without drawing distinctions between 
this and related terms such as responsible investing and socially responsible investing’ (2018: 7). 
The report covers the following markets: Europe, the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia 
and New Zealand. 
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are based on the assembly and analysis of non-financial data, on which evaluation 
and valuation practices will be applied (Leins, 2020). As Wood (2011) and Eurosif 
(2005, 2014) show in their overview of sustainable investment, a widely used 
evaluation and valuation practice is screening. This involves identifying particularly 
high performing assets according to a particular standard, or the removal or 
exclusion of low performing assets according to a particular standard. Other forms 
of screening involve the evaluation of relative performance compared to peers, 
sometimes referred to as best-in-class. In addition to these, investment strategies 
may target particular themes or particular impacts, the latter referred to as impact 
investing. A second set of practices are driven by pension schemes’ shareholder 
rights. Again, drawing on Wood (2011) and Eurosif (2005, 2014), these practices 
reflect either active or passive ownership strategies. In the case of active 
ownership this might involve participating in voting at AGMs, the filing of 
shareholder resolutions, or behind the scenes engagement with executives over 
poor sustainability performance. Asset managers will be responsible for the 
delivery of a sustainable investment strategy, and achieving this will involve other 
actors providing data, analysis, management or engagement services. 
In this section, I have introduced the contemporary origins of the concepts of 
corporate responsibility and sustainability, as they have been applied to economic 
actors. Garriga and Melé’s (2004) typology of theories provides a framework for 
understanding the theories motivating investors’ choice to invest sustainably. 
Building on the observation that investment practices are integral to 
understandings of sustainable investment, I have illustrated the two strands of 
investment practices which define this investment activity. This discussion raises 
an important question: given pension schemes’ fiduciary duties – discussed in 
detail in the previous chapter – in what ways do pension schemes approach 




The question of sustainable investing and governing ‘best interests’ 
Given the long-term investment horizons of pension schemes, some have argued 
that they are particularly well suited to the long-term investment considerations 
which characterise sustainable investing (Hawley and Williams 2000; Willis Towers 
Watson, 2017). Furthermore, this interest in sustainable investing is likely to grow 
as a result of (a) the growth in private pension assets, in response to the 
retrenchment of state pension provision (Munnell, 2006), and (b) the real-world 
impact of unsustainable investing becoming more visible, shifting societal norms 
towards greater acceptance of sustainability considerations (Willis Towers 
Watson, 2017). 
As I have noted earlier, motivations and rationales for investing sustainably are 
likely to be diverse. Among those pension schemes committed to sustainable 
investing are those serving beneficiaries from religious organisations with clear 
ethical principles. There are other committed schemes which are interested in 
sustainable investing for instrumental reasons – that is, they believe that 
sustainable investing will have a positive material impact on the fund’s financial 
performance, or alternatively, they believe there will be no negative financial 
impact (but that wider societal or environmental benefits will accrue). And there 
are also likely to be other pension schemes that are involved in some kind of 
strategic ‘green-washing’ behaviour; these schemes will claim commitment but 
lack any genuine integration of sustainability issues in their investment strategies.  
But there are also many pension schemes that remain unconvinced about the 
instrumental rationale for a consideration of sustainability issues, and believe their 
fiduciary duties preclude them from considering them (Woods and Urwin, 2010), 
despite the legal advice (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005). Indeed, the turn 
to sustainable investing challenges the status quo and the assumptions 
underpinning pensions professionals’ practice (Aspinall, 2018).  
The UK Law Commission on the Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries was 
tasked with addressing the fiduciary duties of investment intermediaries, to 
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address uncertainties and misunderstandings among trustees and their advisors12. 
Within this Commission, Dr Magda Raczynska and Professor Duncan Sheehan’s 
viewpoint illustrates the perspective of those who have serious concerns about 
the integration of sustainable investing in pension schemes: 
In a large pension fund – or even most smaller ones – the idea that one 
could identify the scheme members’ views is worrisome. The most that 
could be done is to go on the basis of some democratic opinion poll, but 
that would seem to fetter the trustees’ discretion, and in any case leave a 
sour-taste at the pure majoritarianism of the mechanism... The idea that 
the membership of the Universities’ Superannuation Scheme has a view on 
investing in arms firms for example seems to us implausible.  (2014: 119)  
These perspectives identify the perceived tensions presented by sustainable 
investing, highlighting the problem that, in their eyes, fiduciary duty is to act in 
beneficiaries’ best interests but these are difficult to ascertain when wider non-
financial considerations are taken into account. Knowing beneficiaries’ best 
interests is difficult because of the plurality in ethical viewpoints among 
beneficiaries, and because it is often assumed that views must be held by every 
single member for them to be considered in their collective best interests.  From 
this perspective, sustainable investing is a headache for pension schemes: it 
reveals the difficulty in knowing the best interests of others, and the difficulty of 
knowing if these interests are shared.  
Indeed, sustainable investing that is not either based on a pre-determined shared 
ethical perspective or undertaken for instrumental reasons raises a number of 
complex problems for pension schemes. First, sustainability questions in this 
context may involve ‘technical’ knowledge (e.g. on financial considerations and 
their application to investment strategies) which pension scheme beneficiaries do 
not have, leading to relatively uninformed preferences. Second, sustainability is a 
concept that is underscored by long-term considerations, and an orientation 
 
12 This was undertaken following a recommendation in The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and 
Long-Term Decision Making (2012). 
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towards the future. However, institutions generally are incentivised to focus on 
the short-term (MacKenzie, 2018; Smith, 2021). In pensions governance 
specifically, a lack of clarity by trustees on the period over which investment 
performance is judged can lead to the problem of short-termism (Myners 2001), 
as can the structure of incentive compensation (Ambachtsheer, 2016). Third, 
sustainability questions will inevitably involve the articulation of values that 
address concerns that are wider than simply the risk-adjusted return of 
investments, but consider the flourishing of ecology, society, growth and human 
life (Portney, 2015).    
How sustainability values can be articulated, and considered in pension scheme 
investment strategies, is unclear, and raises further dilemmas. First, of all, there is 
the question of the extent to which values are shared and in agreement, and how 
consensus is defined and identified in practice13. Second, values may be plural, and 
may be driven by non-financial concerns. Pluralism may exist at the individual level 
(a single individual’s judgements may be informed by plural values), as well as 
between individuals (some individuals will have different values to others). 
Pluralism inevitably introduces complexity into decision-making, and this has 
implications for how effectively decision-making on behalf of others should be 
governed. In the legal context of a pension scheme, for governance to be lawful 
and legitimate, there will need to be a course of action that is considered by 
fiduciaries or their equivalents as fair and in the ‘best interests’ of all beneficiaries, 
despite the existence of plural values.  
Plural values also raise the spectre of incommensurability. Values are 
incommensurable when two or more options cannot be judged using the same 
criteria; no single yardstick is available to enable comparison and to form the basis 
of a judgement between them. For example, Smith (2003) and O’Neill (1997) 
highlight how environmental issues give rise to incommensurability challenges 
 
13 Legal advice from Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer clarifies that ‘a decision-maker may integrate 
ESG considerations into an investment decision to give effect to the views of the beneficiaries in 
relation to matters beyond financial return… A decision-maker who chooses to exclude an 
investment or category of investments on this basis will need to be able to point to a consensus 
amongst the beneficiaries in support of the exclusion’ (2005: 12). 
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when both economic values and environmental values inform decision-making. 
The tendency to attempt to reduce environmental values to economic terms 
mispresents these values in decision making. Even in the absence of 
incommensurability, value pluralism can still lead to ‘hard choices’, where 
different options are ‘on a par’, with no obvious way to choose between them. 
When such conditions are present, rational decision-making, in its widely accepted 
conceptualisation, is challenged (Chang, 2017).  
When pension scheme beneficiaries give expression to sustainability or social 
concerns that are broader than simply a focus on the financial risk-adjusted return, 
problems in the appraisal of options, judgement and decision-making will surface. 
For example, when beneficiaries express a wish to divest from coal, from 
investments in manufacturing that involve child labour, or from real estate that 
favours financial return over the provision of affordable housing, they are 
introducing values that may not be commensurate with the economic values 
which guide a sole focus on risk-adjusted return. In the latter case, how can the 
desire to invest in affordable housing (motivated by normative concerns) be 
appraised alongside the desire to maximise the risk-adjusted return of a scheme 
(a goal motivated by financial concerns)? Incommensurability is not necessarily a 
given – there may be scenarios when plural values can be concurrently realised in 
neat ‘win-win’ moments. In other investment decisions, such as in the real estate 
example included above, this may not be the case. In these contexts, it is not 
necessarily clear on what basis, and how, pension schemes should appraise the 
options available to them14. In the absence of simple solutions to these challenges, 
pension schemes must find ways of navigating this complex terrain (Mitchell et al., 
2016).  
Policymakers have suggested that one solution might be to understand 
beneficiaries’ preferences better (The Law Commission (UK), 2014; European 
High-Level Working Group on Sustainable Finance, 2018; House of Commons 
 
14 See the WDR documentary: Schmutzige Geschäfte mit der Rente (2020) for an insight into 
beneficiaries’ non-financial ecological and social concerns. 
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Environmental Audit Committee, 2018). These policy recommendations assume 
that all beneficiaries have well-defined sustainability preferences, and that these 
can be integrated into decision making to meet the ‘best interests’ of beneficiaries. 
But the issues highlighted previously, namely beneficiaries’ limited knowledge on 
sustainability questions, and the existence of plural values, will make this 
challenging. Given these barriers, how can the governance of pension schemes be 
shaped to better inform and understand beneficiary preferences; to handle the 
existence of plural – often conflicting – values? 
In these circumstances, where complex value-based decision making is involved,  
does sustainable investing become impossible? How can pension schemes really 
know what beneficiaries’ interests are, and the extent to which they are shared? 
Fiduciary duties grant boards the responsibility to act on behalf of the 
beneficiaries, in their best interests. But the complexity of these judgements is 
clearly increased in sustainable investment.  
Smith (2003) argues that communicative processes that inform, engage, and 
enlarge citizens’ perspectives can have value in governing complexity. If 
communication and engagement with citizens has informed complex decision 
making in environmental policy making, do they have a value in pension schemes 
and sustainable investing? If the answer is a cautious yes, then theories that focus 
upon communication – theories of voice – such as stakeholder theory, 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy may be relevant in this 
context. While each of these theories have distinctive histories and theoretical 
foci, they all share two similarities: (a) an engagement with publics in governance 
decision-making; and (b) an appreciation of the value of communication in this 
engagement. These theories provide three alternative ways of considering the 






Since the 1950’s the concept of corporate social responsibility and, following the 
Brundtland report in 1987, sustainability, have shaped contemporary perspectives 
on the role of business. Garriga and Melé’s (2004) typology of corporate social 
responsibility theories provides an insight into how different orientations and 
motivations (instrumental, political, integrative, and ethical) shape varied 
understandings and applications of corporate social responsibility, sustainability 
or environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) investing. In sustainable investing, 
approaches are not only defined by concepts and motivations but are also shaped 
by investment practices. These practices are either data-driven, involving the 
assembly and analysis of non-financial data, or driven by pension schemes’ 
shareholder rights, reflecting either active or passive ownership strategies.  
Among pension schemes, there are diverse orientations towards sustainable 
investing, ranging from the committed to the unconvinced. For some schemes it 
can be a headache; it raises complexity in knowing the best interests of others, 
and the degree to which interests are shared. Further difficulties arise from 
beneficiares’ limited technical knowledge, the incentivisation of the short-term, 
and the difficulty of articulating values that are broader than a focus on the risk-
adjusted return on investments. When these broader values are expressed, 
problems in the appraisal of options, judgement and decision-making will surface. 
In these circumstances, where complex value-based decision making is involved, 
how can fiduciaries or their equivalents govern sustainable investing? Given this 
complexity, could communicative processes that inform, engage, and enlarge 
beneficiaries’ perspectives play a role? In the following chapter I look to three 
theories of voice – stakeholder theory, participatory democracy and deliberative 
democracy – to explore their alternative theoretical perspectives and examine the 
role of communication in governing sustainable investing.  
54 
 
3.  Three Theories of Voice: Stakeholder, 
Participatory and Deliberative Theories 
Can stakeholder, participatory and deliberative theory – three theories of voice – 
provide guidance for understanding the benefits of involving beneficiaries in the 
governance of sustainable investing in pension schemes? Agency theory, emerging 
from a rational choice perspective, identifies how effective pension scheme 
governance is restricted by the problems symptomatic of agency relations, 
specifically: asymmetries in knowledge, and lack of monitoring mechanisms for 
beneficiaries. As discussed in the previous chapter, sustainable investing makes 
that task even more complex given that it can bring value pluralism into decision 
making, and decisions may be characterised by incommensurability problems 
(Smith, 2003) or ‘hard choices’ (Chang, 2017). Both agency problems, and the 
questions arising from sustainable investing, make effective governance in this 
area complex. Given these problems, policy makers have suggested that, in some 
circumstances, beneficiaries preferences should be better understood and 
addressed in decision making (The Law Commission (UK), 2014; European High-
Level Working Group on Sustainable Finance, 2018; House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee, 2018). This chapter takes this suggestion as a 
starting point and examines three prominent theories of voice and their inclusion 
of ‘publics’: stakeholder, participatory and deliberative theory. These ‘theories of 
voice’ have a shared normative focus on understanding and engaging with publics, 
whether customers, employees, citizens or others. I have defined these theories 
collectively as ‘theories of voice’, but each has its own history, with different 
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disciplinary foci and addressing specific theoretical concerns. Stakeholder theory 
has generated a significant literature over the last thirty years (Laplume et al., 
2008), as well as influencing private and public governance. Participatory 
democracy and deliberative democracy have both emerged from within the field 
of democratic theory. Participatory democracy’s influence has not only been on 
considerations of the workplace but also community development in the UK and 
internationally (e.g. Chambers, 1999; Cornwall, 2002). Deliberative theory has 
been hugely influential as a democratic theory but has also informed 
developments in citizen participation in policy-making during the last twenty years 
(Fischer, 2012; Smith, 2009).  Each of these theories represent a distinctive strand 
of theorising about the place of publics in public and private governance. Given 
their distinctiveness, each theory is illustrated in turn, along with the criticisms 
they face and their relevance for the governance of sustainability in pension 
schemes. Following this, the extent to which these theories present solutions to 
the questions raised by the governance of sustainable investing is discussed. 
The chapter begins with stakeholder theory. This theory’s relevance for this 
research lies in its strategic focus on the benefits organisations realise when they 
engage publics in their decision making. Stakeholder theory argues that 
organisations should engage with all those who can help create value, considering 
business and ethics in the strategic management of organisations. Where 
stakeholder theory is weakest is in its under-acknowledgement of multiple and 
conflicting interests, and how these can be addressed through models of 
stakeholder management in practice. 
Next, I turn to participatory democracy, perhaps a more surprising choice for any 
discussion of pension scheme governance. Participatory democracy is concerned 
with the democratic benefits of non-institutional actor involvement in firms and 
public governance. Given the growing significance of pension schemes as societal 
and financial institutions, there are good reasons for considering the democratic 
qualities of pension scheme governance in the same way that the democratic 
qualities of the firm are considered by participatory democrats. The theory brings 
an emphasis on active participation as a form of learning, which is particularly 
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relevant to contexts such as pension schemes, where knowledge asymmetries are 
prevalent. 
Finally, the relevance of deliberative democratic theory for the context of pension 
scheme governance is examined. This theory focuses on the value of 
communication for democratic decision making. The theory’s focus on the 
conditions, processes and possibilities of deliberation make it particularly 
insightful for examining the potential of voice in pension scheme governance, and 
in particular, for the consideration of preference transformation.  
By examining each of these theories in turn, this chapter explores the variety of 
ways voice in organisations can be normatively theorised. They provide fresh 
theoretical perspectives on the value of engaging with wider publics in 
organisational decision making; for individuals, for organisations and for wider 
society. 
Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory, the pre-eminent ‘theory of voice’ in the field of business and 
management, presents an argument for why a wider group of actors’ interests – 
not only the interests of shareholders – should be considered in the decision 
making of firms. Its relevance to pension schemes and sustainable investing lies, 
first, in its significant influence in management studies and second, because it 
explores the intertwining of moral and business decision making in organisations, 
and how firms create value. Focused predominantly on the work of Freeman (and 
his co-authors), a leading author in this field (Laplume et al. 2008), I outline the 
theory’s main characteristics, identifying the ways it addresses problems found in 
pension scheme governance, and questions raised by sustainable investing. 
Beginning with a discussion of the theory’s historical background, assumptions 
and claims, I examine how stakeholders are defined, how the theory understands 
value creation, and its mutual recognition of business issues and ethics in 
organisational decision making. As well as examining areas of contestation, I look 
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at the theory’s relevance, and implications, for the context of agency relations in 
pension schemes and the challenge of sustainable investing.  
Freeman published his book Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach in 
1984. It was not the first time the term ‘stakeholder’ had been used: the first 
recorded mention was in 1963 in a Stanford Research Institute report to describe 
the myriad of actors – not just the shareholders – who are critical to organisations 
and their success (Freeman et al., 2010). Freeman’s stakeholder theory, shaped by 
the discussions he was having with his colleagues in the Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania (Freeman et al., 2010), has become influential in the 
field of strategic management and beyond. The theory has been influential not 
only in the academic literature – receiving peak attention in 1999 (Laplume et al., 
2008) – but has also influenced organisational governance in the public and private 
sectors, such as New Labour’s approach to new public management in the late 
1990s and early 2000s (Prahakar, 2003). Based on pragmatist assumptions, 
stakeholder theory addresses the question of how organisations can contribute to 
human flourishing (Freeman and Wicks, 1998; Freeman et al., 2010). It considers 
three interrelated problems: (a) the problem of how value is created and traded; 
(b) problems between ethics and capitalism; and (c) the managerial mind-set and 
how managers think about value creation and business ethics (Freeman et al., 
2010). Freeman’s work is underpinned by an understanding of social science as a 
moral endeavour which examines how we can live better (Freeman et al., 2010: 
74).  
The ‘stakeholder theory’ umbrella includes an enormous diversity of perspectives 
and empirical applications (Parmar et al., 2010; Scherer and Palazzo 2011b; 
Hasnas, 2013). Although this diversity facilitates theoretical innovation, it has also 
generated conflicting assumptions and claims among theorists (Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2011). Following Gallie’s (1956) seminal argument, Miles (2012) 
characterises stakeholder theory as an essentially contested concept which is 
subject to ongoing discussion and debate. Scherer and Palazzo’s (2011b) meta-
theoretical framework and Donaldson and Preston’s (1995) taxonomy of the field 
have both sought to make some sense of the variety of assumptions, metaphors 
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and theories that are used. Donaldson and Preston (1995) identified three 
distinctive approaches in the stakeholder literature: (1) descriptive/empirical 
stakeholder theories, which empirically examine and potentially explain the 
characteristics of business-stakeholder relationships; (2) instrumental 
representations, which identify the links between stakeholder management and 
company performance; and (3) normative conceptions, which link moral or 
philosophical principles to business management. The theory has been highly 
influential in discussions of sustainability and the firm (e.g. Jones et al., 2018), but 
so far it has not been widely discussed in relation to pension schemes and 
sustainability.  
One of the central characteristics of stakeholder theory is its consideration of 
wider groups of actors, ‘stakeholders’, rather than only the financiers to whom the 
firm has legal responsibilities. This broader perspective contrasts with an agency 
perspective, which presents a more simplified account of firm actors, and their 
relations. ‘Stakeholders’, defined by Freeman, are those who ‘have a stake in or 
claim on the firm’, as well as those ‘without whose support, the business would 
cease to be viable’ (Freeman et al., 2010: 26). Stakeholder theorists therefore have 
an openness towards a range of interests that are formally outside, but related, to 
the firm. The nature of the firm’s relationship to these interests will determine 
which ethical stance is taken, whether collaboration, cooperation or containment 
(Dunham, Freeman and Liedtka, 2006). Stakeholder theory therefore opens-up a 
conversation about the significance and value of wider actors for strategic decision 
making. It is the active management of the business environment, stakeholder 
relationships, and the creation of shared value which lies at the heart of 
stakeholder theory (Freeman and McVea, 2017). 
The goal of stakeholder management is the realisation of ‘value’, not defined, for 
example, by the risk-adjusted return on investment, but as a broader social 
phenomenon that is realised for stakeholders as well as the organisation. As 
Freeman and his colleagues argue, stakeholder theory asks ‘how we could 
redefine, re-describe, or reinterpret stakeholder interests so that we can figure 
out a way to satisfy both, or to create more value for both’ (Freeman et al., 2010: 
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15-16). It is through effective stakeholder management that maximum value is 
created and distributed. Central to stakeholder theory’s conceptualisation of value 
is that both business and ethical decision making are entwined. In contrast with 
scholars who focus on corporate social responsibility as a separate domain of 
management, stakeholder theorists discuss corporate social responsibility as a 
consideration that is an intrinsic part of value creation. For stakeholder theorists, 
creating value in its broadest sense involves the joint consideration of business 
and ethics, through the process of stakeholder management. This distinction is 
significant; stakeholder management becomes the means of realising value for 
business and society. As Freeman and Moutchnik state: 
CSR [corporate social responsibility] is built on false conceptual distinctions 
such as (1) facts and values; (2) business and ethics; (3) social and 
economic; (4) business and social, and others. It is almost an apology about 
business being about the money and self-interest, so that some ‘social’ 
compensation is necessary. If you change the underlying narrative of 
business to see it as ‘creating value for all stakeholders’, then CSR just isn’t 
necessary. This is a subtle but important point: as long as we continue to 
talk about CSR as separate from ‘the business’, then we are implicitly 
approving of the old narrative of business. (2013: 6) 
Stakeholder theorists have no single definition of a stakeholder. Stakeholders are 
defined by the organisation at hand, their model of value creation (Freeman, 
2015), and their industrial context (Parmar et al., 2010). Not all stakeholders will 
be equally important (Freeman and McVea, 2017), and their relative importance 
may change over time. The principles underlying stakeholder identification are 
critical in shaping which stakeholders are defined as more or less significant. One 
approach is to evaluate them as either primary stakeholders, upon whose support 
an organisation needs to exist, or secondary stakeholders, who have no formal 
claim to the firm, and the firm has no duties towards other than moral duties 
(Gibson, 2000). Another approach, taken by Phillips et al. (2003), distinguishes 
between stakeholders according to meritocratic values (those who make the 
greatest contribution to the firm), and according to moral values (those to which 
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a firm has the strongest moral obligation). Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) 
typologise stakeholder identification into three categories: identification based on 
power/resources; identification based on perceived legitimacy; and identification 
based on a degree of urgency. Stakeholders are therefore identified, first as a 
result of the organisation, its model of value creation and its context. And second, 
as a result of the principles which underscore their identification.   
In contrast with the widespread use of stakeholder theory in discussions of 
corporate governance, it has not been widely applied to pension scheme 
governance. Notable exceptions are Ambachtsheer (2008; 2016) and De Kruijf and 
de Vries (2014). Ambachtsheer et al. (2008) identify communication with 
stakeholders – particularly beneficiaries – as central to the effective governance 
of pension schemes. De Kruijf and de Vries (2014) also identify pension scheme 
stakeholders, and discuss them in terms of four bilateral relationships: ‘(1) retired 
and active plan members; (2) employers (organisations) and employees (trade 
unions); (3) government and pension funds; and (4) the board of pension funds 
and the participants in those funds’ (2014: 334). Additionally, they characterise 
these stakeholder groups by their varied levels of knowledge, and varied levels of 
influence on pension scheme governance. Both of these applications of 
stakeholder theory illuminate how it can enhance understandings of pension 
scheme governance by clarifying: first, the breadth of actors significant to pension 
schemes; second, these actors’ motives and interests; third, the nature of their 
relationships to each other (and not only in principal-agent arrangements); and 
finally, their varying levels of knowledge and influence.  
But there is a further aspect of stakeholder theory which is particularly 
enlightening for understanding pension scheme governance and sustainable 
investing. The goal of stakeholder management is the realisation of ‘value’: not 
simply value as defined as the risk-adjusted return on investment, but value as a 
social phenomenon, created through relationships (Freeman et al., 2010). 
Stakeholder theorists understand strategic management as the means through 
which maximum value can be created and distributed. And central to effective 
stakeholder management, and its creation of value, is the consideration of ethical 
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issues in business. For stakeholder theorists, corporate sustainability is not a 
separate concept, or a separate domain of management – sustainability 
considerations are part of effective stakeholder management (Freeman and 
Moutchnik, 2013: 6). From this perspective, sustainable investing can therefore be 
realised if a pension scheme’s significant stakeholders regard sustainability as part 
of the ‘value’ of a pension. Stakeholder theorists argue that effective stakeholder 
management is the means of realising this outcome.   
Stakeholder theory illustrates how organisations identify value by engaging with 
stakeholders. It suggests that if these stakeholders value ‘sustainability’, then 
effective organisations will respond to this in their model of value creation. But 
the theory leaves many questions unanswered. Laplume et al. (2008) have collated 
criticisms of stakeholder theory, which include critiques of its theoretical 
assumptions (e.g. Balmer, Fukukawa and Gray, 2007), its breadth (e.g. Kline, 2006), 
its divergence (e.g. Donaldson, 1999), its effectiveness (e.g. Child and Marcoux, 
1999), and its relevance for smaller enterprises (e.g. Perrini, 2006). One of the 
most pertinent criticisms relevant to this discussion of pension schemes is that the 
theory fails to address, and even exacerbates, existing agency problems in 
organisations. Specifically, Heath and Norman (2004) argue that stakeholder 
management creates a multi-principal environment, with each principal (or 
stakeholder) having varied and potentially conflicting interests. This makes 
management decision making and accountability more complex and performance 
less easily assessed. It is argued that, perversely, it increases the likelihood of 
agents pursing their own interests, rather than realising socially responsible 
outcomes. Jensen (2002) argues that stakeholder theory fails to identify a single 
valued objective for the firm, and therefore lacking clarity on the purpose of 
management decision making. According to these critiques, stakeholder theory 
adds further complexity to principal-agent relations, rather than simplifying or 
remedying them. 
A second important line of criticism is that stakeholder theory does not sufficiently 
discuss hierarchy and inequality among stakeholders – some stakeholders will be 
more important than others within an organisation’s management decision 
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making (Gioia, 1999), and their relative positions will be informed by the firm’s 
legal obligations. Freeman acknowledges that stakeholders will have varied 
viewpoints (2004) and that executives must make attractive trade-offs between 
these (Freeman et al., 2010). However, the practical question of how stakeholders’ 
views can be best integrated into management decision making is left open.  
The method of stakeholder input is an open question. Everything from 
stakeholder representation on boards of directors to informal and non-
specific ‘concern’ for stakeholders by decision-makers has been suggested. 
However it is achieved, it is important for the sake of ethics, psychological 
well-being, and organizational success that stakeholders be accorded some 
say in determining not only how much of the organization’s outputs they 
receive, but how those outputs are created. (Phillips et al., 2003: 490) 
Fourth, while the stakeholder perspective argues that stakeholders’ concerns 
should be ‘intermeshed’ together (Freeman and Moutchnik, 2013: 4), the question 
remains: which conditions, structures, processes and procedures best realise this 
‘intermeshing’? Some theorists have developed practical models for bringing 
stakeholder perspectives into management decision making, such as Driver and 
Thompson‘s (2002) ‘corporate senate’. This is presented as a place where 
‘established interests could be finally bought together into a decision making or 
advisory arena alongside the other (stakeholder) interests’ (2002: 125). But 
further understanding of the models of stakeholder management, and the 
principles which underscore them, are needed since these design choices shape 
the form, structure and scope of stakeholder influence. This will clarify how 
stakeholder management can be achieved in practice, whether in corporations or 
in pension schemes.  
Stakeholder theory is best understood as a theory offering an alternative set of 
assumptions to agency theory and articulating a contrasting theoretical narrative 
on management and value creation. It does not directly refer to principal-agent 
problems such as asymmetrical information and knowledge, or the challenges of 
monitoring. Instead, it develops a normative argument for the consideration of a 
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wider range of stakeholders in the creation of value. There are two aspects of 
stakeholder theory that are particularly relevant for the context of pension 
schemes and investing: its focus on stakeholders (i.e. primarily beneficiaries in this 
context) in the value creation process, and its consideration of business and ethics 
as intertwined. For stakeholder theorists, both these considerations are addressed 
through effective stakeholder management. The theory has been criticised on a 
number of grounds. First, that it offers little insight into the practicalities of 
achieving multi-stakeholder goals, and how these can be managed (Gioia, 1999; 
Jenson, 2002).  And second, the claim that it exacerbates rather than remedies 
principal-agent problems (e.g. Heath and Norman, 2004). But a concern which is 
even more relevant is the lack of detail on how stakeholder interests should be 
considered, as well as on the types of structures and processes which enable 
effective stakeholder management. Stakeholder theory offers a valuable 
normative perspective on the benefits of engaging with significant actors, but 
leaves much open as to how stakeholder management is accomplished. 
Participatory democracy  
Participatory democracy emphasises the active engagement of publics in the 
governance of organisations, and has influenced the governance of social 
movements (della Porta, 2013), workplaces (Pateman, 1970) and international 
development institutions (Chambers, 1999; Cornwall, 2002). This section explores 
how participatory democracy can enlighten us about involving members in 
pension scheme governance. Currently, participating in a pension scheme simply 
denotes membership, with fiduciaries or their equivalents responsible for 
governance decision-making. Participatory democracy emphasises a different 
type of participation which empowers individuals in the decision making of 
institutions.  
In this section I refer to ‘participatory’ democracy and ‘active participation’ to 
describe the type of involvement of members in the governance and decision 
making of pension schemes. Starting with an examination of the normative 
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commitments of participatory democracy, I then discuss the value and implication 
of this theory to pension scheme governance, and the challenges presented by 
agency theory. Critiques of the theory, along with problems of taking a 
participatory approach to pension scheme governance are explored, assessing the 
relevance of participatory democracy for this context. 
Active participation has been conceived since the 1960s as a form of democratic 
experience and action, presenting a distinctive alternative to elite liberal theories 
of representative government. Participatory principles formed the basis of the 
organisation of student protest movements at that time (Hilmer, 2010; Floridia, 
2017), as well as alternative forms of political theory. Penncock summarises the 
participatory purpose as an impulse to:  
Maximise the opportunities for all citizens to take part themselves, to share 
in making decisions that will affect their lives, and of course in the 
deliberations and group activities of all kinds that lead to these decisions… 
it is valued for its assumed contribution to self-development as much as for 
its advancement of personal interests through public policy. (1979: 441) 
Carol Pateman’s Participation and Democratic Theory (1970) is arguably the 
fundamental text in this tradition of theorising  responds to elite liberal democratic 
theories by developing ‘a participatory theory of democracy’. Re-interpreting 
Mill’s argument for small-scale democracy as well as Cole’s argument for guild 
institutions, Pateman (1970) theorises the value of democratic workplaces. She 
argues that the significant impact of workplaces on individuals’ lives and well-
being is the basis of the normative case for greater democratic control by workers 
in decision making. It is the institutional significance of workplaces which 
underscored her argument for democratisation along participatory lines.  
The basis of Pateman’s (1970) theory is the notion that active participation is an 
educative process where democratic learning takes place. She argues that through 
active participation in decision making citizens develop democratic knowledge and 
skills are developed, which can then be exercised in other areas of their life. In 
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Pateman’s eyes, participatory democracy is a way of learning by doing. She quotes 
Mill: 
We do not learn to read or write, to ride or swim, by being merely told how 
to do it, but by doing it, and it is only by practicing popular government on 
a limited scale, that the people will ever learn how to exercise it on a larger. 
(1970: 31) 
This focus on the learning that takes place in participatory institutions is a 
distinctive part of Pateman’s participatory democracy. She sees workplace 
participation as means of educating and building the capacities of citizens. The 
learning that they gain – about democratic decision making and control – will, she 
argues, support their engagement in democratic politics more widely. 
Participatory democratic workplaces, society and politics are conceptualised as 
mutually reinforcing spheres of activity – with active participation in one sphere 
supporting active participation in others.  
Although Pateman’s classic contribution was published almost 50 years ago, the 
concept of the workplace as an incubator for improved societal democratic 
relations continues to be influential (e.g. Estlund, 2003). In Strong Democracy 
(2003), Benjamin Barber emphasises active participation as a catalyst for the 
development of common, shared interests and a wider sense of citizenship. The 
common thread between both Pateman (1970) and Barber (2003) is the notion 
that participatory democracy – whether in the workplace or elsewhere – 
strengthens individuals’ active participation in democracy more widely.  
There have been a number of different criticisms of the participatory perspective. 
Warren (1996a) questions the radical democratic argument that it is a lack of 
knowledge, experience or skills, or even opportunity, that limits active 
participation in politics. Rather, he argues, individuals may choose to avoid 
complex and demanding politics entirely out of choice. He suggests that 
participatory democracy is unlikely to realise its ambitious goals for an engaged 
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citizenry, arguing that it over-simplifies the varied reasons for individuals’ lack of 
engagement with democratic politics.  
Cooke and Kothari (2002) criticise the assumption that active participation in 
governance leads to greater control. In their discussion of participatory structures 
in international development, they argue that these structures to often fail to 
realise their goals. Rather than empowering participants, institutionalised 
participation co-opts. International and national development institutions use 
participatory structures to gain buy-in into institutional pre-arranged goals, and 
participatory structures serve to de-politicise these goals rather than 
democratising them (Cooke, 2013). Indeed, there are many instrumental reasons 
why institutions may establish participatory processes with citizens, not least of 
which is the avoidance of litigation (Irwin and Stansbury, 2004). These critical 
perspectives highlight that citizens and institutions will have varying – and 
potentially conflicting – objectives and the institutionalisation of participatory 
opportunities may not necessarily realise its ambitions for the empowerment of 
citizens in institutional contexts. 
Along with these theoretical critiques, one of the most significant challenges to 
participatory democracy is the impact of economic, social and cultural inequalities 
on active participation. Active participation demands time and skills, and this too 
often leads to the dominance of those with available time, fewer financial 
constraints, confidence, and perceived eloquence. This creates democratic 
inequality where already more privileged interests can easily dominate over the 
interests of the poor, less educated, female and those from minority ethnic or 
cultural groups. As Bachrach and Botwinick (1992) highlight, participatory 
democracy can fail not only because of existing inequalities, but because the time-
intensive mode of active participation which, in contrast with other democratic 
modes such as voting, requires a relatively high level of commitment. This 
inevitably limits who takes part and raises the question of whether participatory 
democracy tends to foster rather than constrain social and economic inequalities, 
essentially creating a participatory elite. Mansbridge’s (1983) influential study of 
participatory decision making in a New England Town Meeting and workers’ 
67 
 
cooperative illustrates this problem clearly, identifying how individuals tended to 
under-acknowledge the very real impact of inequalities on their own and others 
involvement in participatory structures. For participatory governance to be 
democratic, it must successfully address the economic, social and cultural 
inequalities, and their impact on shaping who actively participates. 
The response of participatory theorists to these persistent challenges has been 
varied. Some have argued that while active participation may foster inequalities in 
the short-term, the longer-term implications of participatory democracy lead to 
greater equality, as a result of increased worker control (Bachrach and Botwinick, 
1992). Rather than assume that these inequalities will be minimised in the future, 
Cornwall (2002) suggests that the active participation of the least empowered 
should be facilitated. This ‘tactical’ approach involves informing, educating and 
developing the political capabilities of the excluded. The participatory budgeting 
process of Porto Alegre, in its early years (1989–2004), is one of the most 
commonly cited examples of a participatory structure that actively sought to 
reduce exclusion, with incentives to promote engagement among economically 
marginalised groups (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012). As well as seeking to realise 
equality in active participation, it also aimed to provide an educative and 
empowering learning process, and allocate genuine control over local decision 
making (Baiocchi, 2001).  
Given the ambitions of participatory democracy, and its predominant focus on 
firms and public governance, in what way does it have relevance for the problems 
of pension scheme governance and sustainable investing? Active participation in 
decision making stands in direct contrast to the principal-agent relationship; 
rather than a principal relying on an agent to act in their best interests, in 
participatory structures individuals have the opportunity act for themselves. As 
Pateman (1970) highlights, participation facilitates learning and the creation of 
knowledge. While Pateman stresses its value in learning about democratic 
governance, it is also the case that those actively involved in governance learn 
about the business or organisation, its strategies, management and performance. 
After all, active participation in governance involves shaping decisions on these 
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matters and learning about democratic processes happens as a consequence of 
this participation. In pension scheme governance, active participation therefore 
offers the possibility of improving beneficiary knowledge and addressing the 
knowledge imbalances that agency theory highlights. The value of participatory 
democracy for understanding pension scheme governance therefore lies in its 
capacity to address the knowledge imbalances between beneficiaries and 
schemes. The theory’s value is less clear when the practicalities of governance are 
considered more closely. More specifically, two particular questions arise: can 
participatory learning really bridge the knowledge gap between beneficiaries and 
finance professionals – especially when it is widely observed that fiduciaries or 
their equivalents often lack sufficient understanding (Clark, 2004)? And who can, 
and would, participate actively in pension scheme governance?  
(Quasi-)mandatory pension systems seek to extend participation in pension 
schemes, that is, to expand their membership. But as of yet, there is less policy 
interest in the participatory engagement of beneficiaries as active participants in 
scheme governance. Participatory democracy has primarily considered the 
engagement of workers in firms and citizens in public governance, but elements 
of this theory are relevant to pension schemes and sustainable investing. Through 
active participation in decision making beneficiaries themselves have greater 
influence. And the learning that active participation fosters enables beneficiaries 
to become more knowledgeable – addressing the knowledge imbalances 
identified by agency theory. Participatory democracy has been criticised from 
multiple perspectives, and one of the most pertinent is that it fails to address – 
and even exacerbates – inequalities. Those with the most time, resources and skills 
more likely to actively participate in governance and shape the form and outcome 
of decisions; those who are time-poor, lacking in skills or confidence are likely to 
be under-represented. Such inequalities are likely to be heightened even more in 
pension schemes. The risk remains that a particular stratum of time-rich and 
educated beneficiaries, or established interest groups, will take the opportunity to 
become involved, and dominate participatory processes (Irwin and Stansbury, 
2004). A further risk is the instrumental use of participatory processes to serve a 
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scheme’s own institutional goals, rather than reflect beneficiary interests. These 
challenges reflect the complexity of realising participatory goals in the context of 
pension schemes. While participatory theorists argue there are ambitious benefits 
to be realised by greater citizen involvement in decision making, there are many 
challenges to their achievement in practice. 
Deliberative democratic theory  
Deliberative democracy provides a third theoretical perspective on voice, again 
emerging from democratic theory. As a body of literature, it contains diverse 
theoretical influences, with the work of Rawls (1971), Habermas (1984, 1996) and 
the American pragmatists informing its theoretical presuppositions (Floridia, 
2017). Just like stakeholder theory and participatory democracy, deliberative 
democratic theorists address the question of voice and how a public can be 
involved in decision making. Its primary focus is on the conditions required for 
voice, and its value for collective interest formation and decision outcomes (for 
example, the epistemic benefits of deliberation). This section presents a discussion 
of the theory’s central characteristics, pulling out the assumptions, concepts and 
debates which are particularly relevant to pension scheme governance and 
sustainable investing. Most deliberative democratic theorists focus upon 
democracy in the public domain, and on matters of collective public interest – as 
reflected in the theoretical focus on deliberation among a public, and in the 
empirical focus on constitutional, political, state or policy issues. However, the 
influence of deliberative democratic theory has stretched to civil society 
organisations and, more recently, to the governance of private institutions such as 
firms (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Scherer et al., 2016; Schormair and Gilbert, 
2020).  
Deliberative democratic theory developed not only in response to competing 
democratic theories, including participatory democracy, but also in response to 
the conditions of contemporary liberal democracies during the latter part of the 
20th Century. These include a widespread disenchantment with politics and lack of 
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trust in politicians; low levels of political awareness and limited and unequal levels 
of political participation; and highly partisan media outlets that entrenched 
conflict (Chappell, 2012).  The theory stands in contrast to aggregative voting-
centred theories (Talissse, 2015); agonism’s focus on the inherent conflicts found 
in liberal democracies (Mouffe, 2000); and pluralism’s focus on the competition 
between interest groups (Chappell, 2012). It critiques assumptions of the self-
interested individual with exogenous preferences (Chambers, 2003; Freeman, 
2000) and instead focuses on the role and value of deliberation – the exchange of 
reasons on a fair an equal basis – as a means of shaping preferences and crafting 
collective democratic decisions.  
Deliberative democracy, broadly defined, is thus any one of a family of 
views according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens 
is the core of legitimate political decision making. (Bohman, 1998: 401)  
A distinctive aspect of deliberative democracy, in comparison to stakeholder and 
participatory theories, is the attention given to the form of rationality which 
communication according to deliberative principles fosters. Habermas’ (1996) 
elaboration of communicative rationality informs many deliberative democratic 
theorists’ work. He argues that communication forms the basis of the social co-
ordination of action, through the creation of claims which are mutually 
understood as valid. As Dryzek succinctly summarises: ‘communicative rationality 
finds its grounding in the linguistic interaction of collective life’ (1990: 220). It is 
through public communication that a shared, collective rationality forms, and this 
is the basis of decision making around commonly agreed upon actions.  
Deliberative democratic theory shares with stakeholder theory and participatory 
democracy an interest in the involvement of a wider public in organisational 
decision making. But deliberative democracy focuses not only on their inclusion, 
but also the conditions necessary for their free and equal participation (Cohen, 
1996; Smith, 2009). Deliberation stands in contrast to forms of instrumental and 
coercive behaviour that restrict freedom, looking instead to conditions that foster 
mutual respect (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996) and trust (Sanders, 1997). 
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Equality among individuals and perspectives are regarded as essential: individuals 
should have equal opportunity to participate and be active deliberators; and all 
perspectives should be expressed and considered (Smith, 2003).  
Deliberation is taken to generate distinctive benefits, such as an openness to and 
understanding of the perspectives of others (Freeman, 2000). Communicative 
rationality orientates individuals towards collective interests and a common good 
rather than the pre-determined interests of the individual (Talisse, 2012). 
Deliberative democracy’s treatment of preferences further distinguishes it from 
agency theory – and more broadly social and rational choice theory in political 
science (Dryzek, 2000). Rather than treating preferences as pre-given and 
essentially determined by an actor’s position and circumstances, deliberative 
democratic theory recognises their flexibility and their potential transformation 
under democratic conditions (Elster, 1986). Public deliberation, it is argued, 
creates the circumstances whereby individuals’ preferences are voiced, listened 
to and tested. Through mutual listening, engagement, and reflection – a 
deliberative exchange between individuals – more considered preferences 
emerge. Transformation does not necessarily equate to significant change; rather 
preferences are now held for good reason. The theory conceptualises preferences 
not as something that are fixed, but as mutable under democratic conditions.  
Deliberation not only helps realise a shared understanding of the common good, 
but for some theorists it is the process that realises the most valid 
conceptualisation of the common good. Deliberation is taken to be the most 
effective process for realising an outcome that in the best interests of the 
collective; an argument which is often known as the epistemic justification for 
deliberation: ‘democratic deliberation and agreement is the best (if not the only) 
means we have for ascertaining truth about the common good and laws that best 
promote it’ (Freeman 2000: 384). Central to this epistemic formulation is the idea 
that deliberation is informed: both in terms of information on the matters at hand, 
but also in understanding the views, reasons and justifications of others. Talisse 
describes the deliberative process as: 
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A respect for other citizens that is manifested by providing them with 
reasons for our beliefs and preferences and by listening to the reasons they 
in turn provide. The underlying assumption is that in the public, 
deliberative forum participants need to go beyond sharing their opinions 
and reasons, to presenting reasons that others can also accept, involving a 
shared process of their consideration. (2012: 210) 
A further justification for democratic deliberation is that it enhances the 
accountability and legitimacy of institutional decision making. In contrast to elite 
deliberations which take place behind closed doors, accountability is strengthened 
because of the public nature of deliberation – citizens are able to hear and see for 
themselves how opinions and arguments are made. Accountability, among 
deliberative democrats ‘is primarily understood in terms of ‘giving an account’ of 
something, that is, publicly articulating, explaining and most importantly 
justifying’ (Chambers, 2003: 308). This deep understanding of accountability is not 
just between institutions and those who they govern, but also among the 
governed themselves, between members of a deliberating public. It is the public 
aspect of deliberation, as a form of social interaction, that is central to realising 
enhanced accountability. It is not only accountability that is strengthened by 
democratic deliberation, but even more significantly, legitimacy is also reinforced. 
For Rawls, one of the benefits of deliberative communication on decisions, and 
their justification with reasons that all can accept as democratic citizens, is that it 
fosters more legitimate political institutions (Freeman, 2000: 379).   
Deliberative democratic theory is not without its critics, who address its 
weaknesses from different vantage points. It has been criticised by Pincione and 
Tesón (2006), who question its assumptions from a rational choice perspective. At 
the centre of their argument is a concern with the epistemic claims made by 
deliberative democrats: deliberation cannot meet epistemic standards because 
citizens do not have a sufficiently informed understanding of the social world. 
They point to the use of rhetoric by lobbyists and politicians, who have an 
incentive to distort and mislead citizens, leading to spurious arguments in 
deliberations. In such circumstances, they argue, the best epistemic outcome is 
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unlikely to be realised through deliberation. While Pincione and Tesón (2006) state 
they are not against deliberation as an activity – as a freedom – they do remain 
unconvinced by the epistemic claims of theorists.  
Like other theories of voice, inequality manifests itself as a further challenge to 
deliberative democracy. Economic and social inequalities limit freedom, equality 
and the expression of liberty, respect and fairness for all in deliberative processes 
(Sanders 1997: 349). Deliberative democratic theorists can be accused of under-
acknowledging the impact of these inequalities and the exclusions they foster. 
Deliberation – as a source of democratic agency – may reinforce these social and 
economic inequalities in a way that other democratic procedures manage to 
avoid. Furthermore, as Sanders (1997) and Young (2000) highlight the deliberative 
ideal tends to promote ‘rational’ communication over others, devaluing norms of 
communication that are based on emotion, testimony, rhetoric or cultural 
practices. Given that these latter norms are more common forms of expression 
among citizens with lower levels of formal education, the result is that these 
perspectives are less likely to be present, heard, or valued in deliberations. Such 
critics argue that rational communication is reified by deliberative democrats over 
other forms of communication. This important and influential critique against the 
deliberative ideal has also been reiterated in the literature on deliberation in 
corporations (Dawkins, 2015). 
A final prominent critique argues against the claims that democratic deliberation 
delivers institutional legitimacy. Pennington (2010) argues that institutional 
legitimacy comes, not from an effective deliberative process, but from 
institutional performance (Pennington, 2010: 169). If institutional policies serve 
the needs of their citizens effectively then they will achieve legitimacy among 
citizens. In contrast, effective deliberative procedures which leads to bad policy 
outcomes will not enhance institutional legitimacy. For Pennington (2010), it is 
therefore the institutional policy outcomes that should be the focus of the 
discussion rather than deliberative procedures. 
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While these critics raise pertinent concerns, second generation deliberative 
democrats have broadened the conceptualisation of deliberation, away from a 
focus on reasons to include a wider range of expression (Bächtiger et al., 2018), in 
ways that are sensitive to broader approaches to what counts as deliberation 
(Young, 1996; 2000). Additionally, the emerging literature on the design of citizen 
engagement models influenced by deliberative democracy also has addressed the 
type of conditions necessary to ensure the realisation of equality (Siu and 
Stanisevski, 2012) as well as reason-giving (Collingwood and Reedy, 2012). Despite 
these criticisms, evidence is emerging that the boarder public have higher levels 
of confidence and trust in deliberative institutions when compared to established 
bodies such as legislatures (Warren and Gastil, 2015).  
The application of deliberative ideas to corporate governance (Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2011b) indicates the merit of considering the place of deliberation in 
forms of voice in pension schemes. Communicative rationality presents an 
alternative form of rationality – distinct from the instrumental rationality which 
grounds agency theory and social choice theory (Dryzek, 2002). Viewing pension 
scheme governance through the lens of deliberative democracy starts with an 
acknowledgement of the need to create conditions for communicative rather than 
instrumental forms of rationality. Looked at in this way, pension scheme 
governance can be understood, not only in terms of the various actors (e.g. 
principals, agents) and their pre-determined interests, but also in terms of the 
mode of communication between these actors, and the potential of democratic 
deliberation for generating mutual interests and collectively agreed actions.  
Deliberative democratic theory provides an alternative way of conceptualising and 
addressing the problems of knowledge and monitoring raised by agency theory. 
From a principal agent perspective, knowledge describes a position of 
understanding on governance decision making and organisational performance. 
Deliberative democratic theory also addresses the idea of informed and 
knowledgeable citizens, but focuses on how this knowledge is created through a 
fair and equal process of public deliberation and reason giving. Through processes 
of public deliberation it is argued that citizens become more informed, 
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knowledgeable and able to contribute to better decision outcomes. They are also 
able to bring to bear their ‘local’ or experiential knowledge that is difficult for 
fiduciaries or their equivalents to access. In the case of pension schemes this 
process of knowledge creation may include, for example, shared understandings 
of organisational performance. If the communicative basis of knowledge is 
accepted, then the ideal of deliberative democracy suggests shared knowledge 
can be created between principals and agents, limiting the knowledge imbalances 
between them.   
Similarly, just as agency theory highlights the problems beneficiaries have 
monitoring their pension schemes, so deliberative democrats discuss the potential 
of deliberation to enhance accountability of institutions. The two theories are 
focused on different concepts, but they are not unrelated. Accountability 
describes a commitment by an institution to be transparent about actions, 
performance and their consequences. In contrast, monitoring describes simply the 
ability of a principal to have oversight of institutional actions, performance and 
their consequences. Accountability encapsulates monitoring, and more 
accountable institutions are more easily monitored. If democratic deliberation in 
institutions improves accountability, as is claimed, then it should also improve the 
availability of monitoring opportunities. For pension scheme governance, the 
implications are that forms of public deliberation will enhance beneficiaries’ 
opportunities to monitor their schemes. 
Deliberative democratic theory has particular merit for the issue of sustainable 
investing. In its simplest form, sustainability describes the consideration of 
environmental and social factors, in the long-term. This simple formulation hides 
the complexity involved in making sustainability decisions, which involve the 
expression of values. Deliberative democratic procedures may be particularly 
valuable in this context (Smith, 2003). A genuine consideration of plural 
perspectives, through open and inclusive engagement with others, is more likely 
to result in a decision-making process which reflects a breadth of values, and 
includes consideration of values which prioritise wider, collective sustainability 
concerns. Deliberation is a process under which these more public good 
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considerations are given due weight. This perspective suggests that democratic 
deliberation may be particularly well-suited to the complexity of sustainable 
investing. Like stakeholder theory, it is a theory which seeks the inclusion of plural 
values and opinions. But in contrast to stakeholder theory, it provides greater 
clarity on the characteristics and conditions required for shared preferences and 
notions of the common good to develop. These qualities make it particularly 
relevant for the challenges raised by sustainable investing. 
Of all the criticisms of deliberative democracy, perhaps the most pertinent for the 
context of pension schemes, is the challenge of involving the public on a free and 
equal basis. Deliberations with pension scheme beneficiaries will be influenced by 
wider socio-economic inequalities and societal discriminations. And the 
complexity involved in judging investing and sustainability is likely to exacerbate 
the problem further, with potential epistemic advantages to more educated 
members. This is where mini-publics and other similar models, discussed in more 
detail in chapter eight, offer pertinent insights into how publics can be informed 
in practice, to provide opinions on complex or contested policy questions. Such 
institutions are designed to ensure the inclusion of a diverse group of participants 
and through facilitation and learning ensure that they are in a position to engage 
in informed deliberations. Their capacity to bring forward reasoned 
recommendations on highly complex issues, including scientific and technological 
developments, indicates how these challenges might be ameliorated in the 
context of pension schemes. Any institutionalisation of deliberation in this context 
would require an approach which directly acknowledges and addresses the 
challenges of inequality and epistemic deficits.   
The theoretical language of deliberative democracy helps us to reconsider the 
assumptions and claims of pension scheme governance as theorised in agency 
theory. Based on the concept of communicative rationality, it discusses the place 
of public deliberation in democratic decision making, and the conditions required 
for its success. Through informed public deliberation, based on a fair and equal 
exchange of reasons, deliberative democrats have argued this creates the 
conditions for the transformation of preferences and the development of shared 
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understandings of the common good. For institutions, it is argued that deliberative 
democracy delivers the best decision outcome (the epistemic argument), as well 
as enhanced institutional accountability and legitimacy. Despite the critiques to 
deliberative democracy, it is clear that this theoretical perspective offers a 
valuable lens through which to view the specific challenges found in pension 
scheme governance and sustainable investing.  
Concluding comments 
This chapter examined three theories of voice – stakeholder theory, participatory 
and deliberative democratic theory – and analysed their relevance for pension 
scheme governance and the challenges presented by sustainable investing. 
Agency theory clarifies how pension scheme governance is characterised by 
pervasive knowledge asymmetries between principals and agents, and a lack of 
monitoring opportunities for principals. Sustainable investing introduces the 
additional problem of incommensurability – the problems of comparing and 
evaluating options that have no common denominator for comparison, or give rise 
to ‘hard choices’ (Chang, 2017). In this context how can pension schemes 
understand their beneficiaries’ values, the extent to which they are shared, and 
govern effectively? 
The three theories have distinctive assumptions and differing theoretical goals. 
However, they all share a normative concern with the role of publics in 
organisational decision making. Each of these theories of voice bring a different 
contribution to the discussion of these challenges. Stakeholder theory focuses on 
the concept of value, the role of stakeholders in defining value, and the 
intertwining of moral and business issues. Using this theoretical perspective, 
sustainable investing will become a reality if it represents value to its various 
beneficiaries. This particular perspective lacks detail on how stakeholders should 
be involved in this process of value creation, as well as lacking an 
acknowledgement of the presence of competing interests and plural opinions, and 
how these can be managed in practice. 
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Participatory democracy, a theory of voice which emerged from democratic 
theory, brings another contribution to the discussion of pension scheme 
governance and sustainable investing. The active participation of beneficiaries in 
pension scheme governance develops beneficiaries’ knowledge vis à vis their 
pension scheme. Active participation enables beneficiaries to become more 
knowledgeable not only about democratic governance, but also managerial 
matters, including sustainable investing. One of the major challenges to 
participatory democracy is the impact of social and economic inequalities on 
differential rates of active participation, although theorists and practitioners 
acknowledge this, and have sought to address this theoretically and in practice. 
Participatory democracy illustrates how the act of participating can become a 
learning process, diminishing some of the knowledge asymmetries identified by 
agency theory.  
Deliberative democratic theory, based on an understanding of communicative 
rationality, examines the value of informed, open, reason-based public 
deliberation, and its place in transforming preferences and developing shared 
interests and understandings of the common good (Freeman, 2000); notions that 
are relevant for decision making on sustainability in pension schemes. Deliberative 
democratic theory has been critiqued on a number of grounds, including its 
reification of reason over other communication styles, leading to inequality within 
deliberation (Young, 2000). However, it offers potential answers to the specific 
challenges found in pension scheme governance and sustainable investing. The 
theory’s focus on the development of shared understandings through deliberative 
communication, as well as enhanced accountability through deliberation are both 
highly relevant. Building upon this theoretical basis, it is possible to imagine that 
public deliberation may play a part in developing shared understandings of 
sustainability, as well as contributing to enhanced accountability within 
governance decision making.  
These theories of voice have predominately been applied to firms or to public 
institutions, and each of these initiate a distinctive theoretical conversation on 
governance. Each, in their own way, challenges the assumptions of agency theory 
79 
 
and develops normative claims – for individuals and for organisations – on voice, 
and its benefits. In this chapter I have identified the ways in which their central 
arguments are relevant to understanding pension scheme governance and the 
task of sustainable investing. Going forward, in the following chapter I will 
synthesise their concerns into one conceptual framework which I will later use to 




4.  Analysing Pension Scheme Governance: A 
Conceptual Framework of Voice 
In this chapter, I distil the normative ambitions of stakeholder theory, 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy into an integrative 
conceptual framework of voice. The framework assembles the main insights from 
these theories to guide the empirical analysis of voice in pension schemes. 
Integrative conceptual frameworks such as this are beneficial for several reasons: 
first, by integrating three theories of voice, it provides a robust theoretical basis 
for this analysis; second, it links theoretical ambitions with the practice of voice; 
and third, it enables the comparison of the practice of voice across different sites 
or cases. As such, this framework provides a basis for analysing the empirical 
practice of voice, and the extent to which voice realises normative aspirations of 
stakeholder theory, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy.  
Towards a conceptual framework of voice 
The conceptual framework outlined in this chapter merges perspectives from 
stakeholder, participatory and deliberative theories together into a synthetic 
structure; inevitably incorporating some features which are common, as well as 
some features which are either unique to one particular theory or are articulated 
in notably different ways. By blending their concerns, the conceptual framework 
provides a theoretically-grounded, integrated conceptual framework of voice that 
has been specifically designed for clarifying the normative aspirations of voice in 
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pension scheme governance. Although the aim is clarification of the normative 
building blocks of voice, in practice – as will become clear in the later empirical 
chapters – these qualities can be interrelated, with the realisation of one quality 
affecting the realisation of others in the framework. The purpose of this 
framework is, however, to articulate the conceptual distinctiveness of these 
qualities. These qualities serve as conceptual steppingstones, enabling this thesis 
to move from the three normative theoretical literatures to empirical research 
assessing voice, and its realisation, in practice.  
A conceptual framework of voice 
Stakeholder theory, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy all make 
normative claims on the value of voice. These three theories have been chosen 
because of their influence; each one has significantly shaped academic theorising 
in their own fields and have, as a result, influenced how organisations integrate 
publics into their decision making. The approach adopted resonates with the 
frameworks developed for assessing citizen engagement in public governance. 
Smith’s (2009) analytical framework is a significant influence on this thesis, but 
other frameworks address similar criteria developed from democratic theories or 
concepts (e.g. Renn et al., 1995b; Rowe and Frewer 2004; Dalton et al. 2006; 
Papadopoulos and Warin 2007; Fishkin, 2012). In contrast to these previous 
frameworks which tend to focus predominately on democratic characteristics, I 
have specifically additionally included the concept of value. To ignore the 
economic aspect of pension schemes would reflect a failure to understand that 
their purpose is to deliver a pension. As a result, this integrative framework 
combines the democratic (participatory and deliberative) theories that are more 
closely associated with voice in public governance, with the strategic management 
theory (stakeholder theory) which is most closely associated with voice in private 
governance. I therefore examine not only the democratic qualities of voice, but 
also the way in which voice contributes to the creation of value – the ultimate 
economic purpose of the pension scheme. 
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Each of the theories have their own concerns, emphasising particular normative 
values, particular understandings of how publics should be engaged in decision 
making, and particular claims about the benefits of such a process. Inevitably their 
disciplinary boundaries determine their focus, with each presenting a partial 
understanding of what voice could be, and what it could achieve in organisations. 
By extracting and synthesising their concerns, this conceptual framework reflects 
not only their commonalities, but also the breadth of their aspirations. The 
purpose is to provide a relatively concise framework, with explicit normative 
theoretical origins, which can be used to assess voice in practice; to understand 
the ways in which, and extent to which, the conditions (Thompson, 2008) for these 
normative aspirations are realised.  
Stakeholder theory brings an emphasis on how plural perspectives in 
organisational governance can enhance value. Participatory democracy 
emphasises, on the one hand, the role of active participation for enhancing 
beneficiary knowledge, and also the necessity of linking participation to influence. 
And finally, deliberative democracy emphasises the mode of communication, its 
place in transforming preferences and developing shared interests and 
understandings of the common good. By blending insights from these three 
theories together into one conceptual framework, voice in pension scheme 
governance can be elucidated in terms of: (a) inclusive engagement; (b) 
deliberative communication; (c) informed engagement; (d) transparency; (e) 
influence; (f) articulating value; and (g) feasibility. These qualities each represent 
facets of the concept of voice, providing conceptual clarity specifically designed 
for context of pension schemes and the task of sustainability investing.  
In the table overleaf, I summarise these qualities, their definitions, empirical 
research questions, and similarities with related concepts in the literature. 
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Table 1: A Conceptual Framework of Voice 
Qualities of 
voice 













A focus on democratic inclusion 
Who is involved? Are the participants sufficiently 
representative of beneficiaries?  
Does the design of the voice model enhance or limit inclusion 
and how does it do this? 
Representation and inclusivity 
(Beetham, 2012; Fishkin, 2012) 
Input Legitimacy (Geissel, 2012)  
Inclusiveness (Smith, 2009) 
Openness and Access (Papadopoulos 
and Warin, 2007) 
Participant Selection (Fung, 2006; Gastil 






A focus on deliberative communication  
Are key features of democratic deliberation realised? 
How inclusive is the communication (in terms of individuals’ 
participation, and in terms of the plurality of perspectives 
expressed)? 
Is there respectful engagement with others’ opinions? 
Is there a commitment to forms of consensus or constructive 
decision making? 
 
Deliberative engagement (Fishkin, 2012)  
Democratic process (Geissel, 2012) 
Degree of engagement of participants 
(Beetham, 2012) 
Communication and decision mode 
(Fung, 2006) 
Quality of deliberation (Papadopoulos 










A focus on the degree to which participants are informed, and 
decision making is based upon informed judgements 
To what extent are participants informed? 
How is their knowledge enhanced through participation?  
How are executives and board members informed on 
beneficiary perspectives? 
 
Impact on participants (Beetham, 2012) 
Civic education (Geissel, 2012) 
Considered Judgement (Smith, 2009) 
 
Transparency  Deliberative 
democracy  
Extent to which publics are aware of voice 
How is the process made explicit to participants?  
How is it communicated to a wider public? 
How can publics respond to this? 
 
Publicity, Transparency and 
Accountability (Papadopoulos and 
Warin, 2007)  
Transparency (Smith, 2009) 





Focus on the degree of influence in decision-making 
Are forms of voice given formal decision-making authority? 
What other types of informal influence exist? 
In what ways is influence exhibited? 
 
Input to policy debate and policy 
outcomes (Beetham, 2012) 
Connections to policy process (Fishkin, 
2012) 
Authority and power (Fung, 2006) 









Focus on how articulations of sustainable value are realised 
Do forms of voice enable expressions of sustainable value? 
Do forms of voice enable diverse expressions of sustainable 
value? 
Information on stakeholders’ utility 
function (Harrison et al., 2010) 
Salience given to plural perspectives 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) 
Creating value for stakeholders 
(Ambachtsheer, 2016) 
 
Feasibility  Dahl (1998) Focus on the feasibility of voice 
Are forms of voice practical, given the resources required – 
whether the costs placed on participants or organisers?  
Effectiveness (Fung, 2006, Geissel, 2012) 
Efficiency and Effectiveness 
(Papadopoulos and Warin, 2007)  




Qualities of the conceptual framework 
Inclusive engagement 
‘Inclusive engagement’ is a key quality of this conceptual framework and is related 
to the question of equality, a value that is central to the concept of democracy 
(Dahl, 1989). Equality itself is subject to varied interpretations among political 
theorists, for example whether it is equality in capacities and resources, equality 
of access, equality of participation or equality of outcomes (Saward, 2016). In this 
framework, the quality ‘inclusive engagement’ refers to an understanding of 
equality that is grounded in participation. Models of voice are premised on the 
idea of publics engaging – of taking part – in decision making. Inclusive 
engagement therefore involves the participation of all relevant publics and 
without this engagement, the normative aspirations of voice are diminished. For 
the context of pension schemes and sustainable investing, inclusive engagement 
is best understood as the engagement of the full breadth of beneficiaries. These 
will include beneficiaries of differing status in relation to the scheme, such as 
employees contributing to the scheme or pensioners receiving a pension. It will 
also address the inclusion of beneficiaries who differ according to socio-economic 
characteristics, which will shape their capacity, resources and access to 
participate. Inclusivity in this context, involves the participation of all significant 
publics in pension scheme governance. 
Achieving inclusive engagement in practice is challenging. Experience from public 
governance has identified patterns of differentiation in participation, with not all 
citizens equally represented (Cooper and Smith, 2012). Unequal participation on 
the basis of gender, race, family status, income, knowledge and skills or other 
characteristics is widespread, and consistently pose a challenge to the principle of 
equality of engagement. These varied socio-economic characteristics combine in 
multiple ways to affect citizens’ participation or lack of participation. Such 
characteristics are manifested first, in structural barriers such as a lack of time to 
participate, for example because of the demands of work or caring responsibilities, 
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or through lack of financial resources. For pension schemes which have 
beneficiaries geographically dispersed across regions, the additional structural 
barrier of distance is also relevant. But constraints are also manifested at the 
individual level, such as an individual’s beliefs about their capacity and aptitude to 
participate, informed by their perceptions of the knowledge and skills required. It 
could also be manifested in individuals’ beliefs on whether their interests, and 
their personal norms of expression, will be perceived as legitimate by others 
(Young, 2000). For questions which appear technical and demanding such as 
pensions and investing, these types of individual beliefs are likely to significantly 
influence beneficiaries’ sense of entitlement to participate and inform their 
tendencies towards engaging. 
It is not just the weave of wider socio-economic inequalities, and their 
manifestation, that is relevant here. The design of public engagement mechanisms 
is a factor which can further help or hinder the realisation of inclusivity (Fung, 
2006; Smith, 2009). The design details of how voice is realised (e.g. the selection 
and recruitment procedures), and other practicalities (e.g. the when, where and 
how voice takes place) will shape participation. By considering the underlying 
conditions that are likely to create unequal participation, forms of voice can be 
specifically constructed to limit their impact. 
For pension scheme governance, the issue of inclusive engagement is just as 
challenging (if not more so) as in public governance. In this context, two critical 
questions can be used to guide assessments of models of voice. First, who is 
involved, and are they representative of the wider beneficiaries? And second, in 
what ways does the design of a model of voice (e.g. selection procedures, but also 
practicalities) determine the degree of inclusion?  
Deliberative communication 
Deliberative communication, derived from the literature on deliberative 
democracy, is a second quality within this framework of voice. This quality is 
concerned with the extent to which the types of communication in forms of voice 
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evoke the normative aspirations of democratic deliberation. This is a process that 
can be roughly summarised as involving mutual listening, the exchange of opinions 
and beliefs, and the reasons behind these, in a way in which others can test and 
potentially accept (even if they are not in agreement) (Freeman, 2000; Talisse, 
2012). Inevitably, any summary of deliberative democratic ideals tends to over-
simplify what is a diverse and contested range of arguments. For the purposes of 
this empirically orientated conceptual framework, the deliberative democratic 
literature is useful for two reasons. First, it shines a spotlight on the mode of 
communication taking place in models of voice; a focus on deliberation, rather 
than on other modes of communication, which may involve the exchange of 
opinions but may be underscored by other principles such as aggregation, 
expertise or strategic negotiation (Fung and Wright, 2003). Second, it is valuable 
because it focuses on the norms which should be present to enable democratically 
grounded deliberation to take place.  
These theoretical norms have been condensed into a variety of criteria to 
determine forms of deliberative communication in practice. In their Deliberative 
Quality Index, Steenbergen et al. (2003) classify democratic deliberation according 
to the following characteristics: open, free participation in a debate; the 
justification of assertions through ‘the orderly exchange of information and 
reasons between parties’ (2003: 25); the consideration of the common good 
(including self-interest that serves the common good); treating others with 
respect; undertaken with the purpose of consensus (although its realisation is not 
a requirement); and participation in an authentic way that is without deception.  
More recently, Gastil et al. (2012) have defined effective public deliberation by the 
existence of: (1) an analytic process that seeks to inform, clarify, understand and 
evaluate trade-offs; (2) a social process that seeks to enable inclusive 
participation, mutual comprehension and understanding; and (3) a final decision-
making process that effectively addresses the problem, in a manner that draws 
upon democratic decision rules.  The conditions for effective deliberation may be 
considered to be determined by the design of a model of voice. In practice, the 
way in which participants engage with each other plays a significant role. This is 
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an aspect of engagement which is not totally in the control of any organiser or 
facilitator. Indeed, one of the criticisms deliberative democrats have faced is their 
lack of acknowledgement of power differentials, its strategic use among 
participants, and the implications for constraining deliberative democratic ideas 
(Mansbridge, 2015).  
In the face of these limitations, what are the ways in which voice can be designed 
to ensure effective deliberation? For pension scheme governance, a concern with 
deliberation would translate into an examination of the conditions created for 
engagement, and the extent to which they enable deliberative norms to flourish. 
Steenbergen et al. (2003) and Gastil et al. (2012) provide a detailed picture of how 
deliberative communication can be conceptualised in practice. By considering 
these frameworks in light of, first, the context of pension scheme governance and 
second, in relation to the priorities of other qualities of the conceptual framework, 
the quality of ‘deliberative communication’ in this framework focuses on three 
indicators. It examines: the inclusiveness of communication, first, as understood 
as presence, in terms of all individuals who are present actively participating in a 
dialogue or communicative exchange. And second, in terms of the inclusiveness of 
content; that is, that individuals participating in a communicative exchange are 
able to express themselves fully and plural perspectives are realised. Deliberative 
communication also involves respectful engagement with others and their 
opinions or beliefs and a commitment to constructive decision making. By 
addressing these areas, the extent to which forms of voice used in pension 
schemes are able to evoke the ideals of deliberative democrats can be illustrated 
and examined. 
Informed engagement 
Informed engagement is central to both deliberative democratic theory and 
participatory theory, but the benefits of informed participants are perceived quite 
differently. Deliberative democratic theorists argue that the informed 
understanding developed through deliberation contributes to the conditions for 
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preference transformation (Elster, 1986), as well as delivering better epistemic 
outcomes (Estlund, 1997). Participatory theorists take a different perspective; 
they stress how voice is essentially an educative process, through which 
participants ‘learn’ how to participate. From a participatory perspective, active 
engagement can imbue participants with a deeper understanding of, and capacity 
to act, in wider forms of democratic decision making (Pateman, 1970).  
Given the emphasis in both of these theories on learning and its benefits, informed 
engagement should be regarded as central to any conceptual framework of voice. 
For pension scheme decision making and sustainable investing, informed 
engagement involves the joint consideration of multiple forms of knowledge. 
Scheme executives, and firms that offer services to the scheme, bring forms of 
technical and bureaucratic knowledge into the decision-making process (e.g. 
financial, actuarial, regulatory expertise). Beneficiaries, on the other hand, will 
bring forms of non-professional, lay knowledge that is formed by the conditions of 
their lives, reflected in their common sense, and which can be described as 
experiential knowledge (Petts and Brooks, 2006). While there is a tendency to 
value technical or bureaucratic knowledge more highly than lay or non-
professional knowledge (Petts and Brooks, 2006), a central goal to forms of public 
engagement on scientific or technical topics is the joint consideration of these 
multiple forms of knowledge, and, in some instances their integration or co-
production, in governance decision-making (Petts and Brooks, 2006; Edelenbos et 
al., 2011; Fischer & Gottweis, 2013).  
How can forms of voice realise informed engagement among its participants on 
questions involving technical or bureaucratic expertise? The greatest asymmetry 
will be between professionals and non-professionals. But there will also be 
asymmetries among participants, where some are more informed on particular 
aspects or facets of an issue than others. Knowledgeable participants may be 
informed by a range of sources: their own professional training, their prior 
experience (for example, in judging similar issues), or from exposure to an issue 
from mass and social media. While these knowledge asymmetries cannot be 
removed, the task of voice is to ensure participants are sufficiently informed to 
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participate as equally as possible. In some institutionalised forms of voice, 
information or evidence on technical or bureaucratic matters have been provided 
to citizen participants to inform their discussions (Brown, 2014). The design of 
voice, how it is organised, and the framing of its questions will shape how this 
knowledge is provided to participants, and its depth and breadth. Any form of 
voice will always involve critical decisions about the inclusion of technical or 
bureaucratic knowledge; for example, on the depth of technical knowledge 
required, the relevance of different points of view for the discussion, the 
legitimacy of sources, and the appropriateness of various types of evidence. To 
avoid  ‘bias’ creeping onto the design of voice (Collingwood and Reedy, 2012) the 
decisions which judge the legitimacy, and relevance, of different strands of 
knowledge require careful consideration. 
There are various strategies that can be put in place to ensure that engagement is 
informed, and to mitigate against the impacts of unbalanced information 
provision. The first is to ensure the context of the issue under discussion, the 
breadth of perspectives represented in the issue is understood, and to consider 
their own perspectives and motivations. This combination of research and 
reflection will not necessarily remove bias, but it will make implicit assumptions 
more explicit, reducing blind-spots and unbalanced assumptions early on. The 
second is to engage relevant stakeholders in the early stage of the design process, 
for example in the form of an advisory committee, to ensure diverse perspectives 
inform the design and scope of voice, and for these experts to be used as a 
sounding board to address which evidence, and how it should be integrated into 
a model’s design.  
Informed engagement involves not only the inclusion of technical or bureaucratic 
knowledge, but also the inclusion of a public’s experiential knowledge – their non-
professional or lay perspective. The three theories of voice drawn upon in this 
thesis (stakeholder theory, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy) 
highlight the lack of knowledge of governing actors (i.e. agents) on the 
perspectives, attitudes and understandings of their publics (i.e. principals). Forms 
of voice will bring this non-professional, lay knowledge into discussions and 
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deliberations. The realisation of this perspective requires the full participation of 
a lay public and expression of the plurality of their perspectives.  
How voice is designed (and implemented) will shape how successfully this form of 
knowledge is elicited and integrated. For example, the openness of technical or 
bureaucratic experts to this knowledge, and the extent to which it is taken 
seriously (or not) will shape its influence. Equally, the way in which the design 
provides opportunities for participants to express this knowledge in breadth, and 
in full, will also contribute to its realisation. Again, including this form of 
knowledge successfully requires attention to the plurality of lay perspectives, and 
voice should be designed to allow opportunities for the full breath of perspectives 
to be expressed (a matter which was discussed in more detail in the previous 
qualities ‘inclusive engagement’ and ‘deliberative communication’). 
Given these normative arguments, empirical analysis of voice should examine 
several questions about the type and nature of informed engagement. For 
example: in what ways are participants informed on technical or bureaucratic 
matters? On what types of issues or perspectives are they informed? And what 
are the sources, processes or means through which they become informed? How, 
if at all, are different types of knowledge valued? And similarly, in what ways can 
executives or board members become more informed on beneficiary 
perspectives? Finally, is this form of knowledge taken into serious consideration? 
By exploring these questions, voice in pension schemes can then be evaluated by 
the extent to which they effectively facilitate and realise an informed 
understanding on not only technical and bureaucratic knowledge, but also the 






Transparency (or publicity) addresses the visibility and openness of voice, both to 
the participants involved and to a wider interested public, which can be 
distinguished as internal transparency and external transparency respectively 
(Smith, 2009; Raphael and Karpowitz, 2013). Transparency is central for forms of 
public engagement (Rowe and Frewer, 2000), given that without sufficient 
transparency, models of voice will fail to operate as legitimate governance entities 
– particularly those without standard formal accountabilities (Parkinson, 2006). 
Transparency is not only valuable for the obvious reason it develops trust and aids 
accountability, but also because it can improve the quality of decision making. As 
deliberative democrats highlight, transparency can have benefits for the quality of 
deliberation itself as ‘having to defend one’s policy preferences in public leans one 
towards using public reason’ (Chambers, 2004).  
Although the appeal of transparency at first appears uncontroversial, its 
desirability is more complex than other qualities in the framework. For example, 
while greater transparency may ensure decisions are taken with due consideration 
of the best interests of others, it may equally lead participants to communicate in 
non-deliberative ways, such as strategically or symbolically to wider publics 
(Chambers, 2004; 2005). These types of consequences may be more likely when 
issues are highly controversial, creating forms of outrage and attracting one-sided 
media reporting. Therefore, while it is widely regarded that transparency is an 
essential aspect to forms of public engagement in governance, it has not only 
advantageous but also disadvantageous qualities, with the latter surprisingly little 
acknowledged (Fung, 2013).  
Transparency is, however, central to discussions of public engagement in public 
governance, with transparency and publicity to participants, and to a wider public, 
commonly focused upon in evaluative frameworks (Smith, 2009; Papadopoulos 
and Warin, 2007). To understand the extent to which transparency has been 
realised a number of questions should be posed. If the essence of transparency is 
understood as an openness or availability of information, this can be achieved 
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through two means: the most limited form of transparency involves enabling 
publics’ access to information (i.e. publics have the right to enquire and to receive 
information), and an extension to this involves the proactive communication of 
information (i.e. information provided to the public, for example through targeted 
communications). Transparency also involves an appreciation of the content of 
the information that is being made transparent, and its salience to the public and 
to the matters of governance. Extending this, is the question of whether this 
information is sufficiently informative to enable publics to engage further with 
institutions, on the basis of this transparency (Fung 2013; McCarthy and Fluck, 
2016). Seen in this light, transparency is defined not just by accessibility or 
communication, but also by the creation of the conditions under which publics 
have the capacity to respond to this information.  
In any discussion of transparency, the question of who is gaining access to 
information, and who is able to respond to it, is of significance. For pension 
scheme governance, transparency should not only be in place for beneficiaries 
participating, but also for the wider population of beneficiaries who are the non-
participating public, arguably a type of constituency. Understanding the extent to 
which voice is transparent therefore involves, in the first instance, understanding 
how (the means through which) transparency is realised, understanding what 
information is being made transparent (the content); understanding for whom 
(which publics) transparency is realised; and finally, understanding how these 
publics have the capacity (if at all) to respond to this information. Both the 
participating and non-participating public should have access to information which 
helps them understand, and follow, a form of voice and have opportunities to 
respond to this information. By drawing these definitional understandings of 
transparency together, this conceptual framework can be used to gauge the 





Influence is essential to the concept of voice; without influence voice provides no 
genuine alternative to exit. Further, an absence of expected influence will result 
in a corrosion, rather than strengthening, of trust in institutions (Rowe and Frewer, 
2000). Some scholars of public engagement conceptualise influence very broadly, 
in terms of the impact of public engagement models on wider public opinion 
formation (La Font, 2014), or their impact within a wider deliberative system 
(Mansbridge et al., 2012). In contrast, I examine influence in the same way as the 
other qualities in the framework: as a quality realised at the organisational level, 
on an organisation’s decision making. 
Influence in decision making comes in many different forms, ranging from de jure 
or de facto decision-making authority, to forms of diffuse organisational influence 
that may impact perceptions or attitudes among decision-makers. In public 
governance scholarship, influence has been elucidated by examining the ways in 
which it shapes a public policy-making process. For example, Fishkin (2012) and 
Beetham (2012) have identified the links between forms of public engagement, 
policy-making and policy outcomes, in particular exploring the ways in which 
influence can be identified, when de jure or de facto authority is absent. Similarly, 
Goodin and Dryzek (2006) arrive at eight types of policy influence, characterised 
as: making policy, being taken up into the policy process; informing public debates; 
shaping policy through market testing; legitimating policy; 
confidence/constituency building; popular oversight; and resisting co-option.  
A common approach in studies of public participation understands influence in 
terms of the gradations of power or control. Arnstein’s widely cited ladder of 
citizen participation (1969), discusses influence in terms of eight steps: 
manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated 
power and citizen control. This approach is underscored by the assumption that 
sponsoring authorities share more or less power with the public, depending upon 
the position on the ladder. More recently, Gaventa (2006) has developed a 
typology along three dimensions (level, spaces, forms), which recognises that 
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sources of power are often distributed outside a sponsoring public authority, and 
identifying how these expressions of power may impact on the realisation of 
localised influence.  
These types of power-orientated scales are useful for illuminating how influence 
is constrained. Participatory democrats typically view delegated decision-making 
authority or control as the most desirable form of influence (e.g. Pateman, 1970; 
Arnstein, 1969). While genuine influence is certainly necessary if voice is to have 
any value, direct control may not always be suitable or feasible. For example, 
consultative or advisory forms of voice may be more appropriate depending on 
the governance problem (Fung, 2006), whether for legal reasons (e.g. legal 
authority is held by another entity) or when a public engagement process cannot 
practically include all relevant publics. Does this mean that, in these 
circumstances, public engagement will fail to realise any benefits? Most forms of 
voice instigated by organisations fill the grey area defined by consultation, advice 
and collaboration. Given this, it is even more essential to understand which 
conditions enable forms of voice in these settings to effectively influence decision 
making.  
In recent years there has been increasing interest among scholars in 
understanding in more detail how the design features and conditions of public 
engagement models shape their influence (Barratt et al., 2012; Font et al., 2018; 
Pogrebinshi and Ryan, 2018). One of the findings to emerge from this research is 
the question of the degree and form of institutional embeddedness. In contrast 
with many models of public engagement, the practice of voice in pension scheme 
governance is likely to be highly institutionally embedded. Mapping influence 
empirically is tricky; there may be instances of policy changes or impacts of 
decision making that can be clearly related to forms of engagement, but instances 
of lack of influence are rarely acknowledged or documented. In addition, there will 
be genuine moments of ‘soft’ influence and a willingness to listen to a public, but 
equally other moments where there is much ‘talk’ about voice, but little interest 
in grasping the implications, and even less interest in change. 
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To summarise, understanding the influence of voice in pension schemes will 
involve identifying, the form of voice, the degree of authority granted, and the 
basis of that authority (whether de jure or de facto). It will also involve establishing 
on which policy areas beneficiaries are able to engage and how their participation 
links to decision making processes. But in addition to this, influence will also be 
the result of the context of the scheme, particularly executive and fiduciaries’ (or 
their equivalents) willingness to listen and respond to beneficiaries. It is therefore 
not only the formal characteristics of voice which shape influence, but also 
decision-makers’ attitudes to the engagement of beneficiaries will be an indicator 
of its likely degree of influence. 
Articulating value  
Articulating value in this conceptual framework addresses the capacity of models 
of voice to enhance understandings of value. In particular, it asks how effective 
they are at enabling beneficiaries themselves to articulate their understandings of 
value. In essence, delivering value in a pension scheme involves delivering a 
pension – a product – that beneficiaries consider beneficial to their interests, and 
worth contributing to. As such, value is not a given, but a subjective concept 
(Garriga, 2014). This notion of value is derived from stakeholder theory, and the 
specific focus of this research is the beneficiaries’ articulations of value15. I draw 
on the stakeholder definition of ‘value’ to examine how, and to what extent, forms 
of voice are able to realise beneficiaries’ articulations of value. Stakeholder theory 
is particularly well suited to the context of sustainable pension schemes because 
its notion of value is based upon the assumption that business and ethics are 
intertwined. Stakeholder theorists argue that by considering both jointly, through 
their management of stakeholder relationships, companies create value (Freeman 
et al., 2010). Indeed, in sustainability orientated pension schemes, beneficiaries in 
these schemes will take into account diverse considerations when making a 
 
15 Rather than on wider stakeholder theory themes, such as the multiplicity of stakeholders, the 
jointness of their interests, and the management of these (Freeman, 2010). 
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judgement on value, not only the risk-adjusted return, but also the scheme’s 
performance according to sustainability concerns, considerations that address 
both ‘business’ and ‘ethics’.  
Voice will only be effective if they enable beneficiaries to articulate the breadth of 
financial and non-financial considerations that inform their notions of value. This 
raises two challenges. First, beneficiaries will have different values, perspectives, 
expectations, and aspirations, informed by issues such as age, gender and the size 
of their pension pot, as well as their orientation towards sustainability values. 
There is no one ‘beneficiary perspective’ on value, but instead the existence of 
plural perspectives, which will be influenced by varying individual situations, as 
well as assumptions, expectations and aspirations. Second, the challenge of 
sustainability is that it raises difficult questions about what to value. This may give 
rise to incommensurability problems, or hard choices which are ‘on a par’ – not 
incommensurable – but nevertheless difficult to choose between (Chang, 2017) in 
decision making. The task for voice is to find ways to understand and appreciate 
pluralities, and achieve ways of reconciling these, in order to achieve effective 
scheme decision making that realises value for beneficiaries. 
Despite these challenges, for voice to be effective it should contribute to creating 
a better – a deeper, clearer – articulation, and understanding of, what ‘sustainable 
value’ means to beneficiaries, and essentially what they see as a ‘good deal’ 
(Harrison and Wicks, 2013). There will be other sources of knowledge on how 
beneficiaries perceive the value offered to them. For example, complaints data, 
market research, competitor analysis and regulatory insight will also contribute 
towards conceptualisations of the value offered by a pension. But for this specific 
discussion, it is clear that forms of voice should enable beneficiaries to articulate 
what value means to them in a way that is informative and enlightening. 
Understanding these processes empirically is difficult, and raises the question of 
how forms of voice can provide insight on beneficiaries’ perceptions of value. 
Stakeholder theorists would argue that stakeholder management offers a better 
understanding of stakeholders ‘utility function’ (Harrison et al., 2010). The focus 
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of this thesis is in understanding the ways in which beneficiaries’ notions of value 
are elicited. What kinds of insight do models of voice realise, and how can they be 
characterised? In what way does the model elicit the breadth of considerations 
that inform beneficiaries understandings of value, or what a ‘good deal’ means to 
them? And to what extent does the model enable plural understandings of value 
to be articulated? While many of these questions are similar to those guiding the 
quality ‘deliberative communication’, the crucial difference here is that this quality 
is focused not only on the form of communication, but also on content; 
specifically, the way in which models of voice elicit understandings of the value 
beneficiaries wish to realise from their pension. 
Feasibility  
Voice in pension schemes should be designed in a way that is feasible for their 
institutional context and address the practical issues of organising voice 
effectively. While the question of feasibility may appear obvious, practical 
concerns do have an impact on the realisation of other qualities in the framework. 
Dahl (1998) weighed up feasibility alongside democratic concerns in discussions of 
the merits of different forms of democracy. He argued, for example, that direct 
democracy failed as a democratic model because it was simply impractical in 
highly populated, geographically dispersed nation states. Feasibility is therefore 
an important quality that represents the appropriateness of voice for its context.  
One of the criticisms of models of voice which seek to include a wide public is that 
they are impractical. First because it is difficult to enable large groups of 
individuals to be jointly present to participate simultaneously in voice. And second 
because of the time involved; the public have a range of other tasks they engage 
with (employment, caring responsibilities, hobbies, family and friends), leaving 
little time for participation. For institutions such as pension schemes, which may 
be national in scope, and extensive in terms of size of membership, these practical 
questions are even more pertinent than they are to public authorities. Alongside 
the issues of size and scale are also the financial (Rowe and Frewer, 2000) and non-
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financial resources involved in funding forms of voice. In particular, given that 
beneficiaries generally wish to keep pension administration costs as low as 
possible, it is clear that benefits need to be seen from voice for it to be considered,  
as an effective use of resources. In particular, beneficiaries participating in voice, 
along with other participants such as employers or unions, should have the 
impression the model realises the expected benefits, given their own resource 
commitments in terms of time and effort.  
For pension scheme governance, voice is a feasible solution if it is designed in a 
way that is suitable to the context of the scheme (e.g. size and scale), and for the 
resources available (from the scheme but also the participants). While these 
practicalities may appear banal compared with other qualities, they can have a 
decisive impact on the effectiveness of voice, and its realisation of the wider 
qualities of the conceptual framework. 
Concluding comments  
By developing an integrative conceptual framework of voice, the aim of this 
chapter has been to condense and simplify the varied normative claims of 
stakeholder theory, deliberative democracy and participatory democracy into one 
over-arching framework. Its purpose is to function as a device which can be used 
to assess the effectiveness of models of voice in pension schemes, assessing the 
extent to which they realise their normative claims. It brings together seven 
qualities of voice: (a) inclusive engagement; (b) deliberative communication; (c) 
informed engagement; (d) transparency; (e) influence; (f) articulating value; and 
(g) feasibility. Taking each of these qualities in turn, I have examined the way they 
are interpretated, either informed by stakeholder theory, deliberative democracy 
or participatory democracy. Based on these interpretations, I have developed a 
series of research questions which can be used to guide the empirical analysis, 
assessing institutional voice as it is applied to the context of pension schemes. By 
taking this approach, the conceptual framework bridges the varied normative 
ambitions of these three theories and the practice of voice in the governance of 
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pension schemes. In the chapters that follow, I draw upon this conceptual 
framework to assess two case studies of voice in pension scheme governance, 




5.  Research Design and Case Study Method 
As I have discussed in the introduction, the foundation of this thesis can be found 
in Hirschman’s seminal study of the decline in organisations: Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty (1970). Hirschman outlines the various actions available to individuals who 
are dissatisfied with the performance of an organisation. By drawing upon theories 
that examine forms of voice and their normative benefits, and by focusing my 
empirical research on innovative examples of voice in pension schemes, I take the 
promise of voice for organisational governance seriously, reflecting a humanistic 
approach to academic research (Neesham, 2017). At the same time, I also 
recognise that while voice is a beguiling idea, it may not be the panacea that 
democratic and stakeholder theorists suggest, particularly for pension schemes. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore not only the promise, but also the challenge of 
voice in the context of pension schemes and sustainable investing. 
Building on the conceptual framework of voice, as covered in the earlier chapter, 
I seek to apply this framework to empirical exemplars of governance innovations 
in beneficiary voice. In this short chapter, I explore in more detail the theoretical 
and conceptual foundation of this second part to the thesis; discussing the 
research design choices and strategies employed, and the methods of data 





Defining and researching governance 
The concept of governance has gained traction in recent decades, to understand 
phenomena stemming from the twin trends of increased interdependence 
(globalisation) and increased interest in citizens influencing the decisions that 
affect them (democratisation) (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). As a concept, it is 
widely used to guide academic inquiries both into corporate (Monks & Minow, 
2012) and government (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003) decision-making and control. Not 
only influential in academic research, it is also widely used in policy discourses, 
describing organisational effectiveness as ‘good governance’ (Agere, 2000). 
Despite its widespread usage, it remains an amorphous concept, capturing a 
breadth of features which can be summarised as the who, what, how, why and for 
whom of organisational decision-making and control. Chhotray and Stoker 
succinctly describe the concept as seeking ‘to understand the way we construct 
collective decision-making’ (2009: 2). Understandings of pension scheme 
governance tend to be framed by an agency theory perspective, a body of 
knowledge which conceptualises the nature of the principal-agent relationship 
and the consequences of this for decision-making and control. But less attention 
is paid to understanding pension scheme governance in terms of its formal 
structures and entities – in terms of its institutional design. Related to this, is the 
lack of attention to understanding institutional designs as a social practice, and 
the consequences of this for decision-making and control.  
This thesis, influenced by trends in sociological theory, conceptualises the 
institutional design of governance as a social practice (Schatzki, 2014). By viewing 
governance in this way, I do not see it, for example, only as a concept that 
describes the design of boards or other decision-making entities, and their formal 
responsibilities. Instead, governance is viewed as a social practice that is manifest 
in the social interactions of the social actors involved, and which is connected (in 
both more or less direct ways) to formal organisational decision making. To 
understand governance as social practice, this thesis is informed by constructivist-
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interpretative (Yanow, 2006) ontological and epistemological assumptions (Hay, 
2011). Specifically, the analysis of governance is informed by theoretical traditions 
that emphasise the position of social actors in interpreting reality (Yanow, 2006; 
Bevir and Blakely 2018), and their role in creating meaning (Berger and Luckman, 
1966). Consequential to these assumptions is the recognition that governance can 
be understood through social actors’ interpretations of their interactions. As Colin 
Hay writes ‘social and political realities are then, encountered through our 
interpretations of them – through the meanings they hold for us and the meanings 
we make out of them’ (2011: 170). Understanding governance in this way 
demands a research approach that directly engages, on an empirical basis, with 
social actors, exploring the practicalities and arrangements of governance bodies 
and how they operate, the experiences of these social actors, and specifically, their 
interpretations of these experiences. This understanding implicitly regards these 
individuals as ‘knowledgeable agents’ who are capable of interpreting their own 
social world (Gioia, 2018). It is through actors’ interpretations that we gain an 
insight into the beliefs and understandings which constitute practice, and the ways 
in which practice is shaped by contextual and structural features and conditions.  
Interpretative approaches have been widely adopted in the study of organisations 
(Schwartz–Shea and Yannow, 2011; Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013), as well as 
in the study of public deliberation (Parkinson, 2006; Talpin, 2012; Lee and 
Romano, 2013). Despite this, interpretative philosophies and the application of 
qualitative methods to the study of pension scheme governance are – to my 
knowledge – extremely rare. This seems somewhat surprising given that the 
institutions themselves are so significant for so many people, and given the 
capacity of qualitative research to generate ‘unique, memorable, socially 
important and theoretically meaningful contribution(s) to scholarly discourse and 
organizational life’ (Gephardt, 2004:461). A qualitative approach is particularly 
well suited for developing a deeper understanding of amorphous concepts such 
as ‘governance’, as well as being ideally suited to understanding novel forms of 
governance innovation where commonly agreed concepts and data do not yet 
exist (Reinecke, Arnold and Palazzo, 2016).  
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This sociological conceptualisation of governance as a social practice, along with a 
commitment to conceptualising those involved in governance as interpretative 
agents, forms the ontological and epistemological foundation of this thesis. The 
thesis does not foreground the theoretical examination of practices or 
interpretations. Rather, the core of the case study analysis is shaped by the 
normative concerns of stakeholder, participatory and deliberative democratic 
theories. The focus of the analysis is the way in which the qualities in the 
conceptual framework (derived from these theories) are realised through the 
social practice of governance. 
Research strategy 
The early stages of this thesis began with a reading of the literature on pension 
scheme governance, along with the professional pension press. The issue of 
sustainability was gaining more and more traction in these professional 
publications, and it was clear that there was an active debate and expert opinions 
were mixed. To fine tune my knowledge and crystallise my research questions 
further, I arranged scoping interviews with one NGO actor involved in campaigns 
addressing pension scheme investing, two executives involved in pension scheme 
governance, and one asset manager. The knowledge gained through these 
interviews, coupled with my understanding of citizen engagement in public 
governance, fed into the development of the research questions for this thesis. In 
a nutshell, the central empirical research question at the heart of this thesis is: 
how have pension schemes engaged more closely with pension scheme 
beneficiaries on sustainable investing, and through which models? To answer this 
research question, and in light of my sociological articulation of governance as a 
social practice, the thesis is framed by the following sub-questions: in what ways, 
and to what extent, do these models realise the qualities in the conceptual 
framework of voice?; how do the governance actors involved in forms of voice  
interpret these models?; and finally, what are the implications of these empirical 




The case method 
To answer the research questions set out above, I use the case method. Employing 
a mixture of documentary analysis and qualitative interviews, I draw conclusions 
from two distinctive qualitative case studies of models of voice in pension 
schemes. Case studies have become an influential method in the social sciences 
(e.g. Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009), particularly among researchers studying 
organisations (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Gioia, et al., 2010). They are often used when 
the research question requires the consideration of the wider social context, and 
where the boundaries between the specific study area and context are difficult to 
separate (Yin, 2009). Equally they are helpful when theoretical knowledge about 
an emergent research area is very limited. A case study approach therefore helps 
to unravel an understanding of both the organisational context of the phenomena 
of voice, as well as the specific characteristics of how it is institutionalised through 
model design and practice. To do this, multiple sources of evidence are drawn 
upon, for example, interviews with different actors from different vantage points, 
documentation and in some cases observation (Yin, 2009). These multiple sources 
are triangulated to develop interpretations, improving the validity of the 
conclusions.  
A case study design was chosen for this thesis for several reasons. First, it enables 
access to information that is not in the public domain or available through the 
academic literature. Information on pension scheme governance is generally only 
publicly available in limited forms, often describing formal arrangements. This 
provides very limited insight into the practice of governance arrangements, and 
social actors’ interpretations, including their perceptions of effectiveness. 
Additionally, as far as I am aware, there are few theoretically-informed secondary 
sources describing in detail the way in which governance is practiced in pension 
schemes; drawing on secondary data was therefore not an option for this thesis. 
Second, a case study approach offers distinctive theoretical benefits. A case study 
analysis allows a focus on depth and context, and this is an especially relevant 
approach for qualitative, interpretative research that is concerned with meaning 
in its specific social setting (Stake, 1995; Simons, 2009), and with reference to 
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multiple sources of evidence. Through triangulating interviews with social actors 
and careful reading of corporate documentation, a case study account enables a 
fuller picture of the practice of governance. Additionally, this approach enables a 
specific governance innovation to be identified as a ‘case’ of interest, with the 
particularity and details of the design features and actors’ interpretations 
analysed. This enables a rich, more complete picture of voice, and how it fits within 
the institutional setting.  
Identifying cases and gaining access 
This thesis examines three pension schemes and organisations which can be 
described as trendsetters in the way they have opened up their decision making 
to beneficiaries, to address the challenge of sustainable investing. By examining 
these novel forms of voice, this thesis aims to draw out the promise and challenge 
of voice, not only in relation to these three trendsetting organisations, but also for 
pension schemes more widely.  
Identifying these schemes was not a straight forward task. As I have mentioned 
above, there is limited secondary evidence, and academic literature, on pension 
scheme governance. But information is particularly scarce on models which seek 
beneficiary engagement in pensions governance. Given this lack of case material, 
I began looking for empirical cases to research. As an outsider to the pensions and 
investment industry, I was concerned it might be difficult to find, and gain access 
to, relevant organisations. Indeed, identifying pension schemes which met the 
right criteria for the research was a great challenge – my interest in innovative 
examples inevitably meant that I was looking for schemes that are few and far 
between, and with no established links with industries I had to work hard to find 
them.  
To advance my search, I attended an industry ‘field’ conference organised by the 
Principles for Responsible Investing in London, receiving impact funding form the 
Political Science Association. I approached this conference as an anthropologist 
would, observing and interacting with as many participants as possible and asking 
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for ideas on possible pension schemes for case studies. The conference provided 
an insight into the issues and debates that concerned the industry most, as well as 
how members of this industry would respond to the proposed research. 
Unfortunately, no suitable case study came to light. I had better luck at a 
sustainable finance networking event, which led to a chance conversation with a 
pension scheme manager from the Netherlands. This led to further conversations 
where I explained the research and its goals in more detail and eventually to the 
agreement by a Dutch pension organisation, PGGM, to participate in the research 
as the first case study – the Member Council model. A tip from a colleague in Basel, 
Switzerland, led to the second case study – a combination of two highly similar 
pension schemes, Abendrot and Nest, both based in Switzerland and both 
implementing the Delegate Assembly model. The titles given to these two case 
studies – the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly – are English 
translations of their respective names in original Dutch (Ledenraad) and German 
(Delegiertenversammlung). 
These three organisations – and the two models of voice which they represent – 
are ideal research sites for the analysis of voice and sustainable investing. Each are 
based in (quasi-)mandatory pension settings with limited or no exit, which 
provides a fertile context for the cultivation of forms of voice, given that exit is 
limited. They all share a history in taking sustainable investing seriously and their 
consideration of sustainability is not simply an instrumental matter, but involves 
the joint consideration of sustainability values as well as risk-adjusted return. In 
the case of the Delegate Assembly, two pension schemes were chosen because 
the schemes discussed themselves their similarities to each other. Given this, the 
opportunity to explore the application of the Delegate Assembly model in two 
different contexts enabled an even better, more rigorous, insight into the model 
and the shape of its application. 
While there is much to be learnt from the analysis of exemplar cases, one of the 
critical questions to address is how to interpret the findings from these cases, and 
their implications for wider pension schemes. In the empirical chapters, each case 
study model (the Member Council in chapter six and the Delegate Assembly in 
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chapter seven) is presented as an individual governance innovation of voice. In 
these chapters the central focus is on understanding how, and the extent to which, 
each particular model realises the qualities in the conceptual framework. 
Following Stake, these cases are therefore studies in ‘particularization, not 
generalisation… There is emphasis on uniqueness, and that implies knowledge of 
others that the case is different from, but the first emphasis is on understanding 
the case itself’ (1995:8).  
However, it is also possible to draw intriguing and insightful conclusions by 
comparing these two cases, and drawing further comparisons between these and 
the extant literature on citizen engagement in public governance. In chapter eight 
I use these comparisons to identify the ways in which the Member Council and the 
Delegate Assembly can be effectively enhanced. To achieve this, I compare the 
case study findings with wider theoretical and empirical findings on public 
engagement in public governance. Furthermore, in the final conclusion, I go 
somewhat beyond Stake’s (1995) focus on particularization, and instead draw out 
implications of these cases, and their respective models, for understandings of 
pension scheme governance more broadly.  
Research ethics, informed consent and anonymity 
Before fieldwork began, research ethics clearance was secured from the University 
of Westminster. As part of this, I provided participants from the schemes with 
information about their participation, making it clear that they were able to 
withdraw from the research at any time, and that individuals would not be named 
in the research. A copy of the ‘Research participation’ form is provided in Appendix 
one. Specific confirmation from the pension schemes, PGGM, Abendrot and Nest 
was sought to ensure they are happy to be named in this thesis, and each of the 





Documentary evidence  
Documentary evidence, mainly identified through the PGGM, Abendrot and Nest 
websites, have been used to build up an informed understanding of the legal and 
organisational context of each of models (see Appendix four for a list of all the 
documentary evidence used in the case studies). This evidence includes annual 
reports, documents describing governance structures and their related 
committees and other entities, and decision outcomes recorded in regular 
minutes, contracts or memos. The documents for the Member Council case study 
are in Dutch and those for the Delegate Assembly models are in German, and I 
have translated all the information quoted or referenced in these documentary 
sources myself by drawing on my own knowledge of German and, particularly for 
the Dutch documents, by using the online translation software Deep L. For the 
German documentation I confirmed my translation with a native German speaker 
and, as I discuss below, both case study chapters were sent to each participating 
scheme for their approval of the factual representation of the pension scheme. 
These sources of documentary evidence provide important contextual 
information on the structure and organisation of these schemes, their approaches 
to sustainable investing, and the ways in which beneficiaries have been engaged 
in scheme governance – background details which included in the first part of each 
case study. Second, in some instances these sources raised further questions 
about the model, and its practice. To ensure my case study accounts of each model 
were accurate, I made further contact with the pension schemes by email, to 
address a handful of questions and clarify my understanding. Once the complete 
chapters of each case study were complete, I sent these to each participating 
pension scheme and while one picked up minor points, no schemes replied with 
concerns about the analysis and interpretation presented in these chapters, 
confirming that the case study representations of the Member Council and 





The qualitative fieldwork component consisted of mainly semi-structured single 
interviews, and in three cases, group interviews, with beneficiaries and executives. 
Almost all interviews were undertaken in English, with the exception of one 
beneficiary interview for Abendrot. In a few instances individual Dutch or German 
words were used and these I translated. While there did not appear to be any 
major problems emerging from this approach, I took care to send copies of the 
interview transcripts to the interviewees to enable them to identify any 
misunderstandings (none of which surfaced).  
Interviews for the Member Council case study took place in October 2017 in Zeist, 
Netherlands. In total, I interviewed seven individuals, including the two main 
executives involved in managing the Council and five of the Member Council 
participants. Two group interviews were undertaken with Member Council 
participants for practical reasons, given that interviewees had travelled to Zeist to 
participate in a Member Council meeting on the day and time was limited.  
Interviews for the Delegate Assembly case study took place in December 2016 and 
October-November 2020, in Basel (Abendrot) and Zürich (Nest). As a result of 
Covid-19, the later interviews took place as phone interviews, rather than in 
person. In total, for the Delegate Assembly, I interviewed three executives (one in 
Nest and two in Abendrot – again for practical reasons, undertaken as a joint 
interview), along with two beneficiaries (one who had attended the Assembly in 
Abendrot and one who had not).  
Across the interviews, five women and seven men were interviewed, three aged 
between 36-45, six aged between 46-55, one aged between 56-65 and two aged 
between 66-75. Further demographic details can be found in Appendix five. 
Across both cases, the executive interviews were ‘elite’ interviews with figures 
who were knowledgeable about their organisation’s governance and investment 
management, along with beneficiaries who were participating in the scheme, and 
in most cases in the model. The interviews sought to elicit their detailed 
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interpretations of practice and the way in which it realised, or failed to realise, the 
qualities in the conceptual framework. These interpretations provide insights that 
enabled me to compare, and triangulate, interpretations of practice with formal 
documentation and draw conclusions on the realisation of qualities of voice. 
Within my analysis, I assume that executives and beneficiaries, due to their distinct 
positions in the scheme, are likely to have differing interpretations of governance 
generally, and the voice specifically. Reflecting this assumption, attention is paid 
in the case study chapters to the multiplicity of social actors’ interpretations, and 
where there are notable differences among beneficiary and executive 
interpretations, this is highlighted.   
The qualitative semi-structured single and group interviews with executives and 
beneficiaries, aimed to create socially-grounded interpretations, providing 
insights and understandings of organisational life that could not be realised 
through more positivist approaches (Ercan et al., 2016). The interviews were 
guided by an interview schedule that covered broad questions on: how sustainable 
investing is defined, and acted upon; the governance of the scheme and the place 
of beneficiaries within this; the model and its procedures; and communications 
broadly defined (for further details on the interview questions see the Interview 
Guide, Appendix 2). Through asking these questions and by following up with 
further probes and prompts, the interviews elicited interpretations of governance 
practice.  
In contrast to qualitative traditions that take a wholly inductive approach (Hay, 
2011), these interviews were guided by normative theories of voice, as illustrated 
in the conceptual framework in the previous chapter. These qualities of the 
conceptual framework structured the main areas of the topic guide and the 
question areas, but care was taken to ensure the questions were broad in their 
conceptualisation, and questions were phrased in an open-ended way. 
Interviewees were asked to reflect on their experiences and prompts and probes 
were used to elicit an interpretation of practice. In response to my questions, 
interviewees’ interpretations touched on some of the qualities in the conceptual 
framework in a relatively direct way (e.g. inclusiveness), while others were not 
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addressed directly, but were alluded to in their broader interpretations of practice 
(e.g. deliberative communication, articulating value). 
As with all cases of qualitative interviews in organisations, interviewees may have 
had an interest in presenting their organisation in the best possible light. To 
mitigate this as much as possible, I prompted interviewees to consider the 
tensions, challenges and surprises, as well as success stories, in their experiences 
of governance. Within the interview itself, when comments were ambiguous, I 
would sometimes use the technique of ‘playing-back’ my interpretation of what 
the interviewee had said to confirm my understanding. While I used this technique 
sparingly, so as to avoid ‘leading’ future answers, techniques such as this are 
helpful at ensuring clarity in the understanding of ambiguous or complex answers. 
Following Flick (2018), care was taken to ensure a degree of triangulation between 
sources and between interviewees. Documentary evidence was compared with 
interview findings, and on issues where there as a lack of clarity, I contacted the 
pension schemes directly with follow up questions. Furthermore, in the Member 
Council case, I observed a Council meeting to gain an impressionistic account of its 
operation, and to compare this with interviewees’ own interpretations of practice. 
Unfortunately, I did not observe a Delegate Assembly. 
Data analysis and representation 
The analysis process began in the interview itself; decisions are taken during an 
interview to follow up on a particularly intriguing comment, or the choice is made 
to turn to another question when it is anticipated it will provide a more insightful 
response. This analysis continues after the interview as initial thoughts and 
hunches are developed about the effectiveness of the interview questions, and 
the types of knowledge they are eliciting. Each of the interviews was transcribed 
by myself and in order to move from text of the interview – which described the 
experience and interpretations of the interviewees – towards a theoretically-
framed analysis and notes were taken on emergent themes.  
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To advance this analysis further, the transcripts were coded several times by 
following the common qualitative technique of thematic coding (Boyatzis, 1998). 
The first level of open inductive coding was developed with the goal of finding the 
codes that emerged from the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this round of 
coding, I identified a range of disparate themes, including larger abstract themes 
(e.g. ‘knowledge’), as well as more granular codes that represented an interesting, 
but less abstract, theme (e.g. ‘concerns of wider membership’ or ‘listening to 
beneficiaries’). Following this, the transcripts were re-coded deductively, explicitly 
using the conceptual framework qualities (see Appendix 3 for an overview of 
codes) and reflecting a form of theoretical coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
While my overall interpretation is framed by the theory-driven themes of the 
conceptual framework, the earlier wave of open-coding brought further depth to 
my understanding.  
Throughout this coding process, notes and interpretations were concurrently 
developed. Once the coding had been completed for each case study, the evidence 
available for each quality of the conceptual framework was reviewed and 
interpreted. Where evidence had been coded multiple times with open as well 
theoretical codes, the differing codes were considered and contrasted against 
each other, as a means of reviewing my interpretation. This helped to identify the 
full breadth of themes that each element of evidence represents as well as 
generating a sense that saturation was accomplished by the developing storyline 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). As a result of this iterative process, an empirically 
grounded narrative which reflects on the qualities of the conceptual framework 
was produced. 
This process was completed for each case, and within the writing process of the 
chapters further nuance in the analysis was developed, for example by highlighting 
the degree of difference or similarity in the interpretations of different actors 
(beneficiaries or executives). In the case of the Delegate Assembly model, 
additional variation between the two schemes is also acknowledged and made 
explicit in the analysis, whenever this was theoretically notable. In chapters six and 
seven, the analysis of each case is derived from a within case comparison (that is, 
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the effectiveness of a model in realising ‘inclusiveness’ is judged in comparison 
with its realisation of other qualities, such as ‘deliberative communication’, rather 
than in comparison with another model). Following this, in chapter eight, the two 
case study models are brought into comparison, with conclusions drawn from 
across the case studies and woven into an analysis of the promise and challenge 
of voice. 
Concluding comments 
This chapter explores the theoretical and conceptual foundations of the empirical 
part of this thesis; the analysis of two case studies of governance innovations using 
the conceptual framework. Moving away from an agency perspective on 
governance, this thesis is framed by a sociological understanding that views the 
institutional design of governance as a social practice. Two case studies of 
governance innovations – the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly – are 
the focus of this empirical part of the thesis. These are exemplar models in the 
institutionalisation of voice in pension schemes, situated in schemes with a history 
of sustainable investing. By empirically engaging with social actors’ interpretations 
the thesis offers an insight into the understandings which constitute governance 
practice, and the ways in which practice is shaped by contextual and structural 
features and conditions. These insights were collected through qualitative semi-
structured interviews with beneficiaries and executives. Complementing this, is 
the analysis of documentary evidence in the form of organisational reports and 
documents. Together, these sources of evidence were analysed using the 
conceptual framework. In the chapters that immediately follow, each case study 
model – the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly – are presented 
individually. Afterwards, the two cases are compared and further comparisons are 






6.  A Case Study of a Governance Innovation: The 
Member Council 
This chapter is the first of two case studies and illustrates the Member Council 
model – a governance entity that has been specifically adapted to bring a 
beneficiary voice into decision making at PGGM Coöperatie U.A (PGGM), a 
sustainability-orientated pension organisation, based in the Netherlands. As a 
governance body, the Member Council has statutory responsibilities, but it 
predominantly functions as an advisory body that informs the executive on 
beneficiaries’ perspectives and provides challenge to decision-makers. As such, it 
represents a governance innovation that introduces beneficiary voice into 
decision making. The Member Council model provides an insight into the practice 
of voice in a sustainability-focused pension organisation. 
Drawing upon scheme documentation and qualitative interviews with the central 
actors involved in the Member Council, the first part of the chapter provides an 
introduction to the model by situating it in the pensions system in which it 
operates and its legal and organisational implications. The history and background 
of the scheme is discussed, followed by its approach to sustainable investing. 
Following this, I outline the characteristics and position of the governance 
innovation involving voice in the organisational structure vis à vis other 
governance entities. Building on this descriptive introduction, the main part of the 
chapter explores the practice of the model, as interpretated by the actors 
involved: the beneficiaries and executives. Drawing on the conceptual framework 
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developed earlier in this thesis, an analysis of how the Member Council realises 
the qualities of voice is presented. This analysis focuses in particular on two central 
questions: (i) in what ways, and to what extent, are the conditions for each of the 
qualities of voice realised?; and (ii) how does the practice of the Member Council 
shape their realisation?  
Pensions in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands has a multi-pillar pension system (Ebbinghaus, 2011) in which 
occupational pensions provide additional benefits, on top of the state pension. As 
Anderson (2011) – whose work I draw upon in detail below – notes, the state and 
occupational provision are closely tied together, with the state pension serving as 
a minimum, upon which occupational pensions are paid above this basic level. 
Occupational pensions have had a long history in the Netherlands prior to the 
establishment of the state pension in the late 1950s. They are hugely significant, 
offering an almost universal form of coverage, with 90% of wage earners 
participating. While specific arrangements for contributions and benefits are 
determined at the scheme level, there are some broad patterns in the provision. 
Pensions are predominantly defined benefit, although a mix of defined benefit and 
defined contribution is also commonplace. In recent years, there has been an 
increasing shift from final salary to average salary schemes (Anderson, 2011).  
Distinctive to this system is the importance of social partners, such as the 
employer organisations and unions. These actors are involved in the negotiation 
of pension entitlements as a part of collective wage agreements. The Sichting van 
der Arbeid (STAR) is a significant part of this, and functions as a negotiating forum 
for labour and business interests. In addition, two pensions industry organisations 
(Vereniging van bedrifstakpensioenfondsen [VB] and Stichting voor 
Ondernemingspensioenfondsen [Opf]), along with elderly associations, (the 
Association of Elderly Organisations (CSO), with five member organisations) are 
important organisations with significant lobbying influence. 
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Pension schemes in the Netherlands take different forms: company schemes, 
mandatory sectoral schemes, non-compulsory schemes and schemes for 
particular professions. The particular scheme in the case study is a professional 
scheme for the healthcare and welfare sector. The governance of occupational 
pensions is regulated by the Pension Act (2007), with the regulatory authority 
residing in the Dutch central bank. The governance of company and sectoral 
schemes must include employers and unions as representatives, as well as 
employee representatives, in their administrative boards. The involvement of 
pensioners representatives in the administrative board or the establishment of 
participants’ councils (deelnemersradd) is also recommended by the regulator as 
a voluntary governance body that functions as an advisory council on important 
issues.  
Pension scheme background 
The Member Council is a governance entity which serves PGGM Coöperatie U.A. 
(PGGM), a pension administration organisation established in 2007 by the social 
partners in the health and welfare sector in the Netherlands (PGGM Profielschets 
Ledenraad, 2020 [translation]). In terms of size, PGGM is a large pension 
organisation and manages assets of over €215 million (£194 million) (PGGM N.V. 
Annual Report, 2019). Although it serves various clients, Pensioenfonds Zorg en 
Welzijn (PFZW), the mandatory pension scheme for the health and welfare sector, 
is its largest client with a base of approximately 755,000 members (PGGM 
Profielschets Ledenraad, 2020 [translation]). The Member Council is part of the 
organisational structure of PGGM and PGGM is an administrative body that has a 
service-level agreement with PFZW. Given this, PGGM is the main focus of this 




Sustainable investing approach 
PGGM has had a long history of engaging with questions of responsible and 
sustainable investing, and is a high-profile participant in international industry and 
civil society initiatives addressing sustainable investing in pension schemes (e.g. 
the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change, IIGCC). It portrays itself, both 
internally to its beneficiaries and externally to the industry, as an organisation with 
sustainable investing central to its purpose, along with its focus on return. 
According to an executive, it is consistently named the most responsible investor 
in the Netherlands, and the organisation is guided by its strategic goal to create a 
‘valuable future’, which includes its approach to responsible investment. In its 
Annual Responsible Investment Report it states: 
As a pension investor, we aim to achieve an optimal return for our clients 
while maintaining a responsible risk profile. Within this core task, we pay 
particular attention to responsible investment based on the conviction that 
this can reduce risks and offers opportunities to make a good return with 
investments that contribute to social and environmental solutions. This is 
especially true in the long period in which the money of our clients is 
entrusted to us. (2018: 5) 
Origins of the Member Council 
A documentary which investigated the investment of employees’ pension 
contributions into weapons manufacturers was a decisive moment for this 
scheme. PGGM had already gained a reputation for investing responsibly and for 
being a thought leader in this area, partly in response to previous demonstrations 
by beneficiaries against its investment strategy. But this time the complaints from 
beneficiaries were louder and larger and the pension scheme was inundated with 
criticisms. According to an executive, the sentiment of the beneficiaries was: ‘I am 
curing, or taking care of people every day, and my pension fund is killing them. 
This can’t be true’. As a result of these beneficiary protests – a moment of crisis – 
they realised it needed to address beneficiary concerns about their investment 
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strategy. It was a pivotal moment and one executive (interviewee A) commented 
that through this experience they ‘learned the hard way’ about the potency and 
relevance of sustainability concerns to its beneficiaries. This prompted this 
scheme to rethink their approach to engaging with beneficiaries and they looked 
for ways to integrate the views of beneficiaries into scheme governance with, as 
one executive (interviewee B) remarked, renewed ‘energy, focus and strategy’. 
The Member Council was already a model for bringing employer and union 
interests together, with members appointed by these organisations. These 
governance arrangements were adapted and the Member Council, the most 
important governance body, was expanded to engage a wider group of 
beneficiaries in its decision making.  
The Member Council: Characteristics 
This pension scheme was not new to the concept of sustainable investing but 
executives commented that they needed to improve. To this end, the Member 
Council model was enhanced with beneficiary perspectives, to challenge the 
organisation’s actions and performance, and to strengthen legitimacy. As one 
executive summarised: 
[The Member Council] is a place ‘where they can bring in all their ideas: 
what we are doing well and what we are doing wrong… We need them to 
bring the voice, to understand what we are doing and to agree on what we 
are doing’.  
Interviewee A, PGGM Executive, October, 2017 
The Member Council is a model of beneficiary engagement which represents an 
adaptation and expansion of beneficiary voice in an already existing governance 
entity. As of 2012, the updated Member Council includes 45 members: 15 
members from the employers’ organisations, 15 members from unions, and 15 
directly elected beneficiary members. There is the aspiration that the council must 
‘reflect the members and the social environment of the cooperative. This concerns 
age distribution, male/female, regional and sectoral distribution’ (PGGM 
Profielschets Ledenraad, 2020: 4 [translation]). In a pension system where 
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beneficiary voice in pension scheme decision making has been negligible, it 
represents a novel development (Apostolakis et al., 2016). A summary of the key 
design characteristics of this model is illustrated in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Summary of Design Characteristics of Member Council  
Mode of Selection Election 
Role Title Representatives  





Regularity 4 meetings per year 
Length of term 2 x 4-year term 
Size Small (45 in total, 15 beneficiary members) 
 
The expanded Member Council included a larger number of members, including 
beneficiaries, who were identified from each of the employer organisations 
participating in this multi-organisation pension scheme. In this move, the Member 
Council was opened out to a wider group of actors who were representatives of 
beneficiary rather than of employer or union interests. Executives were unsure 
whether the new opportunities would pique beneficiaries’ interest. They were 
surprised to receive 17 applicants for every available position; bringing into 
question the assumption that beneficiaries lack motivation to participate in 
governance practices. As one Member Council participant commented: 
They thought that not many people would apply, and now there are three 
positions [in my organisation] and still a lot of people apply. So, I think with 
the members, they like to be involved. There are always more people who 
apply than positions.  
Interviewee D, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
In the formal organisational structure, the Member Council is described as the 
highest governing body, and its role is to ‘think about and discuss the direction and 
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policy of the cooperative and act as a link between the members and the 
Cooperative Board’ (PGGM Profielschets Ledenraad, 2020: 3 [translation]). 
However, it is the cooperative board that is the company’s shareholder, and has 
responsibility for the ‘identity, mission, vision and (financial) policy frameworks of 
the cooperative and the interests of the members’ (PGGM Profielschets 
Ledenraad (2020: 3 [translation]). In addition to these two bodies, there also exists 
a supervisory board of PGGM N.V, overseeing a part of PGGM that provides 
commercial services. The result is very complex organisational structure. While the 
Member Council may be defined as the highest governing body, these other 
boards play a highly significant role supervising the organisation’s varied activities. 
In essence, the Member Council’s purpose can be summarised as a mixture of 
statutory, consultative and beneficiary engagement responsibilities. Its function is 
to: (a) meet its statutory responsibilities: e.g. amendment of the articles of 
association, appointment of the members of the co-operative council, 
appointment of accountant, approve of any change or the dissolve of the 
organisation; (b) fulfil an assessment role: providing a sounding board for the co-
operative board; (c) fulfil an ambassador’s role: bringing in members’ wishes and 
signals from the outside (PGGM Profielschets Ledenraad, 2020 [translation]).  
On sustainable investing, the Member Council’s remit is largely advisory: Member 
Council members are free to express their views and challenge existing sustainable 
investment policy, but responsibility for defining the investment strategy is held 
by the investment arm of the PFZW (health and welfare pension scheme). 
Oversight of this is provided by a separate investment board of employer and 
union representatives. Member Council participants are encouraged to liaise and 
discuss policy with this investment board, but they do not have control on decision 




Qualities of the Member Council 
Inclusive engagement 
The aim of the Member Council is to express, in the words of an executive, the 
‘raw reality’ of the social and healthcare workers’ lives and bring this perspective 
into governance decision making. But the question of ‘whose reality?’ is a 
pertinent one. Does the Council involve the full breadth of beneficiaries, who will 
have differing legal positions in relation to the pension scheme (e.g. active or 
retired beneficiaries), as well as varied socio-economic positions (e.g. ethnicity, 
gender, age, social class)? Does the model’s procedures and processes enhance or 
diminish the realisation of inclusive engagement among beneficiaries? 
There is an awareness in this scheme, among both executives and Member Council 
participants, of the necessity of ensuring inclusive engagement in the Member 
Council. There is an aspiration that the delegates represent each of the six 
professional sectors represented in the scheme, from across each of the regions 
the scheme covers, and to ensure the involvement of a mix of ages and both male 
and female beneficiaries (PGGM Profielschets Ledenraad, 2020 [translation]). In 
2012, there were 260 members who submitted applications for 15 positions. 
Despite the aspiration to achieve inclusive engagement, the model still suffers 
from a lack of diverse representation, including an overrepresentation of older 
working age employed males (35-60 years), but an underrepresentation of women 
and pensioners. As an executive (interviewee B) comments, ‘When you look at the 
Member Council, you could say it’s a little bit too old and a little bit too male, but 
the elderly people and the women, that is not yet realised’. Other socio-economic 
characteristics, such as ethnicity or social class have not been actively considered 
in the selection procedure. A Member Council participant offers a similar 
perspective on the pensioner presence:  
The representation of the pensioners is not very good in the organisation. 
I think it is one of the main goals in the future to make it [better]. You don’t 
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have much communication [as a pensioner], mostly it’s the working 
people. 
Interviewee E, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
Another Member Council participant (interviewee E) adds ‘The people who are at 
work, they hear about PFZW. The pensioners living in a small village somewhere, 
they don’t hear about PFZW, they don’t have any contact, and this is a problem’. 
Underscoring the notion of inclusive engagement is the belief that the presence 
of participants with differing characteristics will translate into the articulation of 
differing perspectives or interests. But in this institutionalisation of voice, even 
when selection procedures have been successful – for example in terms of 
regional representation – this did not necessarily translate into the representation 
of regional perspectives or interests. As one executive (interviewee B) says, ‘The 
connection with the local, that is important. And we are not that good in it, 
because… we are very nationally focused.’ Member Council participants highlight 
that the lack of integration of regional perspectives contributes to a disjuncture – 
‘an indifference’ – among beneficiaries towards the scheme and its policies, 
especially when they are themselves unaffected by the problems the scheme is 
addressing.  As one Member Council participant (interviewee F) comments, ‘I also 
think that it is psychological [and] that when you don’t experience a problem, you 
are indifferent to solutions that are made somewhere [else] in the [country]’. 
Among executives and Member Council participants there was therefore a sense 
that beneficiaries’ engagement with the Council tends to be ignited by issues 
which directly affected them, and that problems experienced by others, elsewhere 
in the country, are perceived as less interesting and were rarely a source of 
engagement. 
Member Council participants are conscious of the structural problems of achieving 
inclusive engagement, problems that are likely to be related to gender. The 
demands of work in the social and healthcare, along with the informal care that 
these professionals – often women – undertake, impact upon their capacity to 
participate in the Council, indicating the gendered impact of engagement. As one 
female Council participant (interviewee D) highlights, ‘I mean, how many times 
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when you are working, when you have a job. How much time do you have available 
to get involved? We try as much as possible to support the organisation’. It is not 
just lack of time that is highlighted, but the consequences of working in the health 
and social care sector, ‘I think they are interested, but they work so hard for 
earning the money, I think they are so tired from working, that that’s the problem.’ 
Indeed, it is this sense of their colleagues’ exclusion, and their lack of 
understanding of their financial situation, that motivates several participants to 
get involved in the Member Council.  
The reason why in 2011 I applied, that year I was responsible for a 
kindergarten and I was responsible for a lot of young girls (the employees), 
and they had no knowledge of a contract or a pension, and that was one of 
the main reasons I applied for this job. Looking for ways to support people 
in looking forward to their future. And a lot of people who work in care 
started when they were young, around 18–19, and never looked around 
because they are so involved in their job. They don’t care about tomorrow 
or the day after tomorrow. 
 Interviewee C, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
While the inclusive engagement of all relevant publics is a goal that is fundamental 
to normative conceptions of voice, achieving inclusivity in practice requires 
attention to the organising principles, structures and processes and an 
appreciation of how these may limit the engagement of particular groups.  
Attention should not only be focused on their initial recruitment, but also the 
extent of their continued participation. Indeed, Member Council participants 
described the varied participation patterns, with some participants attending 
regularly and others too often absent or even unable to complete their full term.  
One proposal developed to enhance inclusivity was a recommendation to increase 
the number of Member Council participants, and thereby expand the opportunity 
for diversity. In the words of one beneficiary member (interviewee D) ‘You should 
have more [beneficiary] members because you have more stories’. Although this 
proposal was agreed at the Member Council back in 2012, it had not progressed 
further at the time of the interviews. An executive (interviewee B) explains that 
one reason why the proposal has not been realised is that it would replace 
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employer and union representatives with an expanded number of beneficiary 
members, a move that pushed against ‘vested interests.’ This suggests the 
employer and union representatives were resistant to the idea that their 
representation would be diminished, and beneficiary member numbers would be 
strengthened. As a result, this interest in strengthening beneficiary voice led, not 
to a stronger beneficiary presence, but instead to a review of the role of 
employers’ representatives on the Council. As an executive explains: 
The goal was set – in the end we will have only ‘free members’ [beneficiary 
members] in the Member Council – but what they didn’t decide on was the 
transition period. So this was the first step in 2012 and then we thought 
we’d do the second step in 2016, but there was no step! And there was a 
discussion between the Member Council and the board and one of the 
things that really surprised me is that there were less calls in the Member 
Council for this next step ‘Why didn’t we take the next step?’. We want to 
improve democracy really, but there is now a governance working group 
of the board, looking at the role of the employers because the employers’ 
representatives find it very difficult. 
Interviewee B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
The Member Council model illustrates the way in which inclusivity is 
conceptualised in pension schemes, through an aspiration to reflect the diversity 
of organisations participating in the scheme, their regions, and the age and gender 
profile of beneficiaries. But this case study reveals how, in practice, this aspiration 
is difficult to achieve, with female and pensioner participation in the Member 
Council model low. Given that the scheme represents the interests of health and 
social care employees – a largely female workforce – this lack of engagement by 
female participants is particularly striking. Additionally, the question of whether 
the Council sufficiently represents the views of ethnic minority members, and 
those from differing social classes, is largely unacknowledged. The executives and 
Members of the Council are sensitive to the issue of inclusive engagement and 
have a willingness to improve and address this problem. But their limited success 
with increasing the number of beneficiary Member Council members on the 
Council highlights the gap between their wish to ensure inclusivity, and their ability 
to achieve the organisational changes necessary for this to take shape. 
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Deliberative communication  
‘We are the ‘free members’, we can talk, we can say things out of the book.’  
  Interviewee C, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
Central to achieving beneficiary voice in governance is the necessity of creating 
communication that has deliberative qualities – inclusiveness, respectfulness, and 
orientated around forms of consensus or constructive decision making. Among 
Member Council participants there is a sense that they can express themselves 
freely and with openness, giving the impression that that the mode of 
communication in the Member Council realises a sense of inclusiveness. Reflecting 
this, participants in the Member Council describe themselves as ‘free members’; 
a distinct category of membership that contrasts with employer or union members 
of the Council. This identity reflects their feeling that they have fewer restrictions 
than other members and are able to raise a range of issues at the Council. This 
freedom is not always accepted, in fact, and it has been contested by other 
members of the Council who questioned whether the free members should be 
raising issues that lie outside the Council’s mandate. Following a discussion on this 
issue, a decision was taken to allow all contributions by Member Council 
participants, even if they touched on these wider issues. A strength of this model 
is therefore that it affords participants the opportunity to raise varied concerns 
and interests. Describing her impression of the beneficiary participants in the 
Member Council, an executive says: 
The ‘free members’ are elected – they are the most active. They really go 
for themselves and they want to be in the Members Council. The other 
ones are more from their own organisation – they have their own interests. 
They have to manage with their back office. So the fifteen ones, they are 
really active; they really believe in the pension scheme, they really believe 
they want to make the pension better.  
Interviewee A, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
And a Member Council participant comments: 
In every meeting we do, people often talk about the labour market and 
that there are no people to find to do the work… And that’s a subject that 
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people often say “Well that’s not for here, and the pension scheme can’t 
do anything about it”. Well, that is the reality of where we work. And I 
know that the pension scheme can’t solve everything but it’s good to know 
that this is what we care about. 
Interviewee D, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
The design and format of the Member Council is arranged so that discussions take 
place among a relatively small group (45 members), who are meeting regularly, 
with each individual allocated time in the meeting to contribute at least once to 
the discussion. The meetings are organised to begin with an interactive session 
facilitating beneficiary contributions and perspectives, followed by a discussion of 
the formal responsibilities. Additional special items of interest for learning or 
discussion are also sometimes included. Although there is a commitment to 
ensuring beneficiary contributions on a wide range of issues, the extent to which 
it truly enables the expression of their plural perspectives is an important 
question. Despite the attempts made to create an interactive discussion, the 
impact of time limitations is highlighted by beneficiaries, suggesting insufficient 
time in the meeting for either the beneficiary perspective to be fully expressed, or 
to generate shared interests or jointly identified issues for beneficiaries to work 
together on. On the latter issue, beneficiaries had previously discussed initiating 
meetings outside of the Member Council meetings, but ultimately this idea was 
rejected on the basis that it amounted to a ‘pre-cooked dinner’, with implications 
for the effectiveness of the Member Council meetings. 
In the beginning it was about how to manage things, we suggested once to 
run some meetings before (the Council) but our Chairman said no… he 
called it “Pre-cooked dinner” and the problem is of course that we see each 
other five times a year; we are now trying to organise a community for the 
members of the council. But its slow, there is now the new possibility to 
use your phone, but it’s not completely working at the moment. But that 
we hope will increase the contact between the members of the Member 
Council.  
Interviewee C, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
Although the realisation of respectful engagement with the viewpoints and 
perspectives of others is central to deliberative communication, evidence from the 
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Member Council shows how difficult it can be to maintain. One Member Council 
participant recalled how a board member was dismissive of a Member council 
perspective. This illustrates how, even in organisations committed to beneficiary 
involvement, and where the body is afforded with formal responsibilities, 
respectful engagement can still be difficult to achieve among technical and 
bureaucratic experts. 
For me there was one time, when one of our free colleagues said 
something to the Board and one member of the Board really said “We 
don’t have anything to say about that”. They want a Member Council and 
they say we’re the highest bosses, but you don’t say to your highest bosses 
that you can’t say something about that subject. And I really found that a 
breaking point in our working relationship. 
Interviewee D, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
An additional feature of deliberative communication is the capacity to 
communicate in a manner which is conducive to consensus or achieving 
constructive decision making. The Member Council is designed to function as both 
a consultative and decision-making model. As an executive (interviewee A) 
concisely summarises, ‘We need them to bring the voice, to understand what we 
are doing and to agree on what we are doing’. The ways in which the Member 
Council creates the conditions for constructive decision making is illustrated by its 
involvement in providing feedback on a poorly designed energy deal offered to 
beneficiaries. In this example, the Member Council played a role in moving the 
scheme forwards, from a position of receiving complaints to a renewed more 
popular policy. As one executive explains: 
It wasn’t very green energy. It was very poor on sustainability. And then we 
got complaints. And then we had a discussion (in the Member Council) 
‘Okay, how should we do it, because we also have members who say “Give 
me the best price, I don’t care?”’. So how should we weigh those different 
trade-offs? And that’s where we are learning, we had a special meeting on 
this – they gave us feedback, and then we made a policy on this. It’s also a 
learning curve for the organisation. 
Interviewee B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
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The qualities of deliberative communication were realised in a variety of ways in 
the Member Council model. The very fact that Member Council participants called 
themselves ‘free members’ indicates the type of participation they feel able to 
achieve. And when they faced a degree of resistance, their freedom to raise any 
issues – even those outside their mandate – was re-established. This case study 
also shows that, even in organisations committed to bringing beneficiary voice into 
decision making, resistance among other governance actors can be strong and 
consequential for creating the conditions for deliberative communication. While 
there is a sense that very little is out of bounds, there is also a perception that the 
time available for the Council restricts the depth of discussions, and the ability of 
Member Council participants to develop shared interests and themes to work on. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, this model does, however, go some way in 
establishing the conditions for constructive decision making. 
Informed engagement 
The Member Council exposes the prevalent knowledge asymmetries – not only on 
technical and bureaucratic matters, but also on non-professional and lay 
perspectives – between executives, advisors and beneficiaries. But in what ways – 
if at all – does this model manage to overcome these asymmetries and create the 
conditions for informed engagement with decision-making?  While the Member 
Council has an important role to play in providing oversight of the scheme, 
beneficiary members highlight their difficulty in participating in technical 
discussions and challenging decisions,  ‘The difficulty is that we see each other four 
times a year and all the people who are working here have immense advantage 
and knowledge’ (interviewee C). It is not only the scope of their board role which 
creates challenges, but the limited frequency of meetings, the lack of contact 
between beneficiary members outside of the meetings and the demands of their 
day jobs, making oversight and challenge more difficult. While these issues are not 
unique to this board, beneficiaries are conscious of how these difficulties shaped 
their effectiveness as board members. 
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In addition to the practical constraints they face, the educational background of 
the executive staff, compared with the beneficiary members, present a socio-
educational barrier which beneficiary members find hard to scale. As an executive 
notes: 
And that is sometimes difficult because the representatives from the 
employers’ organisation are highly educated people – sometimes they are 
the Chairman of the board of a big hospital, and they have to deal with 
someone who works as a cook. And that is difficult to work with all those 
different people. 
Interviewee A, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
And alternatively, from the perspective of a Member Council participant: 
You know, I think, most members of the Member Council are, well, highly 
educated. A lot of people from universities and I think there should be 
more people from the floor, just workers, not only the highly level but 
people like me, you know. Sometimes I feel very lonely because I think ‘Oh’ 
when I read their CV. 
Interviewee G, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
But a knowledge and experience gap also exists between the Member Council 
participants and the wider beneficiaries, especially younger colleagues or those 
with little formal education. This imbalance in technical and bureaucratic 
knowledge levels is immediately apparent to Member Council participants: 
A lot of my co-workers are educated at a middle level. And at the pension 
scheme a lot of people are educated at a higher level or an executive level. 
And sometimes the things they write, the words they use, they are not 
really similar to the words my colleagues use. There’s a gap. 
Interviewee D, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017  
Profound socio-economic and educational differences exist between the 
beneficiaries and executives in pension schemes, making the conditions for 
effective informed engagement difficult to realise. By drawing upon a medical 
metaphor and comparing the relationship between a Member Council participant 
and a finance professional with that of a patient facing a doctor, an executive 
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neatly illustrates the experience of feeling uninformed compared with others, and 
of the knowledge asymmetries that characterise pensions.  
Talking as a financial amateur is the same [feeling] that you feel when you 
are a patient and you are talking to the professionals in healthcare. It’s the 
same kind of distance and it’s our goal to really cross this distance, to close 
this gap. 
Interview B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
While this low level of understanding of pensions and investing matters among 
beneficiaries, and the knowledge asymmetries between beneficiaries and 
executives are endemic across this industry, in many ways the Member Council is 
well-suited to addressing this problem. The involvement of beneficiaries in 
quarterly meetings, over a sustained period of time (two terms of four years), 
provides the opportunity for member participants to extend their technical and 
bureaucratic knowledge over time to inform their contributions and decision-
making in the Council. 
Indeed, the Member Council format has been adapted to address the question of 
knowledge asymmetries and work to advance beneficiary members’ 
understanding. To this end, the Member Council meetings have evolved into a 
different, more beneficiary-friendly, structure. Originally crafted in highly 
technical financial language, the language has been simplified, and the meeting 
format has been structured into clearly defined parts focusing on (a) a dialogue on 
emerging themes from beneficiaries; (b) meeting the statutory responsibilities of 
the board; and (c) special items of interest for learning or discussion. The inclusion 
of part (c) enables the discussion of topics which inform and educate beneficiaries, 
improving their knowledge on technical matters. For example, when discussing a 
presentation designed to educate on asset management an executive 
(interviewee B) explains that this was organised so the Member Council 
participants ‘Know how it works in the system and how – if you want to have 
influence – you can go to the Member Council, or call your members (the employer 
or union representatives) in the investment board.’ This illustrates how knowledge 
asymmetries are manifested in in practice. But it also indicates how the board 
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provides the impetus to limit their effect in small, but notable ways. The Member 
Council cannot fully remove differences in technical understanding that exist 
between executives and beneficiaries, but its attempts to minimise these ensure 
Member Council participants are able to play their role more effectively. 
But this understanding of knowledge asymmetries is not the whole story. From a 
deliberative democratic perspective, it is the very existence of multiple forms of 
knowledge, and asymmetries or differences between these, which justify the 
value of public deliberation. Seen through this lens, the aim of the Member Council 
is not only to inform beneficiary members about technical matters in pension 
governance, but rather the other way around: to educate pension scheme 
executives and other actors about the lived experience of beneficiaries and their 
non-professional and lay perspectives. Indeed, executives themselves understand 
the benefits of the Member Council as bringing about learning in both directions. 
For the executives, there are instrumental benefits to a better understanding of 
the beneficiary perspective, as one executive (interviewee A) remarks, ‘It is really 
a belief that we need to be in touch with them. We need this for the business 
model’.  
Participants in the Member Council are acutely aware of the limitations of their 
technical and bureaucratic knowledge and the difficulties in gaining an advanced 
understanding of the organisation and the relevant issues involved in decision 
making. The experiences of the Member Council participants nicely illustrate the 
knowledge asymmetries that are widely discussed in the literature on pension 
scheme governance. To address this issue, the procedures of the Member Council 
have been adapted in a way to make participation, and the technical and 
bureaucratic issues the Council is handling, easier to understand. But not all types 
of knowledge differences are detrimental. In fact, as deliberative democrats 
argue, beneficiaries’ non-professional, lay knowledge is also a resource to be 
drawn upon in decision-making, and these perspectives are particularly vital for 
discussions of sustainability. The characteristics of the Member Council – in 
particular, the investment in participants’ technical and bureaucratic learning, the 
time allocated to hearing beneficiaries’ experiences and concerns, and members 
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ongoing participation over a number of years – each play a role in contributing to 
the conditions for an informed means of engagement.  
Transparency  
Transparency is central to effective governance and a lack of transparency can 
damage the legitimacy of voice and its decision-making outcomes. In the Member 
Council model, significant steps are taken to ensure its transparency, but despite 
this, the model and its activities remain complex for beneficiaries to understand 
and engage with. Understanding how effectively transparency is realised involves: 
first, an appreciation of how it is realised; second, what information is provided; 
for whom this is available; and finally, an appreciation of whether beneficiaries are 
able to respond to this information and engage more closely in with the 
organisation. 
Given the Member Council is a legal part of the governance structure of PGGM, 
basic information on the Member Council, such as who is eligible to be involved, 
the electoral basis of their selection, and the Council’s broad purpose is publicly 
available to all who may be interested on its website. Although this information 
provides the basic background of the Council, there remains limited information 
on how the specific responsibilities of the Council are addressed, including the 
breadth of themes that it tackles. This lack of detailed public information is 
mirrored in beneficiaries’ own difficulties in understanding their responsibilities as 
Council Members. 
Overall, the scheme is an active communicator with its beneficiaries about pension 
matters. It employs a wide range of traditional and digital media (print, direct 
marketing, online communities) to communicate with its members and generate 
further discussion, and these methods are also used to communicate information 
on the Member Council, and between Council members. To help bring the 
Member Council closer to its beneficiaries once a year it has a meeting at one of 
its member institutions.  
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We find that every time the people at the scheme say “I didn’t know it was 
like this”. You know it’s really good and they should do it more often, just 
to realise that it is a very different world.   
Interviewee D, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
But despite efforts to communicate, there remains a lack of widespread 
awareness among beneficiaries about the Council. As one Member Council 
participant (interviewee F) describes, ‘I don’t think they are aware of the existence 
of the Member Council. I think that’s the problem, that we are invisible.’ But it is 
not just lack of awareness which is the problem, but also a lack of clarity and 
understanding of the purpose of the Council, and the ways in which the Council is 
seeking to influence the broad range of issues – not just pensions – that impact 
upon beneficiaries’ professional lives.  
A Member Council participant describes how he informs beneficiaries of Member 
Council discussions and gathers information on their concerns to bring these back 
to the Council; a process of translation between beneficiaries and decision-
makers, referred to as ‘investorship16’. But it is difficult to explain the strategic 
priorities of the organisation to fellow beneficiaries, which are complex for 
beneficiaries to understand.  
For instance, [in] mental health care there are not enough [staff]. There is 
really a problem to get people educated and stick them to the organisation 
where they work. And my colleagues are not aware that PGGM are trying 
to address the problem, brainstorm about solutions… So they are surprised 
[when they hear about it] and then it’s off the table. So that surprises me 
– if I was in their position, I would ask a lot of questions: ‘How does it work 
and what are they doing?’ But they don’t… It’s not in their range of 
thinking, if a pension organisation is trying to solve problems of education, 
I think they go blank. That’s it. 
Interviewee F, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
This lack of understanding is likely to restrict beneficiaries’ ability to respond to 
the Member Council, as well as engage further with their pension scheme. As an 
 
16 The term ‘investorship’ is used by interviewees. In PGGM documentation this is referred to as 
an ‘ambassador’ role (PGGM Profielschets Ledenraad, 2020: 4). 
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executive reiterates, the innovative strategies they develop are not common 
sense, and this presents a communications challenge: 
I think it’s not logical what we do there. It’s not what we are used to. We 
think this is a financial industry, they make money. And they suddenly see 
an organisation who says “It’s not only money we fix, but it’s also your well-
being”. It’s a mix up in their heads.  
Interviewee B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
Despite the efforts invested in ensuring the transparency of the model, awareness 
and comprehension of the Member Council among beneficiaries is difficult to 
realise. And even among Member Council participants, understandings of the 
Council, its responsibilities, their role and areas of influence developed 
incrementally, through participation, rather than from prior information. 
In the beginning it is very difficult… you think you have a say in everything 
and that is not the case. So you have to learn, what can I say that has an 
effect and what can I think about, but it doesn’t affect me and I can’t do 
anything about it. So, for me that was very difficult.   
              Interviewee D, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
This lack of understanding exists despite the varied and advanced communications 
used by the scheme. This case nicely illustrates the difficulty of realising 
transparency when forms of innovative governance, and their strategies, 
challenge taken for granted assumptions about the strategic purpose of an 
organisation. In these contexts, despite the use of varied communication 
channels, transparency is still difficult to realise. Notwithstanding these problems, 
the high numbers of applications to participate in the Council (mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter) indicates that, among a minority of beneficiaries at 
least, the scheme is managing to provide sufficient information about the Council 
to raise awareness and pique their interest in engaging further.  
Influence 
The degree to which the Member Council realises influence over decision making 
is a critical question, but it is a complex picture that emerges. Member Council 
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participants and executives provide an insight into the areas where they have had 
influence (such as in the development of strategy), as well as areas where their 
role seems arguably more ceremonial (such as in meeting their statutory 
responsibilities). The Member Council model illustrates how the influence 
afforded to models of voice is not simply shaped by statutory powers and decision-
making responsibilities, but also by the willingness of executives to listen to 
beneficiary perspectives and respond seriously to their views or 
recommendations. 
There is a clear commitment to beneficiary involvement in the Member Council 
among executives, and to the realisation of the Council’s influence. The Council is 
regarded as integral to realising beneficiary voice. As an executive describes:  
We try to connect our financial business world with the people who are 
working in the care sector, who are not really financial or business like. And 
we learn a lot about it. It’s a hard task but we really try hard to make the 
voice of the members [heard] in the asset managers organisation. And 
today the Member Council will also have a session with Asset Management 
and so they will speak about the assets, but I’m sure the members will say 
what they think about it, and not all the financial complicated stuff, but 
how they feel we should invest.  
Interviewee A, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
Influence is not only seen as something that should have a direct link to policy-
making or strategic development, but also is seen as something that can be 
achieved through understanding the beneficiary perspective better. Discussing 
the relevance of beneficiary engagement from a democratic perspective, an 
executive (interviewee B) says: ‘I think people call this informal democracy. 
Because there is no true direct relationship or (formal) influence but due to this 
contact you get the talk of the people on the floor, up to the pension fund board’. 
This executive stressed the way in which diffuse rather than direct influence could 
be realised through contact and engagement with beneficiaries and their 
perspectives.  
The Member Council’s responsibilities do not include oversight over all areas of 
policy-making. Instead, its role involves specific statutory responsibilities, along 
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with a consultative ‘client’ role for wider policy-making. This latter role does not 
offer full control, but enables the expression of values, opinions, and 
recommendations, as well as the capacity to challenge decision making. As an 
executive (interviewee B) explains: ‘You could only organise inspiration, but I also 
believe there should also be a discipline, there should be a bite in the barking dog.'   
Identifying influence is complex, and there are differences of opinion between 
beneficiaries and executives on whether influence is fully realised. Even though 
the Member Council is defined as the highest governing body, as the quote in the 
‘deliberative communication’ section highlighted, in practice their authority is 
diminished if other governing actors refuse to respond to their questions. And 
furthermore, in the areas where the Council has statutory authority, the Council 
appears to not fully exercise this, and instead closely follow executive 
recommendations, making this appear a largely ceremonial exercise. On these 
responsibilities, a Member Council participant (interviewee D) highlights the 
knowledge barriers which limit the effectiveness of their challenge, when 
discussing their responsibility on approving the choice of accountant: ‘What 
should we say? “No this isn’t a good accountant?” I don’t know’. A different 
perspective is offered by an executive, who argues that the simple act of involving 
beneficiaries in the Council strengthens its position as a ‘disciplining instrument’, 
which can be used to manage the performance of external service providers, such 
as accountants. Commenting on the same scenario he reflects: 
We have KPMG. And two years ago, there was a problem with KPMG [and 
it] remains KPMG”. But I know for sure that in the next meeting the CFO 
will say “It was a close call in the Member Council, because of your 
reputation”. So, it still has some kind of impact, that you [the Member 
Council participants] brought the issue to the table. 
Interviewee B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
On policy-making where the Member Council has a consultative role, there is a 
sense from both participants and executives that the Council has greater 
influence. Indeed, one Member Council participant (interviewee D) believes that 
they ‘wouldn’t be here, we would have quit’ if they had no impact. But needless 
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to say, this perspective was also tempered with realism about the scope of their 
impact. In this respect, there is a sense that patience is important, ‘You hope you 
have an immediate impact on things you say in the Council, but I think that’s not 
possible. But what we see is that the things we say, they are taken care of.’  
On sustainability questions the influence of the Member Council is mixed. Notably, 
its mandate does not include direct control over sustainable investing; this is 
controlled by the asset owner, which is PFZW, the pension scheme for health and 
welfare. This responsibility is held by the investment arm of this organisation, with 
oversight by a separate board which includes only employer and union 
representatives. This distinction between the advisory role of the Member Council 
and the control afforded to the investment board is notable. Justifying this 
separation, an executive (interviewee B) says, ‘Sometimes Chinese walls are good’. 
However, it is not immediately clear why this particular ‘Chinese wall’ is necessary, 
given that to be a Member Council participant, an individual must also be a 
member of the health and social care pension scheme – so there is a legitimate 
link between the two. The lack of formal ties between these two decision-making 
entities can therefore be attributed to a prioritisation of professional knowledge. 
As a result, while the Member Council participants can express their perspectives 
on sustainable investing, ultimately, they do not have any direct control of the 
definition of the investment strategy. As one Member Council member explains, 
‘We also talk about investing in, well, it’s difficult because not everything is our 
responsibility. But we talk about how PGGM invests in the things that are close to 
our heart.’ In this area, the Member Council is designed to offer opinions and 
recommendations rather than control and this is justified by demarcating 
investing as a professional activity involving technical knowledge:  
There is a tension between involving people and professionalism. Even if 
you are involved, you know one thing but you don’t know it better than the 
risk manager or the asset managers – so it should never be an executive 
role. It should always be a non-executive role, an advisory role. It should 
never be a “Tick the box, what kind of company do we invest in? Ok we do 
BP but we don’t do X”. That’s not going to be a wise decision. But to give 
guidelines, or to give in the end maybe guiding principles.  
Interviewee B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
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The Member Council has a stronger influence on sustainability questions where 
they impact on operational issues. As mentioned earlier, an example was the 
decision to advertise an offer on fossil fuel-based household energy to 
beneficiaries. In this discussion, the Member Council participants criticised the 
product for not reflecting their sustainability ambitions. Why, they questioned, 
does a pension organisation which invests sustainably offer non-environmentally 
friendly products to beneficiaries as offers? An executive explains the significance 
of this challenge and how they responded:  
And that’s where we are learning, we had a special meeting on this – they 
gave us feedback, and then we made a policy on this. It’s also a learning 
curve for the organisation. 
Interviewee B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
Similarly, there is evidence the Member Council influences strategic policy-
making, for example by identifying the themes for the impact investing agenda.  
So we started with the Member Council, they were really creating a first 
draft. And what we did afterwards – the second step – was in the executive 
board we discussed it: “Okay, we have the societal agenda, we need the 
themes and the themes are being chosen by the Member Council: What do 
you think of the three themes?” And then they said “We agree”. It is 
difficult to alter the choice by the member council… because they were a 
well-founded [choices]. That was the first step and the second step really 
was having the stakeholder interviews. 
Interviewee B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
The Council has also brought attention to wider beneficiary concerns and has 
developed solutions to address these. For example, one issue raised in the Council 
has been the question of the costs of healthcare and insurance where, as one 
beneficiary member (interviewee C) highlights, since the introduction of 
beneficiary members to the Council ‘we see progress in thinking about these 
things’. Additionally, one beneficiary Member Council participant suggested a 
mortgage product for employees in the health and social care sector, which the 
pension scheme subsequently developed and offered to its members. An 
executive gives her impression: 
141 
 
Yes, they do have influence. It’s not like they have day to day influence. But 
we talked about impact investing and they really did have influence on the 
way we are doing that… And the other way is the CEO is always at the 
meetings four or five times a year. So it’s not something that I can pinpoint, 
but it’s really important that you can hear that four or five times a year. 
And you have each time to tell, what you are doing, what is going well and 
what is going wrong… That has an influence. 
Interviewee A, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
The Member Council is designed as a governance entity with specific statutory 
responsibilities, but also as an ‘internal client’ for eliciting beneficiary views and 
providing a forum for challenge. It is perhaps unsurprising that this concept of a 
‘client body’ has developed within a pension scheme, a place where beneficiaries 
have a very specific legal position17. This suggests that models seeking to extend 
beneficiary engagement in pension schemes may develop into quite distinctive 
forms, which will shape the conditions for realising influence. In the Member 
Council’s areas of formal decision-making responsibility, the evidence suggests 
that the Council has a tendency towards acquiescence and the approval of 
executive recommendations. It is in its consultative role that the influence of the 
Member Council is best illustrated. While direct responsibility for sustainable 
investing is not part of the Member Council responsibilities, the Council is 
nonetheless utilised as a model to hear beneficiaries’ opinions on sustainable 
investing – influence may well exist, but it is indirect. In other strategic and 
operational areas, the Member Council exerts greater influence over the types of 
considerations addressed in scheme decision making, for example in its impact 
investing themes, in its central role in creating innovative financial products for 
beneficiaries, and its contribution to strategy development. Overall, the Member 
Council illustrates various strains of influence possible with beneficiary 
engagement, some more direct and easy to identify than others. 
 
 
17 A discussion of fiduciary duties was covered in chapter two. 
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Articulating value   
Connecting with beneficiaries’ understanding of value is central to the purpose of 
the expanded Member Council model. The move to include beneficiaries in the 
Council originated from a sense that the scheme had wandered too far away from 
beneficiaries’ values, as one executive describes (interviewee A) ‘We have learned 
a little bit the hard way sometimes, when we were investing in weapons and our 
members told us “We don’t want you to do that”’. Consequently, the Member 
Council was expanded to include beneficiary participants and bring into the 
Council their perspectives. Right from the start, both economic and non-economic 
factors were considered relevant to beneficiaries’ understandings of value. But 
how does the Member Council elicit understandings of value; what kind of insights 
are articulated in this model; and to what extent does it enable the articulation of 
plural considerations of value? 
The involvement of the beneficiary participants in the Member Council is not only 
to introduce the beneficiary perspective as an end in itself, but to use this 
knowledge to inform strategic discussions on what type of value the pension could 
offer to beneficiaries. Based on the notion of a ‘valuable future’ (PGGM 
Profielschets Ledenraad, 2020 [translation]), the Council is used to elicit the 
economic and non-economic considerations important to beneficiaries, and 
mould these into an understanding of the quality of life beneficiaries aspire to 
achieve in retirement. The ‘valuable future’ concept clearly reflects an 
understanding of value as proposed by stakeholder theorists, and the Member 
Council is instrumental in realising this understanding. As an executive describes: 
What we really see is the mission of this [scheme] is the ‘valuable future’, 
for the ‘good old days’ [retirement]. And part of that is the pension, and 
what we really see is that to be honest it is only a small part, but it’s also 
informal care, health care, purchasing power, which are also important for 
your ‘good old days’.  




In the words of a Member Council participant:  
For me it means using the money of the people, who work in all the 
organisations that PFZW is for, investing in things that really interest them 
and also making sure that they invest, use the money, to lower the cost of 
living so that they [the beneficiaries] have more money to spend on other 
things, among them, having a good life. 
Interviewee D, PGGM Member Council participant, October 2017 
By identifying and establishing what a ‘valuable future’ could mean to 
beneficiaries, the scheme is able to ensure its products provide the value that 
beneficiaries seek. An executive (interviewee F) describes how the Member 
Council enables the scheme to ‘know a lot about our clients and it’s a connection, 
so we have value for the participants because we do things that [they] find 
interesting. So that’s the advantage.’ By providing an insight into what 
beneficiaries find important, the scheme is able to stay close to beneficiaries’ 
priorities, and this is viewed as bringing strategic advantages. In the pensions 
system in which the scheme operates, characterised by automatic enrolment and 
restricted exit, competitive pressures from other schemes are currently limited. 
However, when discussing the expected opening up of the pensions market to 
greater competition, both executives and beneficiaries have concerns as to 
whether the ‘valuable future’ concept would be able to survive and compete 
against other schemes. As an executive explains: 
What we worry about is that when we have no mandatory scheme is that 
people will choose something cheaper and not better… We know other 
companies which are 50% cheaper, but their return is very low because 
they don’t have a very sophisticated asset management strategy. 
Interviewee B, PGGM Executive, October 2017 
There are two ways in which the Member Council is involved in eliciting 
understandings of value. The first is through the discussions at the Member 
Council meetings. Within this meeting structure, participating members can 
express their perspectives on the pension scheme, and its value to them. A Council 
discussion mentioned earlier – on the topic of energy offers provided to 
beneficiaries – is an example of how the Council members flagged up an issue that 
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led to, as an executive describes, a ‘learning process’. The second is the 
contribution of Member Council participants to formal strategy development by 
involving the Member Council in the ‘valuable future’ strategy.  
Central to the understanding of value defined by stakeholder theorists is the 
necessity of realising the breadth of understandings of value, encompassing 
economic and non-economic considerations. How effective is the Member Council 
at achieving an understanding of the diverse considerations that will inform 
beneficiary notions of value? The involvement of beneficiaries in the Member 
Council enables a broader range of issues to be part of Council deliberations than 
would otherwise be the case. Ideas suggested by beneficiaries have led to new 
financial products, for example an innovative mortgage product specifically suited 
to the pay patterns of health and social care workers. In addition, insights are 
collected from the wider beneficiary base through the ‘investorship’ process, 
involving Member Council participants engaging with their colleagues to better 
understand their aspirations and expectations of the pension scheme. As one 
executive describes (interviewee A) ‘we don’t just want the voice of one person 
we want the voices of many more people’. In this way, the Member Council is able 
to bring the perspectives of their colleagues into the Council discussions and 
expand the range of considerations that are taken into account, informing the 
Council’s discussions of how value can be realised for beneficiaries.  
Feasibility  
Bringing in beneficiary voice into the Member Council model involved expanding 
an already existing governance entity; it did not involve a re-design of the pension 
scheme governance structure, or the inclusion of an additional entity. To 
understand the viability of the Member Council as an institutionalised form of 
voice involves an appreciation its feasibility for this particular context.  
The Member Council meetings take place at the pension scheme offices, where 
there are facilities to accommodate it. Two executives are involved in managing 
beneficiary participation in the Council. For the Member Council participants, their 
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participation involves leave from their employer for each meeting and travel to 
the pension scheme offices, travel and accommodation expenses are reimbursed, 
and members receive a quarterly allowance (PGGM Profielschets Ledenraad, 2020 
[translation]). In between meetings, along with meeting preparations, Member 
Council participants engage with their colleagues on discussions around pensions 
and older age (as part of the investorship process) in preparation for Council 
meetings. The role of the Member Council participant is not insignificant and 
requires an investment in time, and a willingness to learn, both of which have their 
demands. Attempts have also been made to establish a dialogue among the 
Council participants, using an online community forum, but this has had limited 
success. Participation in the Council brings opportunity costs to participants, and 
to a lesser degree to their employer, and the attitude of the employer who will be 
granting them leave may also have an impact on how often they participate. While 
there are, as one Member Council participant (interviewee D) describes, ‘a lot of 
people who always show’, and who do this on a regular basis for several years, 
participation is not uniformly good and there are others who Member Council 
members describe as too often absent. How to handle the issue of absenteeism 
has been discussed, but not resolved by the Council. Similarly, some Member 
Council participants have resigned from their position.  
There is a perceptible feeling among executives that the involvement of the 
beneficiary members in the Member Council is the right fit for this particular 
pension organisation, and brings real advantages to the organisation’s strategic 
decisions. However, such a model also highlights, in the words of one executive 
(interviewee B) ‘There are also problems with democracy, it takes a lot of time – 
it’s complex.’ This executive highlights two challenges: first the amount of time 
involved to reach Council decisions; and second, the necessary knowledge 
required in understanding complex decisions, and in managing the interaction 
between beneficiary viewpoints and professional advice (for a more detailed 
discussion of this point, see ‘influence’). Of course, managing such a process is not 
straight forward and it demands skilled executives. From the beneficiary 
perspective, despite the discussion of the difficulties and problems they face, 
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there is enthusiasm and interest in their involvement in the Council. Arguably, it is 
unlikely that executives and beneficiaries who have chosen to invest their time 
and efforts into the Member Council will find the model lacking. But that still 
leaves the question of whether the Member Council model is viewed as effective 
by the wider beneficiaries in the pension scheme. With awareness and 
understandings of the Member Council among the wider beneficiaries being 
generally low (see ‘informed engagement’), it is likely that (non-participating) 
beneficiaries’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the Member Council are partial 
and limited.  
The Member Council illustrates one model for bringing beneficiary voice into 
decision-making. It nonetheless requires resources – not only executive time – but 
also in terms of time commitment from the Member Council participants 
themselves, who are engaged on a regular basis for a number of years. The overall 
impression of the effectiveness of the model is positive among those involved in 
the Council, and they highlight that there has been an improvement in how the 
Council has addressed beneficiary concerns – the defining purpose of the model. 
Given this, the model appears to go some way to realising the quality of feasibility. 
Concluding comments  
In this chapter I have analysed how the Member Council model integrated 
beneficiaries into scheme decision making. Drawing upon scheme documentation 
and qualitative interviews, the Model is described through the eyes of the actors 
involved, through their inter-subjective interpretations of the model in practice. 
Based on these interpretations, the chapter has addressed the ways in which, and 
the extent to which, the conditions of the Member Council realise each of the 
qualities of the conceptual framework.  
The Member Council model is particularly strong at realising the conditions for 
four qualities in the conceptual framework: deliberative communication; informed 
engagement; articulating value; and feasibility. There is a clear commitment to 
ensuring the characteristics of deliberative communication, and this is perhaps 
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most clearly reflected in participants’ own description of themselves as ‘free 
members’. In addition to this, the Council design helps create the conditions for 
ensuring beneficiaries’ contributions form the basis of constructive decision 
making.  Knowledge asymmetries, both in technical matters and in values, are 
central to any understanding of beneficiary engagement in pension schemes. Both 
of these knowledge asymmetries surfaced in the Member Council, and the 
meetings themselves have been adapted to minimise their impact. The design of 
the Member Council, and the way in which beneficiaries are involved over a long 
period of time, has the potential to alleviate some of these problems. The 
commitment of the scheme to stay closely aligned to the values of the 
beneficiaries indicates how these knowledge asymmetries are also be viewed as a 
resource rather than an obstacle in decision making. On realising value, the 
Member Council represents an interesting example of how beneficiary 
involvement can create an opportunity for beneficiaries to articulate the value 
they want from their pension scheme. Understanding what forms of value 
beneficiaries seek from their pension is a central motivating factor in expanding 
the Member Council. The ‘valuable future’ strategy exemplified this approach, 
both the framework of the strategy itself, and in the Member Council’s 
involvement in defining its central themes. In addition to their contribution to this 
strategy, there is a sense that the involvement of beneficiaries in Council meetings 
had brought a greater diversity of perspectives into strategic discussions, which 
informed and shaped notions of ‘value’ in the scheme. Finally, the Member Council 
is feasible way of bringing beneficiary voice into scheme decision making. While it 
requires resources and commitment, the overall impression is that it offers a 
practical model that successfully brings beneficiary concerns into decision making. 
The Member Council model is somewhat less effective at realising the conditions 
for transparency and influence. Ensuring the transparency of the Member Council 
model is difficult to realise. The scheme communicates using a diverse variety of 
methods with its beneficiaries. But there are low levels of awareness of the 
Member Council, and even Member Council participants’ understanding of the 
Council is limited and develops slowly through their participation. The scheme 
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itself appears to have a well-resourced and fairly impressive approach to 
communications, so the weakness here may not be the communications per se, 
but rather the complexity of the communications task: the involvement of the 
beneficiary members in the Member Council, and its purpose, is quite a challenge 
to communicate and clarify, and this makes the conditions for transparency harder 
to realise. Despite this challenge, the strong interest among beneficiaries in taking 
part in the Council indicates a degree of success in realising the transparency of 
the Council.  Central to the concept of voice is the notion of influence, but in what 
ways did the Member Council create the conditions for influence? The Member 
Council has specific statutory responsibilities, often approving executive 
recommendations, but it also acts as an ‘internal client’ for eliciting beneficiary 
views on a wider range of topics and concerns, and on these areas its influence 
was more visible. In particular, its influence on the ‘valuable future’ strategy, in 
the area of impact investing and its role in co-creating new financial products, 
illustrate the ways in which the Member Council exhibited influence. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that on sustainability issues, given that the investment 
policy was not part of its mandate, its influence was advisory and diffuse rather 
than directly influential. 
The Member Council model is weakest at realising the conditions for inclusive 
engagement. There is an aspiration that the model includes beneficiaries from 
differing member organisations, and from across different regions, in terms of 
gender and in terms of age. But realising this goal in practice has been challenging. 
Additionally, to be fully inclusive, the Council should not only ensure these 
organisational, regional and democratic characteristics are addressed, but also 
consider wider socio-economic characteristics, such as ethnicity, and social class. 
Among those involved in the Council, there is an awareness of this issue and a 
willingness to address it, although their limited success in increasing the number 
of ‘free members’ on the Council highlights the gap between their wish to ensure 
inclusivity, and their ability to achieve the organisational changes necessary for 
this to take shape.  
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At its simplest, the Member Council model illustrates one way in which 
beneficiaries can be integrated into pension scheme governance. Furthermore, 
this in-depth case analysis, based on interviews with executives and beneficiaries 
and drawing upon scheme documentation, has identified how, and the extent to 
which, this particular model realises the conditions for each of the qualities in the 
conceptual framework. While there is significant commitment to beneficiary 
involvement among the executives and beneficiaries interviewed, realising the 
conditions for each of the qualities in the conceptual framework is challenging and 
is achieved with varying degrees of success. As a model it therefore illustrates the 
potential, as well as the barriers, to expanding beneficiary involvement in pension 
scheme governance. Through this detailed analysis of one particular case, two sets 
of wider implications emerge: what do these findings tell us about the promise 
and challenge of voice more generally? And in what ways can voice in pension 
schemes be further enriched? These considerations will be addressed in chapter 
eight and the conclusion of the thesis. But before I turn to these issues, a second 
governance innovation involving voice, the Delegate Assembly, is analysed in the 
following chapter.  
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7.  A Case Study of a Governance Innovation: The 
Delegate Assembly 
This second case study chapter illustrates the Delegate Assembly model – an entity 
that was established as part of the governance of two very similar sustainability-
orientated pension schemes, Nest and Abendrot, both located in Switzerland. Like 
the Member Council model, the Delegate Assembly is an attempt to integrate 
beneficiary voice into pension scheme decision-making, and again it has statutory 
responsibilities but is largely a consultative forum. It is a large scale, annual, 
assembly model that is institutionalised in both Nest and Abendrot – two pension 
schemes that are located in the same national pension system and share strong 
historical, strategic and organisational similarities. Given these strong similarities, 
evidence from these two schemes (Nest and Abendrot) are combined together, 
and the Delegate Assembly is presented as a single case study of the integration 
of beneficiary voice into the governance of these sustainability-focused pension 
schemes. 
I assimilate evidence from these two schemes’ documentation, along with 
qualitative interviews with executives and beneficiaries to build up a picture of the 
model as it is applied in practice. I begin by situating it in its context, namely the 
pension system in which it operates and its legal and organisational implications. 
The history and background of these two schemes are introduced, followed by 
their approaches to sustainable investing. The development and position of the 
Delegate Assembly within their governance structures is then outlined, along with 
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its central characteristics. Moving on from this background, the main body of the 
chapter explores the practice of the model, as interpretated by the actors 
involved: the beneficiaries and executives. Following the same structure as in the 
previous chapter, the Delegate Assembly is discussed in terms of its realisation of 
the qualities of voice addressed in the framework. Again, the two overriding 
questions shaping the analysis are: (i) in what ways, and to what extent, are the 
conditions for each of these qualities of voice realised?; and (ii) how does the 
design and practice of the Delegate Assembly shape their realisation? These 
questions underpin my analysis of the Delegate Assembly’s realisation of the 
following qualities from the conceptual framework: (a) inclusive engagement; (b) 
deliberative communication; (c) informed engagement; (d) transparency; (e) 
influence; (f) articulating value; and (g) feasibility. These qualities distil the essence 
of the theories of voice covered in earlier chapters. While these qualities offer 
conceptual clarity, the empirical evidence also reveals, to some degree, the way in 
which these qualities are related to each other.  
Pensions in Switzerland 
Drawing extensively on the work of Bonoli and Häusermann (2011), this section 
provides an overview of the context of the pension schemes in this case, and in 
particular the Swiss three pillar pension system. The first pillar in the Swiss system 
is a redistributive mechanism that provides universal coverage, designed to meet 
the basic needs in retirement. The second pillar supplements this through the 
provision of occupational pension schemes that are mandatory for all employees 
over and above a minimum earnings threshold. Like the Netherlands, this second 
occupational pillar has a long history and is widely used to provide an improved 
standard of living in retirement, on top of the basic public provision. The third pillar 
is a less widely used form of private pension provision, which is non-mandatory 
and is supported by tax concessions (Bonoli and Häusermann, 2011). Occupational 
pensions are a significant industry in Switzerland. The total assets under 
management of occupational pension schemes were around CHF 875 billion (£700 
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billion) at the end of 2018, with more than 4 million of beneficiaries in a country 
of 8.5 million (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Bundesamt für Statistik, 2020). 
As Bonoli and Häusermann (2011) note, occupational pension provision in 
Switzerland is governed with relative freedom on administrative, finance and 
governance structures and practices compared with other countries. Pension 
schemes may be public or private, and in the latter case they are governed by 
foundations (‘Stiftungen’). Smaller firms have their own specific arrangements as 
a member of a collective foundation (‘Sammelstiftungen’), while larger firms have 
their own corporate foundations. Occupational pensions in Switzerland are mainly 
offered as defined contribution schemes, but each of the smaller firms in collective 
foundations can have their own specific arrangements on contributions and 
benefits. While pensions had traditionally been lightly regulated in Switzerland, a 
major development was the BVG-LLP law (2003), which had implications for 
scheme governance and its supervision by authorities designated at the regional, 
cantonal level. In particular, the law states that each foundation’s board of 
trustees must involve an equal representation of the employers and the insured 
(Art 50-51). In addition to this, it states that two external actors are involved in 
governance: a board of control that supervises annual accounts and a publicly 
licensed expert who checks if the legal obligations are fulfilled. Swiss law also 
specifies that each insured individual receives an annual report, which provides an 
overview of savings, insurance conditions, administration charges, and expected 
benefits at age c.65, a requirement that is lighter than in other countries (Bonoli 
and Häusermann, 2011). 
Scheme backgrounds  
Nest and Abendrot are two sustainability-orientated pension schemes that share 
many organisational and governance characteristics, not least of which is their use 
of the Delegate Assembly model in the governance of each scheme. Both schemes 
have collective foundation status (Sammelstiftung) and were founded in the early 
1980s, with a dual focus on sustainability and self-governance (Nest, no date[a]; 
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Suter, 2017). An executive (interviewee I) described both schemes as sharing many 
similarities, describing them as ‘established players’, representing a specific corner 
of a ‘consolidated’ pensions market in Switzerland.  In terms of size, these two 
pension schemes are significantly smaller in terms of number of beneficiaries and 
assets under management compared to the scheme discussed in the first case 
study, although still significant. In 2020, Nest had 24,748 beneficiaries and CHF 3 
billion (£2.5 billion) in assets under management (Nest, no date[b]). In 2019, 
Abendrot had 12,670 beneficiaries and CHF 2 billion (£1.7 billion) in assets under 
management (Abendrot, no date[a]). They are both multi-employer pension 
schemes, serving a diverse collection of small to medium sized companies 
operating in different sectors. Given their commonalities, these two schemes have 
been drawn together into one case study, representing the Delegate Assembly 
model. Where there are notable differences between the schemes’ use and 
practice of the Delegate Assembly model, or simply small details idiosyncratic to 
one scheme, I draw attention to this by identifying which scheme is the source of 
the data. 
Sustainable investing approach 
Both pension schemes are committed to ensuring their investment strategy is 
guided by ethical, social and ecological considerations, whilst also seeking a 
sufficiently competitive risk-adjusted return. An executive from Abendrot outlines  
their approach to sustainable investing:  
We start from the ethical part anyway, because that’s the reason for being 
for our Stiftung. We believe in being responsible. We are coming from that 
side; now, obviously it should be return-focused.  
Interviewee H, Abendrot Executive, December 2016  
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This strategy is described in their newsletter: 
Our investments not only yield a return, but also meet our sustainability 
requirements. Strict social, ethical and ecological criteria are central to this. 
More important to us than maximising profits is to provide the best 
possible service to our affiliated companies and policyholders.  
(Abendrot Info 58, 2016: 28 [translation]) 
Nest describes itself in its annual report as ‘the ecological ethical pension fund’ 
(Nest Geschäftsbericht, 2018 [translation]), which prides itself on its performance 
as the most sustainable pension scheme in comparison to its peers (Nest, 2019). 
Reiterating this, an executive explains: 
Our reason to be is to generate pensions for the beneficiaries, and the goal 
is to do this in the most sustainable way. In the sense of [doing our] part, 
helping society and the economy to get more sustainable for future 
generations.  
Interviewee J, Nest Executive, December 2016 
Both schemes are guided by an understanding of value that has parallels with the 
conceptualisation of value developed among stakeholder theorists, that is, a 
mutual interest in achieving both ethical and business objectives. 
Origins of the Delegate Assembly 
The schemes were founded by two groups of colleagues, with close connections 
forming between these two pension schemes. These pension schemes were early 
trailblazers in terms of their sustainability focus, and their origins lie in radical ‘68 
movements18. They were founded with sustainability principles as central to their 
purpose, and their novel offer to beneficiaries has been to provide an alternative 
to large-scale finance institutions. As one executive described, ‘We don’t want big 
finance, we want sustainable finance’ (Abendrot). In addition to having 
 
18 Personal communication with Abendrot [translation]. 
155 
 
sustainability core to their identity, the schemes were also created with the 
principle of direct democracy guiding their governance arrangements. In the 
words of an executive at Nest: 
Back in the day, they came up with this idea: we want to have our own 
pension fund, and the power of Mitsprache (transl.: participation), and 
that’s the idea of how it was founded, and really the purpose was to give 
the Delegate Assembly a lot of power; because all the big ones, the 
corporates and even pension funds they are not thinking of us, they are 
doing what they want. We do not know what happens with our pension 
money. And so that was an ideology that was unique to this scheme when 
it started.  
Interviewee J, Nest Executive, December 2016 
While these pension schemes have professionalised over time and have had to 
adapt their strategies in response to changing regulations19, they have continued 
to maintain their dual interest in sustainability and self-governance. Over time, 
they have shifted from being radical experiments – in the eyes of a local 
conservatively-minded newspaper, ‘The wild idea of madmen’20 – to, as an 
Abendrot executive (interviewee I) describes, ‘established players which ensure 
sustainability from their roots, which are Nest and Abendrot.’  
The introduction of regulatory restrictions has limited the scope of the authority 
of the Delegate Assembly and now the foundation board has greater 
responsibilities. This regulatory change diluted the schemes’ strong commitment 
beneficiary voice through the Delegate Assembly21, a change that was not popular 
among the schemes. Despite this change, the Assembly maintains a place, 
although to a more limited degree than originally conceived, as a model for 
 
19 ‘The structural reform of the 2nd pillar enacted by the federal government encroached on the 
organisational autonomy of the delegates' assembly in Nest, which was hard fought for at the 
time. The non-transferable and irrevocable competence now lies with the Board’. (Nest, no 
date[c] [translation]). 
20 Abendrot (no date[b] [translation]). 
21 In personal correspondence with Abendrot, they stated ‘The structural reform defined in detail 
the non-transferable and irrevocable duties of the supreme body (foundation board) of the 
pension funds in the BVG Art. 51a. According to this law, only the foundation board is responsible 




beneficiary engagement. Summarising its own stance, Nest states that it wishes 
‘to preserve elements of grassroots democracy and intends to continue to involve 
the insured in the formation of opinion by means of consultation and consultative 
votes’22. In Abendrot, the importance of beneficiary engagement is stated in its 
key principles, ‘With us, the affiliated companies have the say. At the Assembly of 
Delegates they have a say in all important questions and elect our highest body, 
the Foundation board’ (Abendrot Info 60, 2017 [translation]). 
As collective foundations both schemes have a foundation board (‘Stiftungsrat’) 
as their main governing body, which consists of a minimum of four employer and 
employee representatives. The foundation board is the main decision-making 
entity of the scheme but the Delegate Assembly has, in principle, control over the 
board, given that the Assembly’s statutory responsibilities include electing the 
members of the foundation board on an annual basis. 
The Delegate Assembly: Characteristics 
The Delegate Assembly model is used in these pension schemes to enhance 
beneficiary voice. This Assembly is an annual meeting operating as an entity in the 
governing apparatus of these two pension schemes. It is defined as such in their 
constitutions. Each participating employer organisation is invited to send 
delegates to the Assembly. An average of around 100-600 people attend each 
Delegate Assembly.  
The Delegate Assembly has statutory responsibilities: the presentation of the 
annual report and annual statement of accounts, and the approval of the scheme 
administration costs. In addition, the delegates elect the candidates for the 
 
22 ‘The fact that in foundations the board of trustees makes the important decisions did not fit into 
Nest's basic democratic understanding. The intention was to exhaust the legal possibilities in 
favour of democracy and go to court for this. Nest was not willing to give way on the question of 
the sphere of influence of the Assembly of Delegates (DV). The complaint was filed in 1987 and 
Nest was proved right. An important piece of democracy was thus saved: The Assembly of 
delegates decided on the form of organisation at Nest. These rights were later restricted again 




highest governing body of the organisation, the Stiftungsrat (the foundation 
board). The process of approval is undertaken by raising hands with cards. 
Alongside these statutory responsibilities, the Delegate Assembly is used for the 
purpose of informing and consulting. For example, informal discussions and a Q&A 
session are used to ensure awareness and understanding of members’ opinions.  
A summary of the design characteristics of Delegate Assembly, as organised in 
both these schemes, is outlined in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Summary of Design Characteristics of Delegate Assembly 
Design characteristics 
of Delegate Assembly 
Model 
Abendrot (Pension Scheme 1) Nest (Pension Scheme 2) 
Mode of Selection 
 
Elected in larger organisations 
and appointed in smaller 
organisations, by the Pension 
Fund Commission, a body 
located at each Employer 
organisation1 
Elected by the Pension 
Fund Committee4, a body 
located at each employer 
organisation  
Role Title Delegate Delegate 
Who participates in 
Assembly? 
Beneficiaries, employer2 Beneficiaries, employer2 
Regularity Annual Annual 
Length of term 1 year1 To be determined by each 
member firm  
Size Large (>150 Delegates3) 
No of delegates per firm 
proportionally stratified by size 
of membership 
Large (>150 Delegates3) 
No of delegates per firm 
proportionally stratified 
by size of financial 
contribution 
Note: 1) Abendrot Urkunde (2007) [translation].  2) Abendrot: personal communication 
[translation]. Nest (no date[d] [translation]).3) Abendrot (1): 3-600 (From interview 
[translation]). Nest: c.150, Notebene Magazine 49 (2019) [translation]. 4) Nest Stiftungsurkunde 
+ Geschäftsordnung (2014) [translation]. 
158 
 
Qualities of the Delegate Assembly 
Inclusive engagement 
A strong democratic commitment underpinned the establishment of the Delegate 
Assembly model in the governance of these two pension schemes, and this 
interest in engaging with beneficiaries, on a democratic basis, continues to this 
day. The inclusiveness of the model is heavily determined by the selection 
procedures for delegates. This procedure ensures that beneficiaries attend from 
each of the member organisations that the scheme serves. In both pension 
schemes, this involves allocating a number of places in the Delegate Assembly, 
based upon the size of the organisation’s membership. While this principle of 
selection is shared by both pension schemes, the detail of how it is realised differs. 
In Abendrot the number of allocated places is determined by the number of 
employees, while in Nest this is determined by the sum of insured wages invested 
in the pension scheme23. The delegates present will therefore be inclusive of all 
the organisations that are part of the scheme, but opportunities for beneficiaries 
to participate will be predicated by the size (according to different criteria) of their 
member organisations.  
The model itself – an assembly – provides the opportunity for a large number of 
beneficiaries to participate, between 100-600 people. This is a large-scale event in 
the governance of any pension scheme. It is an annual event, located in either 
Basel (Abendrot) or Zürich (Nest), and as such does not require a significant travel 
time by the delegates, nor is there a need to make a sustained commitment as a 
delegate over several years for a fixed term. As well as meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities, the Delegate Assembly is organised as a social event sometimes 
involving music performances, and always an Apéro (drinks for informal 
networking), so that beneficiaries can make contact with those administering the 
 
23 In their documentation, Abendrot provide a sliding scale of between 2-10 delegates, and Nest a 
scale of between 2-6, which can be extended upwards. This provides an indication of the number 
of delegate places available to the majority of member organisations (Abendrot, 




scheme and cultivate links with other organisations. In Nest, the Delegate 
Assembly is designed to ‘function as a meeting place: people who have known 
each other for a long time via telephone or email can get to know each other 
personally. The affiliated companies can establish contact with each other and 
exchange information’ (Nest Porträt, 2020 [translation]). The Assembly is designed 
to cultivate a degree of intimacy between the beneficiaries and the pension 
scheme and provides business networking opportunities for their member 
organisations. Each of these characteristics make it a model that should be 
practical and appealing to beneficiaries, but there are mixed impressions of its 
effectiveness. An Abendrot executive describes it as: 
A direct exchange, also with members of the foundation board because 
after the meeting there is an Apéro. And a lot of them stay, and it is a bit 
social. And I think it is important to give them a good feeling, that they are 
in the right organisation.  
Interviewee I, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
In contrast, a beneficiary delegate describes it as an event where: 
There are too many people there, and it is very anonymous, I know (the 
executive staff members), but with the others you can’t build a network. 
(Although) I remember I once said something critical and afterwards 
people came to me and we swopped business cards. 
Interviewee K, Abendrot Delegate Assembly participant, October 2020  
(Translation from German) 
The selection procedure for delegates is determined at the level of the employer, 
organised by the relevant Pension Fund Commission (PVK). Each participating 
organisation in the scheme has a Pension Fund Commission, which is responsible 
for the choice of pension scheme, its administration, and communications with 
beneficiaries24. These bodies manage the interface between the pension scheme 
and the beneficiaries in general, and they have a specific role to play in the 
 
24 ‘Each affiliated company has its own staff pension fund commission. It decides on the choice of 
pension scheme for the company. The PVK also monitors the payment of pension fund 
contributions to Abendrot and ensures that the registration of the persons to be insured is 
correct. It is also responsible for ensuring that the insured persons are well and quickly informed 
about changes to regulations or other changes’. (Abendrot, no page[c] [Translation]). 
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selection of delegates for the Assembly, whose details they provide to the pension 
scheme prior to the Assembly. There is considerable room for flexibility in how this 
is achieved, as this procedure is determined at the employer level. As one scheme 
executive notes, the recruitment depends:  
Entirely on the situation. The large companies have regulations that 
describe how the election of the members of the PVK are conducted. Often 
there is a works committee that elects its members from among the 
employees, and the members of the executive board and management 
elect their members from among themselves. In smaller companies, the 
members are often appointed without a large election taking place25. 
 
Indeed, one beneficiary comments that she has not received any information 
about the Assembly, suggesting that in some organisations the PVK may be either 
opaque in its recruiting process, or inactive in recruiting delegates. Both schemes, 
so much smaller in size than the scheme in case study one and with largely local 
employers as members, do not have to concern themselves with a lack of regional 
connection. To address the issue of pensioner participation, Nest requires 
representatives from its Retirement Commission (ReKo), a pensioner body, to 
attend the Assembly. But there is limited oversight in Abendrot and Nest of who 
is participating in the Assembly and whether they represent the full range of socio-
economic backgrounds participating in the schemes. As an executive in Abendrot 
(interviewee H) remarks on the issue of inclusivity, ‘I think like everywhere, I think 
there is maybe the 80/20 rule, with the members, I think 20% are really active, 
they follow things we do, they ask questions. And the rest are just happy’.  
Although the Delegate Assembly model has many characteristics that are likely to 
encourage participation, the problem with delegating the selection procedure to 
the PVKs in each organisation is that there is limited insight into who is being 
selected to participate (and how), and of the extent to which the Delegate 
Assembly ultimately reflects the characteristics of the beneficiary population as a 
whole. Oversight of the selection process is difficult to achieve given that it is the 
responsibility of each of the PVKs located at each employer organisation, which 
 
25 Personal correspondence with Abendrot. 
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have their own locally determined practices of selecting delegates. In this respect, 
selection at the employer level may be practical, but may not necessarily be the 
most successful at ensuring inclusiveness. Indeed, the question of inclusivity is 
arguably hampered by low levels of engagement reflecting, in Hirschman’s (1970) 
terms, a predisposition of the majority to ‘loyalty’ rather ‘voice’. Two beneficiaries 
describe the difficulties of recruiting delegates: 
In our NGO because we are big, we have nine seats [delegate places]. 
Others have two to three seats. The people [beneficiaries] get this 
invitation and we always ask: Does anyone want to come along? We still 
have free places. But practically nobody wants to come along… They are 
satisfied that we are doing the work because they have other issues, it is 
too far removed, and a complex topic. I find that many people are afraid 
and have a certain frustration with numbers and so on. And we are an NGO, 
we are committed people with an interest in the [sustainability] agenda... 
that is the problem. 
Interviewee K, Abendrot Delegate Assembly participant, October 2020 
(Translation from German) 
And it is not a fault of the member companies, the employees may also 
take it for granted that they’re in a pension fund chosen for them, and they 
don’t really ask a lot of questions... if you want to go to the Delegate 
Assembly, then it’s up to you to take the initiative. 
Interviewee L, Abendrot scheme member, November 2020 
The quality ‘inclusive engagement’ describes the equal participation of all relevant 
publics in an institutionalised form of voice. For pension schemes, this involves 
beneficiaries with differing legal positions, as well as varied socio-economic 
characteristics (e.g. ethnicity, gender, age, social class). The Delegate Assembly 
model illustrates how relatively large numbers of beneficiaries can be engaged 
through events that are integrated into pension scheme governance structures. 
Given its size, the model creates some of the conditions for realising inclusivity. 
However, its inclusiveness is diminished by the delegate selection procedures; 
first, by the rules governing how many delegates can participate, and second, by 
the selection procedures organised at each member organisation; both of which 
shape the opportunities available to beneficiaries to participate in the Assembly; 
inevitably with beneficiaries in some organisations having greater opportunities 
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than those in other organisations. Given that these procedures will shape who is 
participating, it is important to consider if the active and interested delegates who 
participate – the engaged 20% – represent the full breadth of beneficiary socio-
economic characteristics and the myriad of perspectives and interests. 
Deliberative communication 
The Delegate Assembly provides, in the words of one executive, a ‘platform to ask 
questions’. Does that translate into the conditions for realising deliberative 
communication? As a form of communication characterised by inclusiveness (both 
in terms of participation and in terms of the diversity of perspectives), respectful 
engagement with others and their opinions or beliefs, and a commitment to either 
consensus or constructive decision-making, deliberative communication presents 
a challenge to the Delegate Assembly model.  
The Assembly model is centred around a Q&A format, a format which has a limited 
capacity to foster in-depth deliberation. In the assemblies, board members are 
positioned separate to the beneficiaries, on a stage, while the beneficiaries form 
the audience. As a Nest executive describes, ‘the main organiser is the CEO 
himself. He organises the presentation and then he gives different parts to 
different speakers because the whole foundation board is there’. The format 
allows for a relatively large number of beneficiaries to put questions to the 
foundation board, with the potential to engage with a large number of 
participants. However, in practice, as an executive in Nest (interviewee J) 
highlights, beneficiaries are motivated for different reasons to be part of the 
scheme and these varying motivations will shape their propensity to ask questions, 
and the issues which are of most concern. For example, some are attracted to the 
scheme because of its relatively low administration costs and local character, 
whilst others work for sustainability charities and place great value on its 
sustainability-focused investment strategy. In both schemes, executives mention 
how the Delegate Assembly can become a platform where strongly held interests 
are expressed very clearly, while the views of those with more uncertain or 
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ambiguous opinions are less commonly raised. This acknowledgement, by the 
executives involved, indicates a degree of openness about limitations of the 
model. A beneficiary delegate questions the model’s effectiveness in this respect, 
but for a different reason; his interpretation is that many critical voices, along with 
the voices of smaller member organisations, are too often silent. While the design 
of the Assembly appears, in theory, to offer a large number of beneficiaries the 
opportunity to participate, particular voices and perspectives are clearly voiced 
more than others. 
I think the ones that have been with us from the beginning, for a long time, 
most of them share the same values of sustainability. The ones who [find] 
this very, very important, they care more and are the ones who have the 
questions and want to know more. And maybe the companies who are with 
us for the reason we have a good simple system, access, and our 
administrative costs are okay and within their framework, and they think 
the investments are going well, but they are not very involved in 
sustainability, maybe they think it is just fine and they have less questions.  
Interviewee J, Nest Executive, December 2016 
Obviously, there are certain interests that can be expressed quite 
aggressively by certain partners who have stronger views than others. So, 
the key is to balance those within the framework. 
  Interviewee H, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
I am always amazed how many critical people sit there and do not ask any 
questions. There are very, very, few people who ask questions in the 
Delegate Assembly. We are one of the largest member companies, with 
many people working with us. We have a weight because we are big… But 
I don't know if it would be the same if we were a small company with three 
or four employees, and I would ask critical questions. I'm not sure that the 
management would give the same attention to me, as a small company. 
We are taken very seriously by the management. And if we have any 
questions, these would be answered immediately.  
           Interviewee K, Abendrot Delegate Assembly participant, October 2020 




In both schemes, the Delegate Assembly provides a place for questions and 
answers, and both schemes’ instincts are to respectfully engage with beneficiaries’ 
perspectives. But it remains an open question as to whether the full breadth of 
opinions are expressed. Discussing how the opinions expressed at the Assembly 
are considered by the foundation board, a Nest executive suggests the board 
‘don’t like to make the decisions that are against the general opinion’. But it is a 
reasonable question to ask whether the Assembly is an effective arena for 
identifying this ‘general opinion’?   
Despite this commitment to the Assembly and to hearing beneficiary perspectives, 
there is a sense among executives that the Q&A format limits how much in-depth 
deliberation can be realised in this model. Both schemes tend to approach difficult 
questions by taking them back to the scheme’s executive staff and finding ways in 
which they could be addressed outside of the Assembly, with any subsequent 
changes in policy communicated later, in one scheme (Nest) via the beneficiary 
newsletter. This approach has not always been viewed by delegates as adequate. 
In particular, in Abendrot, it created the impression that delegates’ concerns were 
not being addressed with sufficient seriousness by the scheme, and with the depth 
of consideration they deserved.  
Certain questions arose, not only about sustainability but also [other] 
questions [and these] were brushed off at meetings where people were 
told “We will come back to you later”. They didn’t feel taken seriously and 
they start thinking “Well, maybe they are changing their standards because 
they are big, they feel like bankers now”. So it’s a very subtle kind of thing 
which you have to touch base with them and show yourselves responsive.  
         Interviewee H, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
In what ways, and to what extent, does the Delegate Assembly model realise the 
conditions for consensus or constructive decision-making? Executives in both 
schemes suggest that, given their status as pioneers in sustainable investing, there 
is already a significant degree of consensus among member organisations and 
their beneficiaries. An executive in Nest (interviewee J) summarises the 
perspectives of their members, ‘A lot of the insured companies, they are designed 
with sustainability in mind, many of the insured are working in the social sector. 
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And they also do not accept arms manufacturing. Therefore, we have hopefully 
shared ideas’.  
In their accounts of the Assemblies, executives and participants describe events 
characterised more by acquiescence than heated debate. While there have been 
increasing numbers of challenging questions on sustainable investing in recent 
years, executives observe that the Assemblies are places where delegates have 
tended to approve their approach, rather than contest their decision-making. 
However, the nature of the sustainability challenge is that it raises value-based 
questions which may well contest an established strategy; in this scenario the 
Assembly should function as a place where these contestations can be aired and 
constructively addressed. The use of voting procedures is one way the Delegate 
Assembly model is able to judge opinion in aggregate – in particular, in Nest the 
Assembly has the right to change the scheme’s sustainable investment strategy 
subject to a voting procedure at the Assembly26. But where the Assembly model is 
less effective is in providing the time necessary to establish an in-depth insight into 
beneficiaries’ interests and concerns, and the degree to which they are shared and 
there is convergence – arguably the first step in any form of constructive decision-
making. In one scheme (Abendrot) an executive suggests that the Assembly itself 
simply does not provide sufficient insight into beneficiaries’ expectations on 
sustainability. To remedy this, additional meetings were introduced at member 
organisations, as better way to understand beneficiaries’ perspectives. The 
implications of this approach are that there is less sharing of perspectives between 
different member organisations, and opportunities for deliberation are 
diminished: 
Usually, it starts with a letter. Then they come to the Delegate Assembly 
where they try to raise their hand and ask the questions and stuff. Because 
we felt there was more of this happening we just thought in order to not 
make these meetings ten hour meetings lets go pro-actively to them, and 
meet them and put these questions on the table and ask them one by one. 
 
26 The affiliated companies have a consultative right of co-determination over the investment 
policy (Nest Geschäftsbericht, 2018 [translation]). 
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So, we are meeting with these people and we are also saying we want to 
more formally include you in this sustainability discussion. 
Interviewee I, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
Does the Delegate Assembly model enhance or hinder the conditions necessary 
for effective deliberative communication? It is a model which enables a large 
number of beneficiaries to contribute their perspectives on sustainability – at first 
glance, it could be expected that this helps cultivate the conditions for inclusive 
forms of deliberative communication. In practice, the Q&A format is not a highly 
inclusive procedure and some delegates, particularly those from larger member 
organisations with a stronger interest on sustainability, are more likely to speak 
up in Assembly meetings. Furthermore, while there is certainly a commitment by 
the schemes to respectfully consider beneficiaries’ views, executives acknowledge 
that the Delegate Assembly is not necessarily the right format, or at least is not 
sufficient on its own, to provide enough in-depth insights on beneficiaries’ views 
on more controversial areas. Given these two weaknesses, the model can be 
viewed as having a limited capacity for realising the conditions required for 
deliberative communication.   
Informed engagement  
‘Informed engagement’ describes the necessity for beneficiaries to participate on 
an informed basis. It involves addressing the existence of knowledge asymmetries; 
the ways through which participants are informed on technical matters; but also, 
the way in which participants’ non-professional lay knowledge is integrated; and 
the extent to which the model enables decision-making which is based upon 
knowledgeable judgements.  
Low levels of knowledge, and interest, among the public on pensions brings an 
additional test to the institutionalisation of voice in this setting. Pensions are 
generally not viewed as a riveting topic, and the implications of policy changes on 
performance are largely invisible in the short term. Forms of voice therefore need 
to not only engage beneficiaries, but also to do so in a way that non only informs 
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them of technical or bureaucratic matters, but also integrates the breadth of 
beneficiaries’ non-professional lay knowledge into these discussions. However, 
among executives in these two schemes, there is a palpable awareness of the 
limited nature of people’s knowledge of, and engagement with, the technical 
complexity of their pensions. As one executive (interviewee I) observes, ‘The 
system is very complicated. I know that because when I have private discussions 
with friends. If you start to discuss it, after five minutes they cut this [off] because 
they don’t want to listen to it. It’s too complicated’. 
The executives in this scheme are not only surprised by their friends’ lack of 
knowledge about their own pensions, but also describe the ‘strange’ lack of 
engagement of many of their beneficiaries in the management of their own 
pension pots, even though for many it is the largest asset they have. As this 
executive (interviewee I) continues, ‘A lot of these people don’t know a lot about 
their pension… they don’t care about it. Even though it’s the most money they 
have, they leave [their employer] and they don’t care’.  
This lack of awareness is not only a result of lack of interest, and the complexity of 
the issues involved, but originates from a lack of understanding of the way in which 
the pension system in general works for beneficiaries. There is some recognition 
that the socio-economic background of beneficiaries has an effect, for example in 
the case of migrant workers, whose levels of understanding will be even lower.  
You see it’s not visible normally, it’s not money you [see]. If you come from 
another culture it may be different. They don’t know that all these 
deductions are actually in your favour, it’s not disappearing into a 
government body. No, it is your own money, it’s your saving and your 
employer actually contributes the same amount. So, it’s growing, and so in 
the end you [should] be interested. 
Interviewee H, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
Given that beneficiaries have low levels of technical knowledge about pensions, 
the Delegate Assembly model is used by both schemes to better inform delegates 
about technical and bureaucratic matters and to answer their questions. The 
board present at the Assembly on administration topics such as the annual report, 
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financial statements and administrative costs, along with other updates, for 
example on the wider Swiss social security system. And an executive in Nest 
describing the Assembly format, illustrates how it has been used as a place to 
inform beneficiaries about investment strategy and portfolio management.  
Mostly [the Assemblies] inform about the past year: the annual report; the 
activities of the scheme; all the figures and all the new members in 
comparison with last year. And there is a presentation, [which] the 
foundation board is presenting. And one point is the investment, [a 
presentation of] what happened in the last year and sometimes people are 
free to ask whatever they want. Sometimes there are questions and 
sometimes not…. [the investment management] was not communicated 
with clarity one year… so they didn’t know [what the approach was] and 
afterwards a year later we explained how it works. And then because after 
this, some of the bigger companies some NGOs also asked, can you provide 
further details. And we decided we will do this at the Delegate Assembly. 
Interviewee J, Nest Executive, December 2016 
However, the effectiveness of the Assembly in informing participants also relies 
on the participants themselves engaging with the information. As one beneficiary 
notes:  
People are invited but they haven’t looked at the important information. I 
would guess that many of the beneficiaries have not looked at the Annual 
Report properly. They have no idea in what Abendrot invests – it is a topic 
that is too far away’. [But the beneficiaries] get an invitation, it’s very dry 
and there is this dry meeting agenda. Yes, it’s not made to be simple. What 
should I say? There is no difference between a local civic assembly, where 
I also receive the same documents and I think “there is so much paper, 
what am I expected to do with this?” So, I stay at home. 
Interviewee K, Abendrot Delegate Assembly participant, October 2020 
The design of the Assembly enables key decision-makers to share technical and 
bureaucratic information with beneficiaries, as well as offering beneficiaries the 
opportunity to share their non-professional lay perspectives. Inevitably, the 
exchange of these sources of knowledge and their joint consideration is limited by 
the constraints of the Q&A format, which is poor at enabling a detailed, in-depth, 
informed discussion between the governing body, executives and beneficiaries. 
The practicalities of this format limit the extent to which informed engagement 
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can take place, both on technical and bureaucratic matters and on gaining an 
understanding of beneficiaries’ lay perspectives. These limitations are recognised 
by an executive in Abendrot, whose response to this problem is to ask for 
questions in advance of the Assembly.  
In the past, we had some critical questions and it was very difficult to 
respond at the meeting, because it is a question of time and you are not 
prepared, you don’t have the right slides to show. So, this year, for the first 
time, we asked them to bring up the questions in advance, so we can 
prepare for it. 
Interviewee H, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
Another executive added: 
Or decide if there are too many questions, so we can say “We come to you 
and explain.” 
Interviewee I, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
The idea of developing communication channels outside the Assembly exposes the 
limitations of the Assembly format for realising informed engagement. Such an 
approach addresses this problem by enabling schemes to develop a more in-
depth, nuanced understanding of beneficiaries’ lay perspectives and concerns in 
specific organisations. While this approach can enhance the conditions for 
informed engagement in this respect, it can diminish how well-informed 
beneficiaries themselves are of the perspectives of others, a valuable 
characteristic of public assemblies. These impacts can be mitigated by how these 
alternative communication channels are utilised; if they are used as a replacement 
to the Assembly, the Assembly itself could become a largely ceremonial matter. 
Alternatively, if are they used as a means as ensuring more informed participation 
in the Assembly, they could also enhance informed engagement in the Assembly 
itself.  
All governance structures in pension schemes operate in an environment 
characterised by knowledge asymmetries. These make closer engagement with 
beneficiaries all the more necessary, but equally make beneficiaries’ participation 
170 
 
all the more difficult. A limitation specific to the Assembly model is that while the 
Q&A format offers engagement, it has limited capacity to generate in-depth 
understanding on both technical and bureaucratic matters, as well as 
beneficiaries’ non-professional lay perspectives, and this makes the conditions for 
informed engagement more difficult to realise. Whether the more localised 
practices being developed by executives to supplement the Assembly will help 
ameliorate these problems or create new asymmetries is an open question. 
Transparency 
The transparency of the Delegate Assembly is central to its perceived legitimacy. 
Gauging transparency involves identifying how information on the Assembly is 
communicated; what information is available, who accesses it; and the capacity of 
publics to act upon this information. In both of these schemes, basic information 
on the Delegate Assembly is widely accessible, for Assembly participants as well 
as for wider beneficiaries and the general public. In particular, information is 
provided on the place of the Delegate Assembly in the constitution of the scheme, 
the selection procedures for delegates, and the purpose of the Assembly – all 
accessible via publicly available documents on the schemes’ websites. In 
Abendrot, minutes from the Assembly from recent years are also available in this 
way. Furthermore, information on the Delegate Assembly is communicated 
through the schemes’ annual newsletters, which inform the wider beneficiary 
membership of the Delegate Assembly, delivered via email as well as being 
publicly available on scheme websites. This represents a degree of public 
transparency, based on the principle of accessibility, that is uncommon in many 
pension schemes. In the words of one beneficiary (interviewee K), ‘There is 
wonderful transparency from Abendrot. You can find everything on the internet, 
practically everything’ (translation from German).   
However, given that neither of these pension schemes have an extensive 
communications infrastructure in place, targeted communications have not been 
a priority. When discussing how they achieved transparency of the Assembly, 
171 
 
executives in both schemes recognise that communications, including on the role 
and function of the Delegate Assembly, are not heavily resourced. Speaking of 
their interest in expanding their communications to beneficiaries, an executive at 
Abendrot (interviewee I) says, ‘We are thinking about building up a team. But it is 
not a major constraint. We do it happily I think because we see it in the interests 
of the organisation.’  
A beneficiary suggests moving beyond publicly accessible information towards a 
greater use of direct communications would be welcome: 
I would find it really cool if they would do more external communications 
and if they would proactively, like an email once a quarter, show where 
their investments have shifted and why they have shifted. And give a bit 
more insight. And especially Abendrot because they are doing so much 
good stuff, they can be proud of what they are doing.  
Interviewee L, Abendrot pension scheme member, November 2020 
Given that the Delegate Assembly model is a long-standing governance body 
established from the earliest days of the scheme, taking place on an annual basis 
for many years, it is likely that there is a relatively high level of awareness of its 
existence and function. In addition, the schemes provide basic information and 
contact details on their website, which can be accessed by beneficiaries and the 
wider public, along with the production of a newsletter directed at beneficiaries. 
Effective transparency is not simply about the provision of general information on 
the Assembly, but also providing the conditions to enable publics to digest and 
respond to the issues and decisions raised at the Assembly. On this matter, wider 
communication channels play a role; for example, the meetings which take place 
outside the Assembly with beneficiaries at their workplaces provides a place to 
raise questions prior to, and after, the Assembly itself. These meetings may offer 
an opportunity to enhance beneficiaries’ engagement with the assembly model, 





The Delegate Assembly was established as a central component of these two 
pension schemes, grounded in a commitment to self-determination. In the early 
days, these Assemblies had a greater degree of influence than they have today. As 
mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, a significant change to the Delegate 
Assembly was the introduction of regulatory restrictions, which reduced the 
formal influence of the Delegate Assembly to a body with a largely consultative 
role rather than with binding authority.  
At the beginning when [this scheme] was founded, it was all about 
‘Selbstbestimmung’ (transl.: self-determination) and that’s why the 
pioneers, back in the day, they came up with this idea: we want to have 
our own pension fund, and we have the power to ‘Mitsprache’ (transl.: 
participate) and that’s the idea how it was founded anyway and really the 
purpose was to give the Delegate Assembly a lot of power to try and 
maintain the central democratic principle underlying the scheme.  
    Interviewee J, Nest Executive, December 2016 
Although the mandate of the Delegate Assembly can be described as consultative 
today, the Assembly maintains its position as a central body in the governance of 
the scheme. Revealingly, an executive in Nest (interviewee J) describes how the 
scheme was involved in actively disputing the regulatory changes to the 
governance structure. These schemes exhibit continuing commitment to 
responding to the views of beneficiaries, creating a favourable setting for the 
Delegate Assembly, even in its diminished form.  
Maybe if the Assembly vote against the opinion of the foundation board 
on an issue, even if it is consultative and not binding, they [the foundation 
board] will really go and discuss it again.  
    Interviewee J, Nest Executive, December 2016 
The Delegate Assembly has statutory responsibilities that include the election of 
the foundation board, and the approval of organisational changes. In these 
aspects, the Assemblies normally approve executive recommendations, rather 
than initiating a highly contested discussion. The Assembly therefore largely 
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functions as a forum for the expression of opinions and for consultative voting. As 
part of the Assembly, delegates are given the opportunity prior to the Assembly 
to shape its agenda: they can suggest topics that they would like to see covered in 
the CEO’s presentation. 
The critical thing to say is that the Delegate Assembly has no real power as 
such. It’s not like a shareholder meeting. But through the board 
appointments it can influence the future direction of the Foundation 
Board. Obviously, if they disagree and dissent, if you have 90% of the 
people against approving, then it is noticed that something is awfully 
wrong. 
   Interviewee H, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
In both schemes, the Assembly almost always meets its statutory responsibilities 
by following the recommendations of executives. One executive from Abendrot 
(interviewee I) summarises the Assembly’s action on its statutory responsibilities 
as, ‘Approval, approval of certain things: marketing changes, organisational 
changes, and then they have to approve the cost of the administration’. When 
asked what would happen if the Assembly would, in fact, disagree with the 
recommendations, the reply is: ‘It should not happen basically, they should 
approve things’. Explaining further, this executive holds the assumption that 
conflict over recommendations rarely happen because the executives would hear 
disagreements from letters or calls before the Assembly. This suggests that while 
the Assembly itself has a prominent role, wider communications with member 
organisations outside of the Assembly also inform how topics are approached, and 
decisions are shaped, in the Assembly.  
While the statutory responsibilities appear to be administered by the Assembly 
with little disagreement or controversy, there is a sense among the pension 
schemes that delegates are, in recent years, expressing more disquiet about 
sustainability matters, perhaps reflecting the growing prominence of these 
concerns in the media, and the wider growth in sustainable investing. But how 
have these opinions impacted scheme decision-making? Discussing how they have 
responded to beneficiaries’ comments, executives in both cases describe a process 
of taking note of beneficiaries’ concerns, considering them after the Assembly and 
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if there is an impact on scheme decision-making, informing beneficiaries 
afterwards about the outcome, for example, through the newsletter. As a Nest 
executive describes: 
When the questions come up or where there were issues that were 
[raised], that comes from the audience to us, we take it up of course and 
handle it internally. There is an internal process or position and then the 
communication of this after the Delegate Assembly… in a newsletter that 
goes to everybody. And so if there is a decision that was based on the 
Delegate Assembly, that is going to be communicated to everybody.  
Two years ago, they exactly asked about an investment invested in a high-
yield fund and somebody actually found out that one portion was private 
service provider who is also involved in transportation of army people. And 
they asked about this and it was the foundation board who said “Ok, we 
didn’t know, but that’s against our rules so we are going to divest”. And we 
checked it, and we asked the asset manager if we could take this out of our 
fund, and they said “No, it’s not possible”. And we said “We’re going to 
divest from your fund”. It came from the Delegate Assembly, it was taken 
seriously, looked at and we took action. So, they have power.  
Interviewee J, Nest Executive, December 2016 
Executives have noticed problems with how effectively the model addresses 
beneficiaries’ concerns. As one executive at Abendrot (interviewee H) concedes, 
‘Meetings where people were told we will come back to you later, they didn’t feel 
taken seriously’. Similarly, a beneficiary highlights his own sense that the Assembly 
fails to adequately address the critical questions raised, especially when they are 
raised by only a small proportion of the Assembly.  
If I wanted to have influence, I would apply for a position on the foundation 
board, as a simple beneficiary I am not naïve, it is very, very, limited. I can 
have a lot of influence if I apply for the board and work on the board. 
Otherwise, I have influence because I am one to ask questions… there are 
too few people who say something, who say anything. When there are 600 
people there and two to three say something, they can forget it. 
Interviewee K, Abendrot Delegate Assembly participant, October 2020 




The question of influence, and its communication, is crucial. The Assembly model 
has statutory decision-making responsibilities and consultative functions. While 
the statutory responsibilities are not insignificant and include voting rights over 
the appointment of the board, in both schemes these are very rarely (if ever) in 
disagreement with the prior executive recommendations. And in terms of their 
influence on consultative matters, the extent of the Delegate Assembly’s influence 
is shaped by the schemes’ commitment to the concept of the Assembly, and their 
willingness to respond to beneficiaries’ concerns. There is some evidence of the 
ways in which the Delegate Assembly has influenced sustainable investment 
policy, as highlighted by the executive in Nest. But there is also evidence, 
stemming from Abendrot, that beneficiaries are aware of the limitations of the 
Assembly for expressing their viewpoints, and shaping decision-making. While it is 
crucial that models such as the Delegate Assembly realise the influence they claim 
to offer, equally crucial is the need to communicate to beneficiaries the shape of 
that influence. Indeed, the particular characteristics of this model – an annual 
Assembly involving different beneficiary participants each year – arguably makes 
it more difficult for beneficiaries to observe the way in which their participation is 
influencing scheme decision-making. It is therefore not only a question about 
realising the conditions for sufficient influence, but also ensuring that this 
influence is effectively communicated. 
Articulating value 
Both of these pension schemes conceptualise value as encompassing both 
financial and non-financial considerations within the same judgement, a 
conceptualisation that has parallels with value as it is understood by stakeholder 
theorists. How is the Delegate Assembly used to elicit beneficiaries’ 
conceptualisation of value their pension offers? This approach has been 
operationalised in these two pension schemes as an investment strategy framed 
by ethical principles and guidelines, and within these parameters their goal has 
been to achieve a competitive risk-adjusted return. As an executive describes:  
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We start from the ethical part anyway because that’s the reason for being 
in our foundation. We believe in being responsible. We are coming from 
that side. Now, obviously it should be return focused… our restraints are 
the ethical guidelines and within that we have to manage those returns… 
[We are] a pioneer in socially responsible investment, everyone of us who 
is working in the investment team and also the investment committee is 
involved in SRI [socially responsible investing], it is not separated from the 
general investment, but it goes together. 
    Interviewee J, Nest Executive, December 2016 
The Delegate Assembly provides an opportunity to identify the matters that are 
important to beneficiaries, and therefore realise an insight into the considerations 
that inform their understandings of value. As one executive remarks, by drawing 
on this knowledge, schemes can stay closely tied to beneficiaries’ concerns and 
interests, ensuring they provide the value that beneficiaries seek. And the recent 
growth in sustainable investing among other pension schemes creates an extrinsic 
market pressure and intensifies the necessity to meet beneficiaries’ expectations 
and deliver the value they seek from their pension. 
I think also because it is a bit more of a values-based organisation, you want 
to understand that those values are still reflected in the insured base, let’s 
say. It’s not that you want to grow away. So, it ensures that the values are 
still represented in the Foundation, as much as the Delegate Assembly… 
this gives us the feeling that we’re still on track and we represent their 
interests. Because it’s not only a return-based investment opportunity – 
whether we are in or out with the markets… here, it is also the values. As I 
said the interaction is quite critical for us to live, as we promised, with a 
sort of ethical background.  
Everybody is talking about [sustainability], and we have to define ourselves 
as new because we come from this forty-year history of ethical 
background… We have to take the initiatives to sell it, to say “We have 
been there forever with this” and we actually do know more than the 
others again because the others only do the window dressing, with this fig 
leaf.  
   Interviewee H, Abendrot Executive, December 2016 
The Delegate Assembly elicits beneficiaries’ articulations of the value they seek 
from the pension predominantly through the Q&A sessions, in which delegates 
pose questions, in public, about areas of scheme performance, or aspects of the 
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investment strategy on which they have questions. Additionally, there is the 
opportunity for beneficiaries to express their opinions through consultative 
voting, on the limited areas on which it is used. In theory, the Assembly’s strength 
lies in its capacity to engage with large numbers of delegates, potentially eliciting 
a broad range of economic and non-economic considerations that are central to 
beneficiaries’ understandings of value. However, as noted earlier, the breadth of 
participation is limited. And when delegates do participate, the Q&A format 
typically generates a quick, immediate response rather than an in-depth exchange 
of opinions, reasons and justifications. The Assembly itself therefore lacks the 
capacity to provide insight into how beneficiaries weigh up or prioritise conflicting 
considerations.  
Apart from this one event, the Q&A tends to lead to defensive ‘answers’ rather 
than a feeling of a genuine communicative exchange. As one executive 
(interviewee H) observes about their experience of the Assembly, ‘We can’t be on 
the defensive all the time, we have to be pro-active and engage those people 
because we have to define our USP anew, in a sense’. Executives in Abendrot 
acknowledge the shortcomings of the Assembly for developing the type of 
interactive exchanges that would elicit beneficiaries’ in-depth understandings of 
the value they seek from their pension. And to address this issue, as noted earlier, 
they are considering developing further channels of communication outside the 
Assembly; a move which reflects the limitations of the Assembly model. 
Both of these pension schemes consider sustainability in their conceptualisation 
of value, an approach which bears similarities with value as it is understood by 
stakeholder theorists. The Delegate Assembly therefore has an important role to 
play in enabling beneficiaries’ to articulate their understandings of value. But what 
types of insights does the Assembly elicit? Notwithstanding the barriers to 
achieving inclusive engagement and deliberative communication, in principle, the 
Assembly model has the capacity for involving large numbers of beneficiaries and 
a breadth of beneficiary perspectives, capturing a plurality of financial and non-
financial considerations. In practice, the model has limited capacity for generating 
in-depth communicative exchanges that elicit a detailed understanding of these 
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varied beneficiary perspectives, the reasons and justifications of their 
considerations, as well as the ways in which these are prioritised by beneficiaries. 
While the Delegate Assembly therefore provides a source of insight into how 
beneficiaries understand value, it does not create the conditions for an in-depth 
articulation.  
Feasibility  
The Delegate Assembly has been a central part of the governance structure of 
these two schemes since their establishment, both of which were founded with 
the principle of ‘Mitsprache’ as part of their purpose. As an executive from Nest 
(interviewee J) simply put it, ‘We really want to have these discussions’. In terms 
of its feasibility and suitability for its context – the Assembly appears to be a 
relatively successful model.  
While it involves preparation from the executive and event management, these 
are not particularly onerous tasks on an annual basis. The model is relatively easy 
for delegates to participate in and requires no ongoing commitment. It therefore 
represents a model of achieving beneficiary voice that requires limited executive 
resources and is easy to participate in for beneficiaries. No doubt, the approach 
taken here is shaped by the context of these pension schemes; the smaller 
membership and their position as regional schemes. Despite these practical 
advantages, participation in the Assembly is far from being a given. One 
beneficiary admits that travelling an hour to attend the Assembly is not something 
she would automatically do, and suggests a way to make participation easier: 
I can’t see why they could not do some kind of hybrid version of it where 
people can also participate virtually if they want. There would be the main 
[event] as well, but at least people could follow and ask questions. People 
can get better informed and I think that would definitely be an option. 
Interviewee L, Abendrot pension scheme member, November 2020 
There may also be potential in using, as this beneficiary suggests, a combination 
of face-to-face and digital technologies to encourage wider participation in the 
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future, particularly given that these technologies have become more routinised in 
2020-21.  While the integration of digital technologies with the face-to-face event 
will make attendance more feasible for some beneficiaries, but inevitably digital 
participation will create a more distant form of engagement. 
Concluding comments 
In this chapter, I have explored how these two pension schemes – together 
forming one case study – have engaged beneficiaries in the governance of their 
scheme. Based upon scheme documentation and qualitative interviews, the 
Delegate Assembly model is illustrated from the perspective of the actors’ 
involved in the Assembly, through their inter-subjective interpretations of the 
model in practice. Grounded in these interpretations, the chapter has examined, 
the ways in which, and the extent to which, the conditions of the Delegate 
Assembly realise each of the qualities of the conceptual framework.  
The Delegate Assembly model is particularly strong at realising two qualities. First, 
there is a commitment across both pension schemes to be transparent to their 
beneficiaries and the wider public, with extensive documentation provided on 
their websites. The transparency of the Delegate Assembly is arguably well served 
by its simplicity as a design. Second, the Delegate Assembly it is not time 
consuming to organise, or to participate in, making it highly feasible and is 
particularly well suited to small pension schemes with a lean administrative 
infrastructure.  
The Delegate Assembly model has mixed success in realising the conditions for 
two further qualities. First, it has a limited capacity to generate informed 
engagement. Like the Member Council model and indeed any form of beneficiary 
engagement in pension scheme governance, the Delegate Assembly operates in a 
context of low levels of knowledge among beneficiaries. It goes some way to 
remedying this situation by providing information to delegates on scheme 
performance and wider issues affecting the scheme. However, the Q&A format of 
the scheme limits the depth of both the technical and values-driven 
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communication that can take place. The opening up of parallel communication 
channels have been developed precisely to address this weakness. In addition, the 
Delegate Assembly’s record on influencing scheme decision-making is mixed. The 
influence of the Delegate Assembly is more visible on its consultative rather than 
its statutory decision-making responsibilities. Both schemes note a greater 
willingness in recent years among beneficiaries to voice their concerns, perhaps 
reflecting a move away from the acquiescence of earlier years towards a greater 
willingness to address controversies. This acquiescence suggests that beneficiaries 
may have limited expectations of the types of influence that is possible to realise; 
for example one beneficiary is somewhat sceptical about the influence he can 
wield in a Q&A session. In terms of the impact of these interventions at the 
Assembly, there is evidence in Nest that sustainable investment strategies have 
been reconsidered in light of delegates’ concerns. The evidence from Abendrot 
highlights not only the importance of ensuring the Assembly has influence, but 
also of effectively communicating the influence of delegates’ interventions at the 
Assembly afterwards.  
Where the Delegate Assembly is weakest is in realising the conditions for inclusive 
engagement, deliberative communication and articulating value. Both schemes 
are committed in principle to engaging beneficiaries in their governance and the 
design of the models offers a large number of beneficiaries the possibility to 
attend and participate. However, delegates are selected at their employer 
organisation, through their Pension Commissions, and the extent to which the 
delegates – the active 20% – are representative of beneficiaries is an important 
question. The evidence suggests there is limited demand to participate and the 
same faces are present each year. Another weaker area is its capacity for realising 
the conditions for inclusive deliberative communication. There is the tendency for 
opinionated delegates to voice their views louder and stronger than those with 
less well developed or strongly held perspectives, diminishing not only their 




Finally, both schemes in this case study have a commitment to sustainable 
investing encompassing both financial and non-financial. But the Assembly’s 
limited capacity for deliberative communication, in turn, impacts upon the 
effectiveness of the model for enabling the articulation of value. Articulations of 
value are constrained by the narrow focus of the Q&A format. Procedures such as 
these are weak at eliciting deliberative qualities that enable value to be articulated 
in the round: in-depth communicative exchanges on understandings and 
justifications of value, and the ways in which differing understandings are 
considered and prioritised by beneficiaries.  
The Delegate Assembly provides an insight into how voice in pension scheme 
governance is practised. Drawing upon interviews with executives and 
beneficiaries and scheme documentation, this chapter has analysed the capacity 
of this model for realising the conditions for each of the qualities in the conceptual 
framework. While the Delegate Assembly, like the Member Council, is one in-
depth case, these findings raise the question of how voice in pension schemes be 
further enriched. In the next chapter, I explore in more detail the structural and 
contextual conditions which enhance or encroach upon the realisation of voice, 
and the ways in which the challenges to voice can be mitigated.  
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8.  The Promise and Challenge of Voice  
In the previous chapters, I have analysed two cases of voice in pension scheme 
governance – the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly. Both models have 
been developed in (quasi-)mandatory systems (Ebbinghaus, 2011), to address the 
challenge of governing sustainable investing. This chapter seeks to build on these 
individual case studies and consider the implications for voice in pension schemes. 
To do this, I extend my analysis by weaving several strands together. First, I offer 
comparisons across the cases studies, and examine how model design shapes the 
realisation of qualities from the conceptual framework. Next, taking a wider lens, 
I examine how structures and contextual features, for example, socio-economic 
inequalities and discursive norms, shape the realisation of the qualities from the 
framework. Finally, I address how these challenges can be mitigated. By drawing 
on the experiences of democratic innovations in public governance, I identify 
which techniques and approaches can minimise these challenges, as well as their 
potential, and relevance, for voice in a pensions setting. 
The literature on democratic innovations in public governance examines 
‘processes or institutions that are new to a policy role, policy issue or level of 
governance, and developed to reimagine or deepen the role of citizens in 
governance processes by increasing opportunities for participation, deliberation 
and influence’ (Elstub and Escobar, 2019: 14). This literature studies various 
models for public engagement typologised initially as popular assemblies, mini-
publics, direct legislation, and e-democracy (Smith, 2009), with later scholars 
adding participatory budgeting, collaborative governance and digital hybrid 
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models (Elstub and Escobar, 2019). This literature is valuable for this discussion of 
voice in pension schemes for two reasons. First, the comparison between the 
Member Council model and the Delegate Assembly model often centres around 
the small scale, in-depth, frequent, format of the former and the large scale, 
diverse, annual, model of the latter. This comparison is reflected in the democratic 
innovations literature, which considers the effectiveness of smaller-scale (e.g. 
consensus conferences) against larger scale (e.g. G1000 in Belgium) models 
(Smith, 2009; Setälä and Smith, 2018; Harris, 2019). This relatively mature 
discussion of the impact of design characteristics provides a valuable body of 
knowledge to draw upon, enhancing understandings of the relative merits of 
Member Council and the Delegate Assembly models.  
A second important feature in this literature is the detailed description, and 
analysis, of model procedures, which offer alternative solutions to the challenges 
of institutionalising voice in pension scheme governance. Many of the examples I 
discuss in this chapter are specifically taken from the sub-literature on mini-
publics, a particular family of public engagement models that includes consensus 
conferences (Blok, 2007) and deliberative polling (Fishkin, 2009). These models 
differ in significant ways from the Member Council and Delegate Assembly model, 
and they have their own strengths and weaknesses. They are generally 
consultative bodies, which stand outside normal representative governance 
structures, with participation based on simple random or stratified random 
selection, and involving participants in facilitated deliberations for the purpose of 
delivering recommendations on a particular public policy question. I also draw on 
the 21st century town hall meeting model (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005) which 
is conducted on a significant scale, involving up to 10,000 participants 
(Lukensmeyer, 2010). These models, while distinguishable by their different 
recruitment procedures, are particularly relevant because they have been widely 
used to engage citizens in policy-making questions which are characterised by 
knowledge asymmetries between technical or bureaucratic actors and the wider 
public; a problem that has been shown to be particularly pronounced in pension 
schemes. For both of these reasons, this literature on innovations in public 
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governance provides an important resource in assessing the potential and 
challenges of the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly models. 
Third, a growing body of scholars are questioning how patterns of civic 
participation are shaped by digital technologies, and the consequences of this for 
inequalities in participation (Dahlberg, 2001; Zhang, 2010; Gilman and Peixoto, 
2019; Moore et al., 2021). Throughout this chapter I touch on the potential and 
limitations of digital participation, and implications of this for public engagement 
in decision-making. In a nutshell, this chapter therefore brings together the 
analysis, and comparison, of the case study models with the broader themes 
discussed in this complementary literature on democratic innovations, including 
the use of digital technologies in this field. By weaving these distinct strands 
together, I elaborate on the promise and challenge of voice in pension schemes. 
Inclusive engagement 
The Member Council and the Delegate Assembly have both been designed to bring 
the voice of the beneficiaries into scheme decision making, so the extent to which 
these models are inclusive, that is, reflective of the diversity of the breadth of legal 
and social characteristics of beneficiaries and their varied perspectives, is a critical 
question. The findings from both the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly 
cases highlight how, even when there is a commitment to realising inclusive forms 
of voice, developing selection procedures that meet this aspiration can be difficult. 
This finding is not unique to the pensions setting. Participation in models of 
deliberative engagement in public governance is also unevenly patterned, with 
social and economic characteristics shaping who participates (Ryfe and Stalsburg, 
2012). A wide literature exists on the ways in which socio-economic characteristics 
impact upon participation in political and civic governance. By drawing on this 
literature, useful comparisons can be made which enable a better understanding 
of the problems of realising inclusion in voice in pension schemes. As Ryfe and 
Stalsburg (2012) note, active participation has been repeatedly associated with 
three characteristics: higher levels of formal education, higher socioeconomic 
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status, and greater integration in social networks. They argue that education 
fosters the skills and confidence that can aid participation, as well as a sense of 
connection to civic matters. Similarly, higher social status contributes to human 
capital which promotes integration in social networks. In addition, life stage and 
psychological attributes are also significant. Specifically, biographical factors, for 
example, family responsibilities, and the degree of financial and social freedom, 
influence the tendency to participate. Psychological factors such as an ability to 
enjoy making sense of complex information, a high sense of personal efficacy, and 
an openness towards conflict also influence if, and how, individuals choose to 
participate.  
But it is not only these socio-economic, structural, and psychological 
characteristics which shape participation. The two cases presented in this thesis 
provide further evidence of how the design of institutionalised voice affects its 
inclusiveness. In the Member Council, inclusiveness is shaped by the use of 
electoral procedures for selection. It is widely acknowledged that elections tend 
to be more exclusionary than other selection procedures as specific people, 
notably the most confident who are typically white, male and middle-aged, are 
more likely to put themselves forward (Mansbridge, 1999; Urbaniti and Warren, 
2008). The limited number of positions will also constrain who is able to 
participate; by design, any process of election restricts how many people can be 
involved. In contrast, the Delegate Assembly is open to a larger number of 
participants, but it is not a fully open meeting; each participating member 
organisation is offered a handful of places, within the range of between 1 to 15 
places. Looking at these procedures at an even more granular level reveals how 
the locally determined institutional arrangements for selecting delegates – for 
example whether it is through invitation or self-selection – will additionally shape 
the inclusiveness of this procedure. Executives in both case studies acknowledge 
the need for inclusiveness, and in the Member Council there is an aspiration to 
realising this. But the case studies show there has been limited success in achieving 
inclusiveness in practice. 
186 
 
While realising inclusiveness is a perennial problem, the literature on public 
engagement discusses how a variety of recruitment procedures have been 
experimented with to address this challenge, involving variations in electoral 
practices and random sampling (Fung, 2006; Ryfe and Stalsburg, 2012). One 
technique which has been used is to target communications to communities of 
individuals who are likely to be underrepresented. This involves publicising open 
meetings more widely among communities less likely to participate, such as low-
income and minority communities (Fung, 2006). But it could also involve taking an 
‘outreach’ approach and actively recruiting participants by drawing on established 
networks of community organisations working with ‘hard to reach’ communities. 
For example, the 21st Century Town Hall meeting model uses outreach to connect 
with potential participants who do not commonly get involved in civic decision-
making (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005). Alternatively, an interview process was 
developed by the Birmingham Race Action Partnership in the UK to identify 
suitable ‘community advocates’ to participate. This use of interviews, as part of a 
broader capacity building and recruitment procedure, was driven by an interest in 
ensuring candidates combined both socio-economic characteristics (in this 
instance, ethnicity) with epistemological characteristics (specialist knowledge and 
skills). This represented an innovation that was a significant change from the 
previous use of elections to identify community representatives (Smith and 
Stephenson, 2005).   
For pension schemes, these approaches have some relevance and potential. By 
publicising opportunities more widely to beneficiaries least likely to participate, 
the numbers of underrepresented beneficiaries can potentially be boosted. These 
types of communications could be direct targeted or targeted via groups within 
employer organisations. This type of approach is particularly relevant for larger 
scale models such as the Delegate Assembly. The approach taken by the 
Birmingham Race Action Partnership may be relevant for smaller models such as 
the Member Council, and may help ensure that the participants, as a whole, are 
not only socio-economically representative of beneficiaries, but bring the relevant 
level of interest and commitment to the role.  
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Another technique that is growing in popularity is the use of random or stratified 
random sampling. These side-step many of the factors which shape participation 
or non-participation, and the problems of under-representation or bias that may 
be a consequence of this. While random sampling is favoured by some (Fishkin, 
2009), stratification procedures are widely used to improve representativeness, 
particularly of minorities, or in mini-publics involving small numbers of 
participants (Setälä and Smith, 2018). Recruitment may involve stratification to 
ensure participants reflect basic demographic profiles, such as gender, ethnicity 
and age. In procedural terms, stratification involves identifying the proportion of 
participants that should have particular socio-economic characteristics for the 
whole group to be representative. Naturally, each individual will be representative 
of multiple characteristics. This approach is particularly useful to ensure minorities 
are represented, given that they may not be selected in a pure random sampling 
procedure if their occurrence in the wider population is small. Random selection 
ensures all those with particular characteristics have an equal chance of being 
selected and if an individual declines, then another randomly selected individual 
with the same characteristics is invited instead. The combination of stratification 
and random selection have been used in a wide variety of models in public 
governance as a way of ensuring the final group of participants reflect the breadth 
of socio-economic characteristics in the population. A classic example of this 
approach is the seminal case of the Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral Reform in 
British Colombia, which involved randomly selected citizens, stratified to ensure 
representation of electoral district and gender (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006; Setälä 
and Smith, 2018). Other well-known mini-public models using this technique are 
citizens juries and consensus conference (Setälä and Smith, 2018).   
For pension schemes, this approach may have relevance, given that forms of 
random and stratified random sampling manage to enhance inclusiveness (i.e. the 
participants reflect the socio-economic characteristics, and status, of the wider 
beneficiaries), as well as encouraging the participation of individuals who are less 
likely to engage (for whatever reason). Furthermore, given that individuals have a 
relatively strong connection, as members of a scheme, they are arguably even 
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more likely to accept the invitation to participate than those who are invited on 
the basis of their residence, which is common to forms of voice in public 
governance. 
A further procedure that can encourage wider participation is the use of 
honorariums. This is payment, in addition to covering the expenses of participation 
such as childcare and travel costs. Widely used in mini-publics and in some other 
forms of consultation, honorariums serve as a financial and symbolic 
acknowledgement of the time and effort participants invest. As a result, the 
importance of participation is elevated and given greater weight, helping to meet 
any additional, unexpected, financial costs incurred through participation, as well 
as incentivising those who might not otherwise participate. This approach is 
particularly relevant of high commitment models such as the Member Council, but 
a more paired down approach can also work as an effective incentive for larger 
scale models such as the Delegate Assembly. 
Finally, digital technologies have been widely discussed as democratising 
technologies and, in the context of voice, having the potential to ameliorate the 
problem of limited inclusiveness. Indeed, in the Delegate Assembly case study, one 
beneficiary suggested that digital technologies could be one way of improving 
participation. Reflecting this interest, there has been a move towards digital 
methods of engagement, known as ‘civic tech’ (Gilman and Peixoto, 2019), which 
have opened up new opportunities for publics in governance decision-making. 
Does the move towards the digital ameliorate the unequal patterns of 
participation in practice? While this is a nascent field of research, the emerging 
picture is that participation in digital engagement mechanisms reflects or 
compounds existing structural and socio-economic inequalities (Dahlberg, 2001; 
Zhang, 2010; Gilman and Peixoto, 2019). The patterns of participation and the way 
in which they are shaped by socio-economic characteristics, such as gender, life 
course, race and class (Robinson et al., 2015), are manifested in complex ways. 
There is evidence of women and men participating in digital technologies 
differently (Dahlberg, 2001; Albrecht, 2006; Kennedy et al., 2021), with this digital 
divide less pronounced in countries with greater gender equality in general 
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(Robinson et al., 2015). Specifically, women’s participation is less frequent, of 
lower intensity, more narrowly focused, and women tend to report lower levels of 
internet skills, contributing to a more disadvantaged position. Ethnicity and life 
stage can also affect internet use and proficiency (Robinson et al., 2015). This 
emerging evidence suggests that digital technologies will provide no easy solutions 
to the problems of inclusiveness in voice in pension schemes, and the barriers to 
inclusion present an enduring challenge to the engagement of publics in 
governance. 
Realising inclusiveness – the inclusion of all types of beneficiaries – is a challenge 
to the efficacy of models of voice. And in both of these case studies, the evidence 
indicates that participants are not representative of the full breadth of 
beneficiaries. This is not surprising, as the structural, socio-economic and 
individual influences that pattern civic engagement also shape who participates in 
pension scheme governance. One way to approach this problem is to learn from 
the experiences of public engagement models and consider how techniques such 
as random stratified sampling, targeted communications and methods of 
outreach, and honorariums can help facilitate participation from the full breadth 
of pension scheme beneficiaries. These procedures described will not mitigate all 
the social, economic and individual factors that lead to non-participation. 
However, they have been widely used in public governance precisely because they 
do go some way to addressing the problem and improving the inclusiveness of 
voice. 
Deliberative communication 
Deliberative communication appears to hold much promise for addressing the 
complex decisions faced in sustainability investing. It is a form of communication 
that centres around the creation of free and fair conditions and mutual respect, 
facilitating the expression of varied perspectives and interests and their underlying 
reasons. While deliberative democratic theorists articulate its characteristics and 
benefits in theoretical terms, empirical researchers have identified the types of 
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conditions that could realise deliberative communication. Realising these in 
practice is no easy task (Mutz, 2006), given the demands it places on institutions.  
Both the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly illustrate how design and 
practice shapes the realisation of deliberative communication, with notable 
differences in their effectiveness. The Member Council model has many qualities 
which help it achieve an enhanced degree of deliberative communication – in 
particular, ongoing participation over a long period of time, which facilitates trust 
and respectfulness; the capacity for learning; and the potential for realising 
consensus or constructive decision making. The institutional commitment to open 
and inclusive communication results in the sense that members are ‘free’ in 
making their contributions. The practical limitations of the Q&A format of the 
Delegate Assembly restricts the realisation of deliberative communication. 
Specifically, the infrequency of the event, and the number of participants involved, 
results in less time available for participants to express their views in sufficient 
depth and explore the perspectives of others. In addition to this, the scale of the 
Assembly impacts upon who participates. A majority of individuals find the public 
expression of opinions daunting and have a tendency towards silence – a finding 
that was evident in the Delegate Assembly, as well as the Member Council. This 
leaves the minority of skilled and confident public speakers to dominate – 
individuals who often have more strongly held views (Fiorina, 1999). 
These findings are not surprising. In New England town meetings, a long-standing 
model of civic participation, there is a tendency for fewer to speak than attend, 
with an average of 5 minutes of talking time per speaker (Bryan, 2004). Reflecting 
on the limitations of public hearings, Lee notes, ‘collaborative and deep 
participation is often contrasted with the comparatively thin two-minutes-at-a-
microphone model of gathering public input at hearings’ (2019: 10).  This suggests 
that smaller group settings are better suited to deliberative communication. But 
even in small group settings, realising the deliberative ideal is still challenging. 
Powerful social norms shape individuals’ communicative behaviour in groups in 
any institutional context (Poletta and Gardner, 2018). And these norms which are 
culturally specific, and gendered, can generate a sense of fear about the social 
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acceptability of viewpoints (Scheufele, 1999), or of offending others (Wyatt et al., 
1996). These shape individuals’ willingness to express themselves fully, and in a 
way that realises forms of deliberative communication.  
Deliberation in small group settings is also affected by the degree of heterogeneity 
of values and opinions between individuals, and the implications of these on group 
dynamics. Mutz (2006) illustrates that deliberative communication is harder to 
realise among groups with heterogeneous opinions, given that trust – a 
precondition of deliberation – is less prevalent. At the same time, Sunstein (2002) 
has highlighted the tendency for the collective opinion of homogeneous groups to 
move further to the extreme of opinion and away from the centre, making people 
less willing to value alternative views or arguments. Both of these findings 
confound the assumptions and claims of deliberative theorists, and suggest that 
realising deliberative communication, even in small group settings, is not a 
straightforward matter.  
By drawing on the literature on deliberation in public governance, we can see that 
deliberation is not only constrained by the size and scale of assemblies, but also 
by norms, group characteristics and dynamics in small-scale settings (whether in 
face to face or digital settings). But this literature also highlights the ways in which 
designs can be adapted to realise deliberation. Specifically, models that manage 
most effectively to realise the conditions for deliberative communication are ones 
that, whatever the number of participants, are designed to ensure small-scale 
interactions among participants, with the additional support of an external, 
impartial, facilitator. Facilitators are responsible for guiding discussions in an 
unbiased manner, and their value is that their interventions can enhance the 
deliberative quality of small group discussions. They do this, first, by establishing 
empathy and trust between participants; second by enabling participation among 
the more marginalised and less likely to speak up (Abdullah et al., 2016); and third, 
by the inclusion of alternative, competing arguments – arguments that might (for 
many different reasons) be complex or difficult to raise and discuss, and require a 
facilitator to create the right conditions for their expression. Finally, by identifying 
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where participants share common interests or concerns, they help set the 
groundwork for consensus or constructive decision making.  
Two models which have successfully integrated facilitators into very large-scale 
formats are the 21st century town hall meeting model (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 
2005) and deliberative polling (Fishkin, 2009)27. Both of these models, while having 
their own individual procedures and techniques, share an interest in generating 
recommendations from deliberations between large and diverse groups of citizens 
to inform public dialogue or a policy process. In these very large-scale models, 
facilitators are central to the realisation of deliberative communication at scale. In 
deliberative polling, participants are randomly assigned into small groups and the 
discussions are guided by facilitators.  
[Participants are] encouraged to ask questions arising from the small group 
discussions to competing experts and politicians in larger plenary sessions. 
The moderators attempt to establish an atmosphere where participants 
listen to each other in a safe public space and no one is permitted to 
dominate the discussion. (Fishkin, 2009: 26) 
These two models are highly ambitious, resource heavy, spectacular engagement 
events. The conclusion to draw here is not necessarily that these complex large-
scale models are suitable for small, lean, pension schemes. Instead, such models 
would be feasible at an industry level, for example if commissioned by pensions 
industry bodies or regulators. Instead, the lesson to be learned for pension 
governance at scheme level is the way in which facilitators help realise deliberative 
communication. The evidence from public governance suggests the judicious use 
of facilitators to guide small-group discussions may be one way to enhance the 
deliberative capacity of large-scale events, such as the Delegate Assembly, but 
 
27 As an example, AmericaSpeaks used the 21st Century Town Hall meeting model in ‘Listening to 
the City’, a high-profile project which addressed rebuilding of the world trade center site. This 
involved 4,500 members of the general public, alongside a further 800 involved in online 
deliberations (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005). The 21st Century Town Hall meeting model can 
include up to 10,000 people (Lukensmeyer, 2010).  Slightly smaller in scale, a recent deliberative 
poll involved 500 American voters in ‘America in One Room’, a discussion of issues relevant to 
the 2020 presidential election organized by the Center for Deliberative Democracy (no date). 
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these techniques are also relevant for smaller-group events such as the Member 
Council meeting. For this technique to be effective, facilitators should be as 
impartial as possible, and be sensitive to the expression of varied forms of 
knowledge, as well as difference, challenge, conflict, and collaboration (Escobar, 
2019). When these skills are absent, moderation will fail to have any positive 
influence on the quality of deliberative communication.28 
Digital technologies have been used to facilitate deliberative citizen engagement 
through real-time, moderated, digital deliberation models addressing policy 
questions. These forms of deliberation are inevitably hampered by the unequal 
participation in digital spaces (as mentioned previously), as well as the technical 
infrastructure required to deliver the relatively sophisticated digital models used 
for policy-making (Grönlund et al. 2009; Smith et al., 2013). There is a small 
amount of evidence which suggests that digital participation models, when 
structured and moderated effectively, have managed to realise deliberative 
qualities which are similar in some ways to face to face deliberations (Grönlund et 
al. 2009). Nevertheless, the evidence in this area is still emergent and mixed 
(Kennedy et al., 2021). Reflecting this, there are also varied assumptions and 
hypothesis on the value of digital technologies. For example, while it is widely 
acknowledged that the social distance afforded to anonymous users in digital 
spaces may serve to foster inclusion, at the same time it can also encourage non-
deliberative forms of communication, such as the expression of aggressively 
confrontational positions by others. In fact, recent research reveals the complex 
relationship between anonymity and the quality of digital deliberative 
communication. Moore et al.’s (2021) study of online discussion platforms 
suggests that the anonymity offered to participants impacts on deliberation in a 
non-linear way, with higher quality deliberation achieved when a mid-level of 
anonymity is offered (neither totally anonymity nor total identification) to 
 
28 The question of facilitator skills is an important point. In 21st Century Town Hall Meetings 
volunteers had one day’s training in moderation before the event. Their independence was 
enhanced given they were external to the public institution. Following this idea, one solution is 




participants in online settings. While evidence is emergent in this area, it is clear 
that unique characteristics of digital technologies, such as the offer of anonymity, 
do not provide easy solutions to realising the conditions for deliberative 
communication. 
Deliberative communication may appear an ambitious theoretical ideal, but the 
Member Council and the Delegate Assembly provide insightful cases of the 
possibility of creating the conditions for deliberative communication in voice in 
pension schemes. The smaller scale Member Council model is most effective at 
realising an approximation of deliberative communication in practice. However, 
even in small scale groups deliberative communication can be challenging to 
achieve. One tried and tested solution to this problem is the use of trained 
facilitators to guide group discussions, a technique that has been widely used in 
models in public governance. A similar approach could be taken in pension 
schemes; ideally with independent, experienced facilitators but the possibility of 
training beneficiaries may also be a practical solution. And the widespread use of 
facilitators across a variety of models in public governance indicates its 
effectiveness, when done well. By drawing upon these tried and tested 
techniques, it should be possible to enrich the quality of deliberative 
communication in voice in pension schemes.  
Informed engagement 
Significant technical and bureaucratic knowledge asymmetries are prevalent in all 
forms of pension scheme governance, whatever the pension systems they operate 
in. Both the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly operate in environments 
with these knowledge asymmetries – balanced in favour of the executives. In 
addition, sustainable investing adds further complexity by creating knowledge 
asymmetries – balanced in the opposite direction – on beneficiaries’ values 




Both the case study models are designed to address the question of limited 
technical knowledge among beneficiaries. For example, in the Delegate Assembly, 
the board present the Assembly with information on the annual report, financial 
statements and administrative costs, along with other updates, for example on the 
wider Swiss social security system. In the Member Council, as well as the provision 
of administrative information, executives additionally arrange for external finance 
specialists to enhance learning on financial investment. In both cases this 
information and learning provide the basic groundwork for informed participation, 
rather than significantly shifting the balance in the knowledge asymmetries 
between beneficiaries and executives. On asymmetries in understandings of 
beneficiary values, both models provide the opportunity for executives, trustees 
and other governance actors to gain an insight into the perspectives of 
beneficiaries. However, it is in the in-depth, frequent, member council meetings, 
where beneficiaries can express in greater depth the ‘raw reality’ of their working 
lives and perspectives, where beneficiaries are most likely to inform and enhance 
governance actors’ understandings of beneficiaries’ values.  
Although these asymmetries are particularly pronounced in pension schemes, a 
similar pattern of asymmetries in knowledge and values is also present in public 
administration, between governance actors and their publics. They are commonly 
present when policy making involves: judging complex technical problems shaped 
by multiple sources of knowledge; matters where there are potentially conflicting 
expert opinions (Joss, 1998); and policy questions which require an understanding 
of public values and forms of local, non-technical knowledge, first to create 
workable solutions, and second to gain public acceptance (Renn et al., 1995a). 
Given this, the challenge of knowledge asymmetries on policy questions that 
involve both technical and bureaucratic knowledge and value judgements has 
been extensively discussed in the public governance literature. Mini-publics such 
as consensus conferences, citizens juries, citizen assemblies, planning cells, 
deliberative opinion polls and the G1000 in Belgium (Setälä and Smith, 2018) are 
relevant for this discussion. Each of these models illustrate how serious efforts can 
be made to tackle the technical and bureaucratic asymmetries, along with gaining 
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a deeper understanding of public values and perspectives. Notably, these models 
do not simply aim to bridge ‘gaps’ in understanding. Influenced by deliberative 
democratic theorising, they also seek to create a social process of mutual learning 
among both expert and public participants (Scheufele, 2011; Joss, 1998). 
Integrating expertise is not a simple matter (Roberts et al., 2020), and realising the 
ideal learning processes is challenging in practice. The way in which mini-publics 
provide multiple sources of expert knowledge, as well as enabling participants to 
actively identify which sources of expertise they believe are the most relevant, 
contributes towards the creation of a learning process, rather than just an 
exchange of knowledge. 
One of these mini-public models, the consensus conference (Joss, 1998; Jensen, 
2005; Blok, 2007), is a particularly relevant example. The value of examining the 
consensus conference model is the insight it provides into how to bring in diverse, 
technical and bureaucratic perspectives into a public deliberation process, and 
offer the opportunity for experts to learn about a public’s values and perspectives.  
This model was developed in Denmark in the 1980s to engage publics in 
deliberations on science and technology questions (Joss, 1998). Since then, it has 
been used on issues such as gene therapy (Joss, 1998), biomonitoring (Nelson et 
al., 2008) or genetically modified foods (Dryzek et al., 2009). While its design has 
many facets, one which is particularly relevant is the way in which it seeks not 
simply to re-balance technical and bureaucratic knowledge asymmetries, but to 
create a two-way learning process between actors with scientific expertise and a 
lay public (Jensen, 2005). In procedural terms, this model brings together a group 
of randomly selected members of the public, stratified according to key socio-
economic characteristics. Their goal is to deliberate on a policy question, guided 
by a facilitator and supported by an advisory committee of experts. On this basis, 
a public report with citizens’ recommendations is produced (Blok, 2007; Dryzek et 
al., 2009).   
Technical experts play a central role in this model and are involved not only in 
engagement with participants but also in an advisory committee that helps 
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formulate the question to be deliberated (Dryzek at al., 2009). The advisory 
committee is also involved in providing balanced briefing materials for citizens and 
in preparing a list of experts and advocates that the citizens can call to hear further 
evidence or testimony (Blok, 2007; Dryzek at al., 2009). In this sense, expert 
knowledge is front and centre in this procedure and the model appears to seek to 
integrate technical expertise, while maintaining its focus on public values and 
deliberation. In addition, the model exposes experts to citizen’s questions, 
generating the potential for them to become better acquainted with, and affected 
by, citizens’ perspectives.   
Like all forms of voice, this approach has its shortcomings. In this particular model, 
there is always the risk that a public’s deliberations and recommendations are 
shaped excessively by experts’ perspectives. Specifically, deliberations will be 
influenced by the assumptions and claims which experts draw upon to formulate 
their contributions, and related to this, by the diversity of expert perspectives 
presented. Biases will be present although these can be mitigated, to a degree, by 
ensuring a breadth of expert viewpoints. This diversity of perspectives offers 
deliberating participants the opportunity to realise a more critical, reflexive 
understanding of individual expert claims (Blok, 2007). The role of expertise in 
mini-publics such as the consensus conference is therefore most effective when it 
is presented in multiple, diverse forms, providing a ‘wide variety of frames (which) 
expose stakeholders to all sides of the debate and to all possible ways of making 
sense of the issue’ (Scheufele, 2011). While consensus conferences are designed 
to offer a process of mutual learning, among both experts and a public, in reality, 
there is a stronger weight placed on participants’ scientific and technical learning, 
rather than the learning by experts on the publics’ values (Jensen, 2005). 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the consensus conference offers a valuable 
example of how highly technical, diverse, forms of knowledge can be integrated 
into voice in order to mitigate asymmetries in knowledge and values. 
The consensus conference provides a way of visualising how procedures can be 
developed which seriously engage with the question of knowledge asymmetries. 
While this model has mainly be used on policy issues of national importance, 
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similar principles have been adopted in other models such as citizen’s juries, 
citizen’s assemblies, deliberative opinion polls and planning cells (Harris, 2019; 
Setälä and Smith, 2018), which have been more widely used at local and regional 
levels of governance. Some of these have also been delivered with digital 
technology, and there is emerging evidence this does not appear to compromise 
the capacity of this model to improve participants’ knowledge on policy issues and 
enhance the kind of learning that will lead to attitude change (Luskin et al., 2006).  
Another variation on the mini-public model has been developed, where it has 
been adapted as a long-term advisory group, rather than just as a one-off event. 
This approach in many ways shares similarities with the Member Council. The 
Toronto Planning Review Panel (no date) was an advisory panel of 32 residents, 
randomly selected among interested citizens, to be representative of the 
population, and charged with providing informed public input on planning 
initiatives over several years. In contrast to the consensus conference, the Toronto 
panel shows how a mini-public can be institutionalised as a ‘go-to’ longer-term 
advisory group, to address emergent policy questions as they appear on the 
horizon. Of course, the risk with the long-term engagement of a mini-public is that 
it can lead to citizens becoming co-opted into institutional agendas (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2002) or increase the potential for conflicts of interest. To a degree, these 
problems can be addressed by ensuring the members are regularly refreshed, 
through the use of time-limitations on the ‘term’ of individuals’ participation.  
In summary, the problem of asymmetries on technical and bureaucratic 
knowledge and on beneficiary values are pervasive problems in pension schemes, 
and they pose a particular challenge to the governance of sustainable investing. 
Voice cannot remove these asymmetries, but the experiences of models such as 
consensus conference show how serious efforts can be made to improve a public’s 
knowledge of technical and bureaucratic matters, as well as expose members of 
the public to the variety of professional perspectives. And the consensus 
conference model also highlights that these techniques have the potential to bring 
benefits, not only for beneficiaries’ knowledge, but also for pensions professionals 
who, through their interactions with the public, gain a deeper insight into the 
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values that underpin beneficiary expectations, perspectives, and values. Although 
consensus conferences and other mini-publics are typically resource intensive 
procedures, models such as these provides inspiration for reconsidering how 
forms of voice can attend to the asymmetries in knowledge and understandings 
of values that are so prevalent in pension scheme governance. 
Transparency  
The transparency of voice, sometimes discussed in terms of ‘publicity’ (Karpowitz, 
and Raphael, 2014), describes the visibility of its purpose, its procedures, its links 
to decision making, and its influence. Without sufficient transparency, forms of 
voice will not be regarded by those participating, and those affected by its 
decision-making, as legitimate entities in the governance of a pension scheme. 
Like many of the qualities discussed in this study, although transparency is highly 
desirable (Chambers, 2004), achieving it can be surprisingly challenging and 
involves practical as well as theoretical considerations. 
While pension schemes are institutions are well placed to realise transparency 
among their beneficiaries, the Member Council and Delegate Assembly models 
exhibit varying degrees of success. Indeed, the scale and scope of institutionalised 
voice can help or hinder the realisation of transparency (Smith, 2009). In the 
Member Council case study, information is distributed through a fairly impressive 
communication strategy involving face to face, digital and print communications 
with wider beneficiaries. In addition to this, the ‘investorship’ process, which seeks 
to connect a wider public of beneficiaries to the work of the Member Council, 
serves as a conduit for information about the Council and provides beneficiary 
feedback. Despite these varied communications, the Member Council model, as 
well as its strategy, remains complex for beneficiaries to understand. Given this, 
transparency is achieved to a degree, but not in its fullest sense, and the Member 
Council remains a distant decision-making body for most beneficiaries. In the 
second case study, the Delegate Assembly model, there is also a strong interest in 
ensuring transparency, although limited resources are allocated for this task. 
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Transparency is largely achieved through the provision of information via the 
website and printed newsletters. The breadth of information made available to 
beneficiaries helps realise an impressive degree of transparency. In addition to 
this, the use of meetings at member organisations outside the Assembly may play 
a role in enhancing its transparency. The fact the Assembly is a long-standing 
element in the scheme’s governance arrangements and its similarities to the 
assemblies used in civic governance in Switzerland may also make it easier for 
beneficiaries to understand the model, making transparency easier to realise, and 
the additional meetings outside the Assembly provide the opportunity to increase 
beneficiaries’ engagement with the model. 
Discussions of transparency among scholars have highlighted the links between 
transparency and model design, drawing attention to how the ties between a 
model and its wider public, constituency or membership shapes the necessity for 
transparency. Transparency is particularly important in models that have no 
formal authority (Fung, 2003) and when participants are not elected by a 
constituency of voters, but are randomly chosen or self-selected (Parkinson, 
2006). These circumstances create weak ties between a model of public 
engagement and its participants on the one hand, and their wider public on the 
other, and transparency becomes a critical means to ensuring forms of voice are 
legitimate and accountable to those who will be affected by their 
recommendations or decisions. This conclusion suggests that realising 
transparency in the Delegate Assembly, a model that draws upon procedures of 
self-selection rather than election, is particularly important. Transparency is also 
more important in models that engage participants in significant learning and 
preference transformation (Smith, 2009). When participants’ understanding of an 
issue departs from the common understanding held by the broader public (in a 
sense, their constituency), the shared epistemological ties between participants 
and the wider public are weakened, and necessitates a stronger degree of 
transparency in order to maintain the legitimacy of the model. This suggests that 




In some ways, the institutional setting of pension schemes arguably makes 
realising transparency easier than in other contexts. Forms of voice in public 
governance – for example, mini-publics or forms of community consultation – are 
often one-off projects, sometimes with limited authority and with weak links to 
policy making or decision-making procedures, along with weak ties to a large-scale 
public with diverse, plural interests. In these contexts, transparency cannot always 
be sufficiently achieved through communications and can be undermined by 
limited media coverage or media representations that are not fully accurate 
(Smith, 2009; Cooper and Smith, 2012; Karpowitz, and Raphael, 2014). These 
factors make transparency all the more necessary, but make the task even more 
challenging.  
Pension schemes provide a more fertile environment for transparency. First, forms 
of voice take place regularly and are established as governance entities. Second, 
the ‘public’ – a group of pension scheme beneficiaries – are easier to identify and 
communicate with, and communications can be easily adapted to meet their 
particular circumstances. Third, while pensions are an unappealing topic for the 
majority, beneficiaries’ interest may be more easily ignited on these matters than 
on wider public policy questions. Although still low, a public’s interest is likely to 
be greater on issues which address their own finances and their own retirement, 
rather than on policy matters which address broader public or collective concerns.  
Such circumstances create fertile conditions for the development of more 
innovative forms of communications with beneficiaries; communications which 
aim to not only to inform about a model, but also to engage them more closely in 
its areas of concern. The ‘investorship’ model in the Member Council is an 
interesting example of how the pension scheme setting offers novel opportunities 
for connecting institutionalised voice with a wider public. This process encourages 
Council participants to translate between their colleagues and the participants in 
the Member Council, sharing information across this divide. Similarly, in the 
Delegate Assembly model additional meetings established outside the assembly, 
and taking place at member organisations’ offices, can also be seen as a means to 
enhance the transparency of the Assembly among non-participating beneficiaries. 
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This has the potential of generating in-depth discussions, creating forms of 
engagement that enable beneficiaries to act, and respond, to the themes raised in 
the Assembly. 
The value of these additional forms of communication channels which take place 
outside of the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly may not just be in the 
enhanced transparency they offer. The systemic perspective developed by 
Mansbridge, both on representative systems (2017) and deliberative systems 
(Mansbridge et al., 2012) considers not only formal entities (such as models of 
voice like mini-publics, among others), but also the informal interactions (such as 
the spontaneous talk between individuals) that take place within democratic 
systems. Mansbridge’s concept of ‘recursive representation’ involves a form of 
recursive communication where actors ‘take in what the other is saying, update, 
revise, and respond on the basis of their own experience, then listen to the others’ 
response’ (2017: 9). For Mansbridge, recursive communication is valuable for 
normatively justifying and legitimising the representative relationship. In the 
pension scheme context, this concept aptly describes, and identifies, the 
normative value of the additional communication channels which take place 
outside the Member Council and Delegate Assembly. In the case of the Member 
Council, the investorship process connects the Member Council participants with 
wider beneficiaries providing a means of, in Mansbridge’s terms, recursive 
communication in ‘electoral representation’ (2017: 7). The additional channels of 
communication developed outside of the Delegate Assembly also offer recursive 
communication between the executives and beneficiaries, reflecting what 
Mansbridge would describe as recursive communication in ‘administrative 
representation’ (2017: 20). In one sense, therefore, these two case studies 
illustrate what Mansbridge’s concept of ‘recursive representation’ might look at 
an institutional level, when recurrent communicative exchanges are used to 
supplement the institutionalised models of voice. These communication channels 
have the potential to not only enhance the transparency of voice, but the 
additional recursiveness they bring can also enhance its effectiveness, and its 
legitimacy, more broadly. While recursive communications have the potential to 
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strengthen forms of representation, there always remains the risk that any closely 
interconnected communications among a tight knit group of individuals will 
diminish the capacity of these individuals to critically reflect on each other’s 
preferences (Papadopoulos, 201229), potentially leading to a form of co-option. 
For recursive channels of communication to work effectively, there should be a 
commitment to making contact with a breadth of diverse beneficiaries. If this is 
achieved, then there is, as the systemic lens (Mansbridge et al., 2012) identifies, 
great value in these forms of complementary communication channels, which link 
models of voice and their decision-making to beneficiaries more broadly. 
Influence  
Of all the qualities discussed in this study, the influence of models of voice on 
decision making is particularly pertinent. Hirschman (1970) offers voice as an 
alternative to exit on the basis that it influences decision making and contributes 
to improvements in organisational performance. In this thesis, the influence of an 
institutionalised form of voice is conceptualised as an outcome of its design, 
including its statutory and informal (e.g. consultative) authority, and the way in 
which these are practised. Furthermore, gaining clarity and typologising the 
impacts across all forms of voice is complex given the diversity of models and their 
goals (Barrett et al., 2012). Alongside this, identifying the form of influence in a 
particular empirical setting is analytically difficult given that influence can be 
diffuse, long-term, and hard to trace. As Pogrebinschi and Ryan (2018) note, 
instead of addressing influence, scholars have largely focused instead on the 
internal effectiveness of the procedures of public engagement. More recently, 
there has been a trend towards studies  that seek to understand models’ influence 
better, examining how procedural and policy characteristics of models in public 
governance shape variations in the impact of participatory processes (Barratt et 
al., 2012; Progrebinschi and Ryan, 2018; Font et al., 2018).  
 
29 Papadopoulos refers to ‘loose coupling’ (2012: 149) as the preferable organisational 
arrangement for avoiding this type of risk.  
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The way in which voice influences policy-making is shaped by the mandate of 
models, and whether they are afforded de jure, de facto or some degree of 
advisory or consultative authority. While models which have statutory powers 
(e.g. the well-known participatory budgeting model of Porto Alegre) are 
fascinating, the majority of models are established as consultative or advisory 
bodies, with the mandate to offer recommendations for consideration by other 
governance entities. In the pension schemes included in this study the forms of 
voice in each case are unusual in that they have a mixture of both statutory and 
consultative responsibilities and the findings from the Member Council and the 
Delegate Assembly illustrate the complex and varied ways in which influence is 
shaped by model design and its interpretation.  
In terms of their statutory responsibilities, in both cases, these follow their 
respective executive recommendations. This could be evidence of a lack of 
genuine influence of the beneficiaries over these responsibilities, or it could signify 
a form of ‘anticipatory internalisation’ (Goodin, 2003: 224) on behalf of the 
executives. This describes the way in which the preferences of others (i.e. 
beneficiaries) are pre-emptively internalised by other actors (i.e. executives) so 
that executive recommendations reflect beneficiary interests. As Goodin (2003) 
points out, while this might be regarded as simply good strategy, there is a strong 
argument that public forums, and the necessity to present your arguments and 
claims publicly to others, are more likely to foster this type of pre-emptive 
internalisation.  
In addition to these statutory responsibilities, both models have a consultative or 
advisory role, through which they can potentially influence substantive 
governance and sustainability issues. In the first case study, the Member Council, 
is conceived of as a ‘client’ body – reflecting the legal context of pension schemes 
– with a mixture of advisory and oversight functions. Influence is most apparent in 
the operational aspects of decision making, and on some specific policy agendas. 
On sustainable investing the Council has less direct influence, and its role is limited 
to providing ‘guidelines or references’ for other governance entities to address. 
Among beneficiaries and executives involved in the Council, there is a sense that 
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it does realise influence, but this can be time consuming and diffuse, that patience 
is required, and it tends to be observable over recurrent meetings. In the second 
case study, although there is evidence that comments from the Delegate Assembly 
have influenced sustainable investment policy in one of the schemes, the model 
design realises a narrow form of influence focused on specific investment choices, 
rather than influence over larger strategic considerations. In contrast to the 
Member Council, it appears that the lack of in-depth deliberations at the 
Assembly, along with its limited frequency which makes sustained analysis of 
wider strategic questions less likely. Furthermore, holding one Assembly per year 
makes it harder for beneficiaries to have a clear sense of how their participation 
in the Assembly is influencing scheme decision making. 
What are the implications of these findings from these two institutional settings? 
First of all, both illustrate the way in which model design can shape how voice 
affects influence. The comparison between the two also suggests that influence 
may be easier to realise, and to recognise, in smaller scale, recurrent models than 
infrequent, larger scale events. On the issue of recognising and communicating 
influence, lessons can be drawn from the models used in public governance. In 
particular, the participatory budgeting model involves an annual cycle which 
involves local citizens in decision-making on public services. As part of the 
preparatory stage in each cycle, the population can hold the main governance 
entity (the local government) to account for its performance in the previous year 
(Passos Cordeiro, 2004). By integrating an explicit review procedure, the model 
addresses the question of its influence in its own procedures, enabling participants 
to review for themselves whether sufficient influence has been realised. This 
simple review procedure could provide a powerful way of raising awareness of 
how beneficiaries’ input is responded to within scheme decision-making.  
In previous sections in this chapter I have focused on how experience with voice 
in public governance can offer fresh thinking and techniques for the application of 
voice in pension schemes, but it may be that the situation is reversed here. That 
is, the institutional setting of the pension schemes – in particular the existence of 
a fiduciary relationship between schemes and their beneficiaries – may enhance 
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the influence of voice. Pension scheme’s fiduciary duties to act in the ‘best 
interests’ of beneficiaries provides a strong legal context which will shape how 
scheme’s respond to beneficiary preferences as they are expressed in forms of 
voice, even if these models are only granted consultative or advisory roles. Indeed, 
as the Member Council illustrates, the conceptualisation of the Council as a ‘client 
body’ arguably gives it more authority – a remit that combines consultation with 
oversight – than many consultative bodies in public governance are granted. And, 
as mentioned, the recurrent nature of this model – a characteristic which again 
contrasts with many forms of voice in public governance – is likely to enhance their 
influence on decision making. Influence is more likely to be realised in forms of 
voice institutionalised in pension settings, than those in public governance 
settings. 
Articulating value  
Realising value for their beneficiaries is the central purpose of pension schemes. 
And forms of voice should enable beneficiaries to articulate the value they want 
from their pension. Beneficiaries’ articulation of value is not the only source of 
information on this matter; information on complaints, market research and 
forecasting, competitor analysis, and insight into regulatory trends, among other 
data, will also be used to define a pension product, and its value for beneficiaries. 
However, for voice to function effectively in a pension setting, it should enable 
beneficiaries to articulate their own, plural, understandings of value. Notions of 
value will not necessarily be succinctly expressed in product terms by 
beneficiaries, but rather expressed indirectly when they articulate their often 
nebulous needs, goals, expectations and aspirations for their pension and 
retirement, as well as their wider social and environmental concerns. For pension 
schemes facing the challenge of sustainable investing, understanding these as 
beneficiaries’ articulations of value will help better inform their governance and 
management of these matters.  
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Although some have examined the link between forms of voice and policy impact, 
or outcomes (Bryson et al., 2012; Newig et al., 2013), in the main much of the 
focus of public governance scholarship focuses on effective procedures (e.g. Fung, 
2006; Papadopoulos and Warin, 2007; Geissel, 2012;). In contrast, stakeholder 
theorists place less emphasis on the procedures of stakeholder management, and 
instead place greater emphasis on its realisation of value; the extent to which 
stakeholders’ goals and needs are satisfied by an organisation (Preble, 2005). For 
stakeholder theorists, understanding value does not necessarily require 
stakeholders to articulate for themselves what value means to them, nor do they 
discuss the procedures by which this articulation could be realised.  As this study 
has shown, the application of forms of voice to pension schemes, and the dilemma 
of sustainability investing, draws our attention to the importance of 
understanding what value means for beneficiaries, specifically, how it can be 
articulated, and the necessary procedures and conditions for this to be realised. 
Put another way, it raises the question of whether forms of voice can provide a 
forum for beneficiaries to articulate the value they want from their pension.  
The findings from the Member Council and Delegate Assembly show how 
articulations of value can be realised in two different forms of voice. In the 
Member Council beneficiaries can articulate value including not only economic 
concerns, but also wider considerations that they regard as important for a good 
quality of life in older age. The ‘investorship’ process has the potential to bring 
further, more diverse, articulations of value from beneficiaries not participating in 
the Council into these discussions. The Delegate Assembly also enables 
beneficiaries to articulate the value they want from their pension, and through 
their questions beneficiaries can address either economic or wider considerations 
that relate to value. Given its size, the Assembly itself has the potential to bring in 
a range of diverse articulations. Where this model is lacking is in its capacity to 
elicit in-depth articulations of value or with conflicting considerations. Both cases, 
in their different ways, illustrate some of the promise of voice for eliciting 
beneficiaries’ articulations of value. 
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Nabatchi (2012) is unique in the field of public administration for linking how the 
design of public engagement models can generate understandings of public value. 
She develops a series of theoretically generated propositions of ideal design 
features which, she argues, are more likely to achieve understandings of public 
value. These theoretically-grounded propositions reflect many of the conclusions 
I have drawn from the empirical analysis of voice.  In particular, both the Member 
Council and the Delegate Assembly are designs characterised by (a) interests 
rather than adversarial positions; (b) moderate to high levels of decision authority; 
(c) the use of informational materials; and (d) the use of multiple events. In 
addition, the Member Council model is also characterised by (e) deliberative 
communication. The significant overlap between the design characteristics of 
these two models, and Nabatchi’s propositions, suggests that they are well placed 
to generate articulations of value among beneficiaries. Where there are lacking, 
according to Nabatchi’s analysis (which reiterates my own analysis earlier in this 
chapter), is in their limited use of (f) small-scale group formats; (g) moderated 
discussions; (h) recruitment open to a broad public; and (i) recruitment that 
minimises self-selection bias. In essence, the empirical findings from the Member 
Council and Delegate Assembly model confirm Nabatchi’s propositions and 
provide initial findings on how voice can be designed to enable the articulation of 
value. 
Feasibility  
When voice is considered as an institutional practice, discussions eventually turn 
to the question of feasibility; a necessary quality in any form of governance. The 
two different forms illustrated in this study, the Member Council and the Delegate 
Assembly, are both highly feasible models which are straightforward to manage 
and do not require significant resources. This is perhaps unsurprising given that 
both have been developed by pension schemes themselves to fit within their 
specific institutional settings. The balance they achieve between scale and 
recurrence make them particularly viable models; the Member Council is a 
smaller-scale, frequent event, whilst the larger-scale Delegate Assembly is run on 
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an annual basis. As with all forms of voice, both require investment of resources 
and have opportunity costs for those involved – they require management time, 
as well as time from the beneficiaries and their employers. The Member Council is 
significantly more demanding than the Delegate Assembly in this respect. But 
overall, involvement in both models is not overly onerous. Indeed, it may be that 
beneficiaries are willing to contribute more time rather than less; the evidence 
from the use of mini-publics in public governance is that citizens are willing to 
participate for multiple weekends, and unlike the question of pensions, many of 
these are addressing policy questions which will not so directly affect participants. 
In this sense, both the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly are very 
practical, highly feasible ways of integrating beneficiary voice into the governance 
of each of these pension schemes.  
Does the use of digital technologies help enhance the feasibility of voice? The 
evidence is mixed on the efficiency benefits of digital forms of engagement. Some 
see the digital sphere as offering efficiency benefits as the costs of project 
managing a face-to-face event are reduced. Achieving these efficiencies and 
benefits, whilst still realising the wider qualities in the conceptual framework, 
requires a close attention to the implications of digital technologies. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, digital technologies do not offer a simple answer to the 
challenges of realising voice. While the thoughtful design of digital platforms for 
public engagement can address some of these, they cannot resolve many 
democratic concerns (King, 2018). 
Concluding comments 
In this chapter I explore the promise and challenge of voice for the context of 
pension schemes and sustainable investing. By interweaving empirical findings 
and theoretical discussions, this chapter presents an in-depth elaboration of the 
value, and potential, of these models for the pensions context. 
One of the most revealing – and perhaps surprising – conclusions to emerge from 
this analysis is that pension schemes offer, in some respects, a particularly fertile 
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environment for forms of voice compared to examples of public governance. As 
member organisations, pension schemes offer a setting which is conducive to 
voice, given that members of an organisation are more ‘invested’ in the 
organisation and therefore arguably have a strong incentive to participate. As 
organisations with a fiduciary relationship to beneficiaries, they are likely to take 
the outcomes of models of voice seriously, even if these models only have an 
advisory or consultative role. And transparency to beneficiaries is arguably more 
easily achieved here than in public governance, which involves communications 
with a much ‘harder to reach’ general public. In fact, both the Member Council 
and the Delegate Assembly reveal how pension schemes are well placed to 
develop enhanced communication channels which, viewed through the systemic 
lens, can realise forms of iterative preference formation through ‘recursive 
representation’ (Mansbridge, 2017). 
The comparison of the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly models 
identifies how their design and practice shape the realisation of voice. This analysis 
largely centres around the contrast between the in-depth, more frequent, smaller 
model of the Member Council and the diverse, less frequent, larger scale model of 
the Delegate Assembly. While these two models realise a number of the qualities 
of voice in slightly different ways, they each have their strengths: the former 
model is particular adept at realising deliberative communication and influence; 
the latter at realising diverse articulations of value. 
In both cases voice is contingent on wider structural and contextual conditions. 
These create perennial challenges, particularly in the realisation of the qualities of 
inclusiveness and deliberative communication. Indeed, I argue that many of the 
challenges faced by institutionalised voice in pension schemes are also faced by 
forms of public engagement in public governance. While there was early 
enthusiasm on the democratising potential of digital technology and the role of 
‘civic tech’ to mitigate these challenges, this optimism has not been borne out by 
the current research where the findings are largely mixed on its value for 
addressing the challenges of public deliberation and engagement. 
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Given this discussion, how should the potential of the Member Council and the 
Delegate Assembly, and the challenges they face, be viewed? By drawing on the 
approaches and techniques used to engage citizens in public governance – 
particularly those developed for mini-publics – I argue that the structural and 
contextual challenges which inhibit the effective realisation of voice can be 
mitigated to some degree. Indeed, it is possible to imagine how both these models 
could be enhanced further by adopting the tried and tested procedures from 
innovations in public governance. In essence, the analysis reveals how the 
Member Council and Delegate Assembly models can be enhanced by seven key 
embellishments. These would involve, first, addressing the inclusiveness of 
recruitment procedures to boost underrepresented groups (for example through 
targeted communications and recruitment procedures, stratified random 
sampling, or honorariums). Second, by involving facilitators in the moderation of 
discussions, whether these take place among smaller settings such as the Member 
Council or larger settings such as the Delegate Assembly. Third, by reconsidering 
how the design of voice can effectively address asymmetries in knowledge and 
values, by taking inspiration from other models which integrate diverse forms of 
expert knowledge with lay knowledge. Fourth, by building on the relative ease of 
communications in a pension scheme and enhancing this to not only improve 
transparency of the model itself, but also the quality of voice outside the model. 
Fifth, by ensuring influence on decision-making and ensuring clarity and 
communication of this influence to beneficiaries. Sixth, by ensuring participants 
have the opportunity to articulate fully the value they want from their pension 
scheme. And seventh, by ensuring models of voice are feasible for the scheme’s 
size and to encourage participation. Taken together, these embellishments 
identify how the promise of these two forms of voice can be more fully fulfilled, 




This research began with a contemporary paradox: beneficiaries’ occupational 
pension contributions, as invested through their pension schemes, form 
significant financial flows. However, almost all beneficiaries are disengaged from 
the governance decisions determining these flows. Moreover, if beneficiaries are 
dissatisfied with the performance of their pension scheme, either in monetary 
terms or in its broader social impact, opportunities to exit are absent or limited in 
pensions systems with (quasi-)mandatory systems (Ebbinghaus, 2011), where the 
market impulse is stifled. This thesis offers a new perspective on how to 
understand and respond to this paradox. Drawing upon Hirschman’s Exit, Voice 
and Loyalty (1970), I argue that in the face of either absent or limited opportunities 
for exit, institutional models which seek to enhance beneficiary voice should be 
considered. In particular, voice has the potential to bring benefits to pension 
scheme governance which, given the recent turn to sustainable investing, 
addresses the complexity of governing schemes in the best interests of 
beneficiaries. Forms of voice provide a forum through which beneficiaries can 
articulate the value they want from their pension – including their perspectives 
towards sustainability. 
Hirschman (1970), argued that in the face of declining organisational performance, 
individuals (consumers, citizens, members, beneficiaries) had three choices: leave 
the organisation (exit), complain (voice) or remain with the hope of improvement 
(loyalty). Hirschman describes voice as: 
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An attempt at all to change the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm 
from which one buys or of the organization to which one belongs. Voice is 
here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, 
an objectionable state of affairs. (1970: 30)  
This thesis takes Hirschman’s definition of voice as its starting point. Like 
Hirschman, I characterise voice as an attempt to change policies that result in 
dissatisfaction. But while Hirschman sees the only opportunities for voice as those 
initiated by publics (petitions, consumer advocacy groups, etc.), I examine forms 
of voice established and institutionalised by pension schemes to engage more 
closely with their beneficiaries.  
To fully understand the implications of Hirschman’s theorising on voice for pension 
schemes, this thesis starts with a portrait of pension scheme governance, including 
an overview of its historical, legal, and organisational context. I examine the 
specific conditions present in mature, multi-pillar pensions systems (the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) operating on a (quasi-)mandatory basis. 
Pension schemes have fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of beneficiaries. 
Some may argue that through the election of employee representatives as board 
members, a form of voice – reflective of trusteeship or its equivalent – already 
exists. However, the fiduciary duties that define board responsibilities inevitably 
create a form of decision making which is isolated from beneficiaries’ preferences. 
For fiduciary duties to be met, it is not necessary for board decision making to be 
close to – to engage with – beneficiaries. It is sufficient for fiduciaries to act in the 
best interests of beneficiaries, based on their own understanding. In this legal 
context, voice is present but in a weak and highly diminished form. Indeed, the 
isolation of board decision making from beneficiaries entrenches a principal-agent 
relationship, along with its associated risks (Clark and Urwin, 2008). 
The growing trend among pension schemes to invest sustainably adds further 
complexity. On matters where the materiality of sustainability concerns is clear, 
the course of action is straight forward. But sustainability issues should not be 
over-simplified. Sustainable investing may challenge the assumption that 
214 
 
monetary value, as captured by the risk-adjusted return, is the best way to achieve 
the value beneficiaries seek from their pension. Faced with these complex 
considerations, this thesis takes Hirschman’s suggestion of voice as an alternative 
to exit seriously. I draw upon influential democratic (deliberative and participatory 
democracy) and strategic management (stakeholder) theories that theorise 
aspects of public engagement in governance. Distilling their normative concerns 
into an integrative conceptual framework of voice, I develop a conceptual guide 
for analysing forms of voice according to the following seven qualities: (a) inclusive 
engagement; (b) deliberative communication; (c) informed engagement; (d) 
transparency; (e) influence; (f) articulating value; and (g) feasibility. 
Some might argue that enhanced forms of voice are infeasible in pension schemes 
and on matters of sustainable investing. In the second part of this thesis, I address 
this critique by turning to governance innovations which strengthen beneficiary 
voice. The practice of voice in pensions schemes is ahead of theory in this respect, 
with innovations already existing among sustainability orientated schemes. By 
empirically examining real-life examples of voice, and assessing these according to 
the conceptual framework, the characteristics of voice are revealed, and its 
capacity for understanding preferences for sustainable investing is explored. Two 
case studies are examined, with each representing different models of beneficiary 
engagement – the Member Council (the Netherlands) and the Delegate Assembly 
(Switzerland). Both models are in sustainability-focused schemes situated in 
mature, multi-pillar pensions systems (Ebbinghaus, 2011), where beneficiaries 
have restricted or no opportunities to exit.  
The analysis of these two case studies is premised on a conceptualisation of 
governance as a practice (Schatzki, 2014), and that there is value in understanding 
social actors’ interpretations of this practice (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2014). 
The two qualitative case studies draw on documentary evidence and qualitative 
interviews, and explore the practice of the Member Council and the Delegate 
Assembly. Specifically, they attend to the ways in which, and extent to which, the 
qualities of voice in the conceptual framework are realised. 
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The Member Council  
The Member Council is a model that illustrates the potential, as well as the 
barriers, to expanding beneficiary involvement in pension scheme governance. 
This model, located in a sustainability-orientated pensions organisation in the 
Netherlands, is composed of 45 participants: 15 of whom are beneficiary 
participants or ‘free members’, 15 are union participants and 15 are employer 
participants. The model has both statutory and advisory responsibilities and 
although it is described as the highest governing body, it performs only an advisory 
function on sustainability. It is a small-scale model, meeting on a frequent basis, 
with participants taking part for a four-year term. While there is significant 
commitment to beneficiary involvement among the executives and beneficiaries 
interviewed, realising the conditions for each of the qualities of voice is, however, 
challenging and achieved with varying degrees of success. 
The Member Council is particularly strong at realising the conditions of four 
qualities from the conceptual framework: deliberative communication, informed 
engagement, articulating value and feasibility. Calling themselves ‘free members’, 
there is a sense that beneficiaries have the opportunity to express their 
perspectives in the Council – reflecting a form of deliberative communication – 
and that the conditions for constructive decision making are created, realising a 
form of inclusive engagement. The Member Council reveals the pervasive 
knowledge asymmetries in technical and bureaucratic matters, and in 
perspectives and values on sustainability. The Council alleviates these, to some 
degree, by providing information, opportunities for development and through 
beneficiaries’ long-standing (four year) involvement which will cultivate learning 
over time. On value, the Member Council illustrates how models of beneficiary 
engagement can be used to elicit beneficiaries’ expectations of the value they 
want from their pension scheme. The ‘valuable future’ strategy, and the Member 
Council’s involvement in this, exemplifies this approach. There is a sense that the 
involvement of beneficiaries in Council meetings has brought a greater diversity 
of perspectives into strategic discussions, which has informed notions of ‘value’. 
The Member Council therefore illustrates how beneficiary perspectives and values 
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on sustainability can be viewed as a resource rather than an obstacle to decision 
making. Finally, the Council appears a feasible model of beneficiary engagement. 
While it requires resources and commitment from all involved, these are not so 
onerous that it becomes impractical. 
The qualities of transparency and influence are achieved in this model with mixed 
success. Although there are varied communications with beneficiaries, realising 
transparency of the Member Council remains a challenge, with a lack of awareness 
among beneficiaries at large. This may be reflective of the complexity of the 
communications task, rather the lack of communications per se. Influence is 
essential to voice, but the task of tracking influence is complex. The Member 
Council has statutory responsibilities, but it is in its advisory role, as an ‘internal 
client’, that its influence is more visible. In particular, the involvement of Council 
members in shaping the ‘valuable future’ strategy, the impact investing strategy 
and in devising new financial products illustrate the ways in which influence has 
been realised. On sustainable investing, its influence has been more diffuse and 
harder to identify. 
Relative to the other qualities, inclusive engagement is least realised in the 
Member Council. Although organisational, regional and demographic 
characteristics are used to guide the selection process of beneficiaries, there is an 
acknowledgement that participation among older and female beneficiaries is 
limited, and inclusiveness needs to be better addressed. Wider considerations of 
ethnicity and social class could also be integrated into the selection procedure. 
While an increase in the number of ‘free members’ on the Council could 
potentially enhance inclusiveness, the Member Council’s experience illustrates 
the difficulties of achieving this.  
The Delegate Assembly 
The Delegate Assembly is a model that operates in two sustainability-orientated 
multi-employer pension schemes in Switzerland. Like the Member Council, the 
Assembly reveals the ways in which voice can be enhanced in pension schemes, 
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along with the constraints that limit its potential. The Assembly has limited 
statutory responsibilities, along with a consultative function on wider topics, 
including sustainability. It is a large-scale event with 100-600 beneficiaries 
attending on an annual basis. Along with the formal voting procedures, a Q&A 
procedure gives beneficiaries the opportunity to put questions to executives and 
board members. While both schemes were founded with a strong commitment to 
engaging beneficiaries in decision making and the Assembly has many strengths, 
the model reveals the difficulties of realising voice in pension schemes. 
Guided by the qualities of the conceptual framework, I identify that the Delegate 
Assembly is particularly effective at realising transparency and feasibility. The 
simplicity of the Assembly concept, along with the extensive documentation 
provided on the schemes’ website fosters a high degree of transparency. The 
limited resources required from the schemes for the organisation of the Assembly, 
as well as from beneficiaries in their participation, make the model highly feasible 
and suitable for pension schemes with lean administrations. 
In terms of realising informed engagement and influence, the model has mixed 
success. The Q&A format limits the depth of the discussions that beneficiaries 
participate in, prompting executives on one scheme to open up parallel 
communication channels outside the Assembly to understand beneficiaries’ 
perspectives better. Tracing the influence of public engagement on decision 
making is always complex. In terms of the statutory responsibilities of the 
Assembly, the evidence suggests it tends to approve executive or board 
recommendations, indicating either a very limited influence, or perhaps also, that 
beneficiaries’ preferences are considered prior, as a form of ‘anticipatory 
internalisation’ (Goodin, 2003). In its consultative functions there is a small 
amount of evidence that beneficiaries’ questions in the Q&A have impacted upon 
investment strategies, but also evidence that the overall tone of the Assembly is 
defined more by acquiescence rather than engaged debate – raising the question 
of whether beneficiaries even have the expectation of influence. In essence, the 
narrowness of the Q&A format, combined with the limited participation, serves to 
create, at best, a very thin form of influence from the Assembly. 
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Inclusive engagement and deliberative communication are more weakly realised 
qualities. Given that the selection of delegates takes place at the member 
organisations, there is little oversight of who is participating, and whether they are 
representative of beneficiaries in socio-economic terms. The evidence suggests 
there is limited demand to take part and the same faces are present each year. 
Furthermore, the capacity of the model to realise in-depth forms of deliberative 
communication is constrained by the tendency for opinionated delegates to 
participate more prominently than those with less well developed, or strongly 
held, perspectives. Finally, the limitations of the model for realising deliberative 
communication have knock-on effect on the model’s capacity to realise in-depth 
articulations of value. Articulations of value are constrained by the narrowness of 
the Q&A format which is weak at eliciting communicative exchanges on value, 
justifications of these understandings of value, and the ways in which these 
differing understandings are considered and prioritised. 
The promise and challenge of voice 
Although I take the ambitions of voice seriously in this thesis, I do not take a 
polemical stance that ignores the structural and contextual challenges to realising 
its promise. In the case analysis of the Member Council and the Delegate 
Assembly, summarised above, I draw out the locally specific conditions that 
enhance or encroach upon the realisation of voice, and its qualities. This approach 
runs consistently through the case studies and the final chapter. In the latter, the 
promise and challenge of voice is discussed not only in relation to the case study 
findings, but also in relation to wider governance innovations. Comparisons 
between the case study findings and broader findings reveal the pervasive 
problems and challenges to the realisation of institutionalised voice, along with 
the techniques and approaches developed in public governance to mitigate these.  
The findings from both the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly cases 
highlight how, even when there is a commitment to realising inclusive forms of 
voice, realising this in practice is challenging. This is not unique to this setting. The 
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knowledge built up on political and civic participation identifies the persistent 
challenges to realising inclusion in the engagement of publics. One solution is to 
learn from the experiences of public engagement models and adapt recruitment 
procedures, for example through the use of stratified random sampling in 
recruitment which is widely used in citizens juries, consensus conferences and 
citizens assemblies (Setälä and Smtih, 2018). Targeted recruitment is another 
alternative technique which is used to identify individuals with the right mixture 
of knowledge and skills and individual characteristics. Additionally, honorariums 
serve as financial and symbolic acknowledgement of the time and effort 
participants invest. Such techniques cannot mitigate all the barriers to 
inclusiveness, but they have been used with success.  
The Member Council and the Delegate Assembly both illustrate how the design 
and practice of voice shapes the realisation of deliberative communication. By 
examining and comparing these models, the intimacy of the Member Council 
appears to realise deliberative communication better than the large-scale ‘two 
minutes at the microphone’ (Lee, 2019: 10) model of the Delegate Assembly. But 
wider theorising and evidence suggest that deliberative communication can be 
difficult to achieve even in small-scale settings. The lessons from public 
governance show that deliberative communication is enhanced when 
independent, skilled, facilitators help create the conditions conducive to 
deliberation. For this to be successful, impartiality is central, along with a 
sensitivity towards the varied expressions of knowledge and their manifestation 
in forms of challenge, conflict and collaboration (Escobar, 2019). 
Both the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly operate in environments 
with significant knowledge asymmetries on technical and bureaucratic matters, 
balanced in favour of the executives. Sustainable investing adds further 
complexity by creating knowledge asymmetries on beneficiaries’ values towards 
sustainability, balanced in the opposite direction. Unsurprisingly, the way in which 
the Member Council and the Delegate Assembly realise informed engagement 
mirror their realisation of deliberative communication. Examination and 
comparison of the two indicates that the smaller scale of the Member Council 
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appears to be stronger at informing participants and realising knowledgeable 
judgements. By interweaving expertise with lay public knowledge, models 
developed to engage publics in science and technology questions, such as 
consensus conferences (Joss, 1998), identify how knowledge asymmetries can be 
better handled. These models have facilitated mutual learning across the 
expert/public divide and the same principles have been applied to policy questions 
at regional and local levels of governance. 
The Member Council and the Delegate Assembly models exhibit varying degrees 
of transparency. In the Member Council model, a fairly comprehensive 
communication strategy is in place but, reflecting the widespread knowledge 
asymmetries, the model remains distant and complex for beneficiaries to 
understand. The Delegate Assembly takes a more traditional approach to 
communications, and this goes some way to achieving a degree of transparency; 
arguably helped by its long-standing central position in the scheme’s governance 
structure and the simplicity of the model. The wider literature identifies the 
importance of transparency, particularly for models when participants are not 
elected by a constituency (e.g. as in the Delegate Assembly) (Parkinson, 2006) or 
when the epistemological ties between participants and the wider public are 
weakened through participant learning (e.g. as in the Member Council) (Smith, 
2009). However, given that pension schemes need only be transparent to their 
beneficiaries – their members – and not to a wider diffuse public or citizenry, they 
are, in fact, well placed to realise transparency of their models of voice. They stand 
in a better position than public authorities using voice to address public 
governance questions. With this in mind, wider beneficiary engagement with the 
Member Council through the ‘investorship’ process, and the use of additional 
meetings alongside the Delegate Assembly model are both illustrative of the 
innovative ways pension schemes can ensure not only transparency is realised, but 
also wider forms or ‘recursive communication’ (Mansbridge, 2017) outside of the 
model itself.  
If voice is to offer a realistic alternative to exit, influence must be present. Given 
that influence may not always be reflected in obvious changes of policy or 
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strategy, but rather forms of anticipatory internalisation (Goodin, 2003) or small-
scale incremental impacts over an extended period of time, identifying influence 
is complex. The Member Council and the Delegate Assembly both have some 
statutory responsibilities, for example over the election or selection of board 
members or the choice of accountants – on these matters beneficiaries in both 
models largely follow the recommendations of the executive. Within their 
consultative remit the evidence of influence is mixed. In the Member Council there 
is some evidence of influence over strategy, areas of impact investing and product 
development, while in the Delegate Assembly influence is more directed to 
specific investment choices, although the model makes influence both difficult to 
realise, and for beneficiaries to observe. These two models, and their comparison, 
illustrate, first, how the design and practice of voice determines its influence. 
Second, they highlight the value of introducing a review procedure into forms of 
voice, enabling beneficiaries to judge for themselves if sufficient influence has 
been realised. And finally, they illustrate how the pension scheme setting, a legal 
context shaped by fiduciary duties to beneficiaries, provides favourable conditions 
for realising influence. 
One of the aims of institutionalising voice in a pensions setting is to elicit 
beneficiaries’ perspectives on the value they want from their pension. Value will 
be expressed through beneficiaries’ varied needs, goals, expectations and 
aspirations for their pension and retirement. For pension schemes facing the 
dilemma of sustainable investing, understanding these as articulations of value 
provides insightful information to inform governance and management decision 
making. The Member Council and the Delegate Assembly both provide forums for 
articulating value. The former manages to realise this in a more in-depth way, as 
illustrated by Council members contribution to the ‘valuable future’ strategy. 
Whilst the Assembly cannot realise in-depth considerations, its size enables it to 
elicit a diverse range of articulations of value. The two cases demonstrate how 
voice can stimulate discussions of value, understood with reference to not only 
economic, but also wider considerations.  
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Finally, the feasibility of institutionalising voice is an important consideration. The 
consideration of voice inevitably, eventually involves the weighing up of practical 
concerns alongside the proposed benefits for individuals and organisations. With 
this in mind, it is worth highlighting that the Member Council and the Delegate 
Assembly are both feasible forms of voice, which place limited burdens on 
organisers and participants. The evidence from the application of mini-publics in 
public governance show that members of the public are willing to give up a 
significant amount of time to participate in addressing policy questions (for 
example, many require participation over a full weekend, or longer). The models 
are designed to balance scale with frequency: the smaller-scale Member Council 
meets frequently throughout the year; the larger-scale Delegate Assembly meets 
annually. Both require investments of time and effort, but neither model appears 
to be onerous and unpractical. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that both were 
designed, right from the start, to fit within their own institutional context.  
To summarise, this thesis has examined institutionalised voice as a governance 
innovation for sustainable investing in pension schemes – and explored its promise 
and challenges. As I argue in chapter two, underneath the talk, strategies and 
trends of sustainable investing lie complex questions which pension schemes will 
need to address if they are to govern with legitimacy. By examining the Member 
Council and the Delegate Assembly, this thesis highlights how voice can be used 
to address the questions raised by sustainability, through its institutionalisation in 
pension scheme governance.  
Are the two cases of innovation included in this thesis simply fascinating 
curiosities, or do they offer wider lessons for other pension schemes operating 
with diverse governance arrangements, and situated in different pensions 
systems? The findings presented in this thesis indicate that while these forms of 
voice have indeed developed within very specific circumstances, notably in 
(quasi-)mandatory pensions systems, they could be easily replicated elsewhere. In 
chapter eight, I discussed the commonalities to voice, whether institutionalised in 
a pension or in a public management setting. If such commonality exists across 
223 
 
these two sectors, it is not hard to imagine that the practice of voice can be 
transferred with ease across pension systems and across schemes. 
The Member Council and Delegate Assembly models are examples of innovations 
that have developed in schemes that are intrinsically motivated to address 
sustainability, and to enhance beneficiary engagement. As such, they represent 
exemplars of innovation, rather than examples of standard practice. For schemes 
that are keen to be at the forefront of governance trends, this thesis therefore 
provides a rich source of knowledge. But it also raises the question of how to 
better understand the characteristics and conditions of schemes that are less 
intrinsically motivated to institutionalising voice. Future areas of research should 
address the varied barriers – for example, legal and regulatory barriers, the 
structural barriers found within the pensions industry, as well as the cultures of 
professional practice – which may constrain the adoption of forms of beneficiary 
voice. 
This thesis not only has implications for developing the practice of pension scheme 
governance, but also raises further theoretical questions at the intersection 
between sustainability and governance. Given the shift towards sustainability, not 
only among pension schemes but among organisations more widely, it develops 
an argument that should be of wide interest. Grounded in the work of democratic, 
stakeholder and public governance scholars, this thesis rests on the argument that 
forms of beneficiary voice can help inform decision-making on the complex 
questions which sustainability raises. The examples of the Member Council and 
the Delegate Assembly provide an initial empirical basis for these claims. 
Understanding in greater detail the ways in which sustainability-orientated 
interests and preferences can be cultivated in pension schemes requires further 
research. This inevitably requires an attention to not only the formal structures of 
the institutional design of voice, but also to their practices and processes. By 
addressing these questions, pension scheme governance can be crafted in the 










Appendix 1: Details on Participation 
Forschung Teilnehmen/Research Participation Details 
 
Deutsch  
• Alle Daten werden anonymisiert und es wird sichergestellt, dass kein Teilnehmer 
und keine Organisation in den Daten und jeglichen Veröffentlichungen 
identifizierbar ist. Daten werden nach der Richtlinien des UK Data Protection Act 
1998 aufbewahrt. 
• Jegwegliche sensiblen kommerziellen Informationen werden vertraulich 
behandelt. 
• Im Interview wird es um ‘Corporate Governance’ Prozessen gehen. Es wird in 
einem offenen, semi-strukturierten Dialog geführt. Es steht Ihnen frei, welche 
Fragen Sie beantworten wollen. 
• Mit Ihrer Einwilligung würde ich gerne das Interview für die später Analyse 
aufnehmen. Die Abschrift wird ihn zugestellt, um Ihnen die Möglichkeit zu 
Klarstellungen oder Änderung zu geben. 
• Als Studentin Universität Westminster folgt dieses Forschungsprojekt den 
ethische Richtlinien der Universität sowie den Richtlinien der UK Social Research 
Association. 
• Sie können sich jederzeit ohne Angabe von Gründen aus dem Forschungsprojekt 
zurückziehen. Sie haben das Recht, sich  über die Forschung zu beschweren. Alle 
Fragen oder Beschwerden richten Sie bitte an mich oder meine Doktorväter 




• The interview is voluntary.  
• All data will be anonymised and no individuals or organisations will be identifiable 
from any publications arising from it. All data will be stored securely according to 
the Data Protection Act 1998. 
• Commercially sensitive information will be treated with confidentiality. 
• The interview will involve questions around corporate governance processes and 
practices. It will be semi-structured, taking the form of a conversation. You are 
able to decline answering particular questions, if you wish to. 
• Ideally, I would like to make an audio recording to help with the later analysis of 
the interviews. The transcript of the recording will then be sent to you afterwards, 
providing you with the opportunity to make clarifications or changes. 
• As a student at the University of Westminster the research project is guided by 
the University’s ethical guidelines, as well as the guidelines of the Social Research 
Association. 
• You are able to withdraw from the research at any time and also have also the 
right to make a complaint about the research if you wish. Any queries or 
complaints can be directed to myself and my supervisors, Professor Graham 




Appendix 2: Interview Guide 
Question Goal 
Introduction (of myself, the project) 
The interview format 
Permission to record 
 
Introduction  
1. What does sustainable investing mean to you at 
‘X’ (pension scheme)? 
 
Probe: long-term/sustainable? Ethical? Environmental? 
Social? Governance? Material impact on performance? 
 
Probe: And how is sustainable investing (SI) different to 
other approaches to investing? 
 




Probe used to pull out 
further key characteristics  
 
2. How do you govern your sustainable investing? 
 
Probe: which bodies are responsible for making 
governance decisions? (main bodies and sub-bodies) 
  
Who is involved in these?  
- How are they 
nominated/elected/selected/chosen?  
- By whom? 
 
What external professionals are involved? 
What is their role? 
How are they chosen? 
How is their performance governed? 
 
Discuss governance in the 
round 
3. Who is your sustainable investing communicated 
to? 
 
Members/beneficiaries? Which members/beneficiaries? 
(retirees, active employees, non-employed members and 
their spouses)  
 
Stakeholders? Which ones? e.g. Government? Professional 
bodies? Suppliers? Investee companies? Media outlets? 
 






Question (continued) Goal 
For each (members and stakeholders) 
Probe: 
What is communicated? 
- Your principles/definitions of SI?  
- Governance arrangements of SI? 
- Investments and tools used in SI e.g. 
strategic asset allocation, tools such as 
best in class, screening or shareholder 
engagement. 
- Management of investment (e.g. 
selection of asset managers and other 
service providers)? 
- Performance information? Against which 
benchmarks if any? 
- Other? 
 
Why do you communicate this?  
 
What are the challenges of communicating? 
 
What is the impact of communicating these? 
 
 
Part A: Members/beneficiaries 
 
1. How does X pension scheme see the role of its 
members/beneficiaries in its governance? 
 




3. And what specific ways are there for members to 
participate in your sustainable investing 
strategy?...Tell me about these… 
 
Part B: Stakeholders 
 
1. How does X pension scheme approach the 
involvement of stakeholders in its governance? 
 





3. And what specific ways are there for stakeholders 
to participate in your sustainable investing 




perceptions of  
beneficiaries and 
other stakeholders, 





Question (continued) Goal 




What is the aim of this procedure? Informing? 
Discussion/Deliberation? Decision-making? Other? 
Frequency  
How often does it take place? (Regular or ad hoc?) 
 
Inclusiveness 
- Who is entitled to take part?  
- Who is selected (and how?) 
- Who actually takes part, in the main?  
- What type of involvement do they have? Why? 
 
Informed engagement/Deliberative Communication 
- What information is provided to inform 
discussions (beforehand, during?) 
- Where does the information come from? (From 
whom? From what sources?) 
- To what extent are differing opinions included? 
How? Why? Why not? 
- What is the response/reaction? 
Probe: Are these differing professional opinions? Are 
these differing member/stakeholder opinions? 
 
Influence 
- What is the role of participants?  
- What types of issues do participants discuss? 
(e.g. understandings of sustainable investing, 
investment allocation (and tools), investment 
management, performance) 
- What issues do you think participants are capable 
of engaging with? 
- Are their views taken into account in decision-
making?  
- How do they feed into decision making?  
- How? Why? By whom? 
- What impact - if any - does this have? 
(examples…) 
- Are there specific members of staff with 
responsibility for engagement? 
 
Transparency 
- How is the procedure made clear to those 
participating?  
















































Question (continued) Goal 
Governance linkages 
- Is this (procedure) linked to other governance 
bodies? Which?  
Probe: And how? Through decision-making processes? 
Through personnel participating in both? Other? 
 
Feasibility/efficiency 
- To what extent do resource constraints have an 
impact on this procedure? 
- Is efficiency a concern? 
- Are people interested in being involved?  
- Is it difficult to engage individuals? 
- Why, why not? 
 
Transferability/Feasibility 
- To what extent to you think it is possible for 
other pension schemes to take a similar 
approach? 
- Why, why not? 
- What changes would need to take place for other 
pension schemes to do this? 
Probe: Changes in the pension schemes? Changes in the 
market? Changes in regulation? 
 
Self-evaluation  
What are the benefits (of this participatory procedure)? 
And the drawbacks? 
What are the challenges? 
 Probe: challenges to participating successfully, 
challenges that result from the participation? 
And what is the impact? 
Why do other pension schemes not do this? 
If they are not doing this, what are they not realising? 
 
Regulation 
What changes in regulation would help you improve 
participation in sustainable investing?  





Details on research goals and timetable 
Are further documents available about the pension 
scheme? 
Would it be possible to follow up with interviewee any 
further questions? 
What other pension schemes globally are engaging with 
others on sustainable investing? 
Discussion of whether other interviews are possible in 
the organisation. 
Summing up  
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Appendix 3: Nvivo Codes 
Higher Level 1 Code Level 2 NVivo Code (examples) 
Sustainability and 
sustainable investing 
‘Growth in competition in sustainable investing’, ‘What is responsible investing’, ‘What is sustainable investing’, 
History of SI/RI’  
Origins and history of voice ‘History of org and beneficiary engagement’,  
Governance arrangements 
and role 
‘Organisational structure’, ‘Beneficiary Engagement Model’, ‘Voice Mechanisms’, ‘Representation: Beneficiary 
Engagement Role’; ‘Role of leadership’, ‘Scheme characteristics’, ‘Challenge of fulfilling Council role’ 
Inclusive Engagement ‘Unequal participation’, ‘Beneficiaries lack of interest’, ‘Interest among beneficiaries’ 
Deliberative communication ‘Values of Beneficiaries’, ‘Expressing values’, ‘Plural Perspectives’, ‘Democratic communication’, ‘Bringing the raw 
reality into the organisation’, ‘Concerns of wider membership’, ‘Disagreements/conflict’ 
Informed Engagement 
 
‘Concerns of wider membership’, ‘Issues raised at Beneficiary Engagement Model, ‘Knowledge and Knowledge 
imbalances’, ‘Achieving member interests’, 
Transparency  ‘Transparency’, ‘Beneficiary surprise’, ‘Engaging with wider membership’, ‘Online communication of investments’, 
‘Online community-driven communications’, ‘Information flow’ 
Influence ‘Listening to beneficiaries’, ‘Beneficiary Bord member influence on SI strategy’, ‘Responsiveness’, ‘Learning’, ‘Use of 
complaints’ 
Articulating value ‘Organising sustainability’, ‘Value concept’, ‘What informs SI’; ‘Why SI’, ‘Sustainable Value’, ‘Bringing in complexity’, 
‘Beneficiary communication on sustainable investing’, ‘Generating new ideas’, ‘Institutional benefits of voice’, 
‘Business model requires it’, ‘Learning’, ‘Sense of responsibility towards beneficiaries’, ‘Idea generation for product 
development’ 




‘Challenge of fulfilling Beneficiary Engagement Model’, ‘Challenge to the organisation’, ‘Challenges limiting success’, 
‘Limitations of Beneficiary role’, ‘Beneficiaries lack of interest’, ‘Disagreements/conflict’, ‘Bringing in complexity’, 
‘Knowledge and knowledge imbalances’, ‘Unequal participation’ 
Promise (cross-cutting) 
 
‘Success’, ‘Improving Voice – member ideas’, ‘Value concept’ 
‘Bringing the raw reality into the organisation’, ‘Business model requires it’, ‘Democratic benefits of communication’, 
‘Generating new ideas’, ‘Institutional benefits of voice’, ‘Learning’, ‘Sense of responsibility towards beneficiaries’, 
‘Idea generation for product development’; ‘Product development’, ‘Voice as an idea of its time’, ‘Why involve 
members’, ‘Why voice’ 
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Appendix 5: Interviewees 
 
Interviewee Age  Gender Position Pension 
scheme  
(case study) 
A 46-55 F Executive  PGGM 
(Member 
Council) 
B 46-55 M Executive  PGGM 
(Member 
Council) 

























H 46-55 M Executive  Abendrot 
(Delegate 
Assembly) 
I 46-55 M Executive Abendrot 
(Delegate 
Assembly) 
J 36-45 F Executive Nest (Delegate 
Assembly) 
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